


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
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
Arctic Storm

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Mail orders to P.O. Box 4017, San Luis Obispo, CA 93403. Credit card orders may be made by phone (1-800-488-2249), foreign residents use (805/546-9596) or fax (805/546-0570).

Command Magazine (ISSN 10595651) is published bimonthly for \$17.95 per year by XTR Corporation, 3547-D South Higuera, San Luis Obispo, CA 93401. Second class postage is prepaid at San Luis Obispo, CA 93401.

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Command Magazine, P.O. Box 4017, San Luis Obispo, CA 93403.

SUBSCRIBERS: Let us know any change of address as soon as possible. If we receive notice of a change of address less than a week before mailing, we cannot guarantee your issue will be sent to the new address.

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A Note From the Editor

Your votes for issue no. 20 came in this way, ranked from highest to lowest.

Blood for Oil	7.02
Malta	6.66
Issue 20 Overall	6.61
Cortés	6.47
Short Rounds.....	6.44
Sword of Allah.....	5.86
Issue 20 Cover Art	5.45

In comparing issue no. 20 with issue no. 19, 26% thought 20 was superior; 36% claimed no. 19 was the better issue; 32% said the two were of about equal worth, and 6% hadn't seen issue no. 19 and so couldn't say.

I was surprised and disappointed "Sword of Allah" didn't get a better reception. Judging from the written feedback, it seems English-speaking military history audiences still aren't much interested in reading about the exploits of a great Arab general — no matter when those exploits took place. (Of course, another way of looking at it may be that the Battle of Yarmuk just wasn't in World War II.)

In this issue, I'd like to especially recommend the material on Yugoslavia during the Second World War. Our broadcast media tend to be at their worst when it comes to providing "deep background" on almost every story they report, and that's been particularly true for the events in the Balkans during the past few years. After you've read our material, your main question about the situation will probably change from "Why has this happened in Yugoslavia?" to "How did Yugoslavia hang together as long as it did?"



Ty Bomba
Editor, *Command Magazine*

SHORT ROUNDS

Movers & Shakers...

The Capture of Riyadh

The modern day Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is very much the creation of one man: Abdul Aziz Ibn Rahman Al-Faisal Al-Sa'ud — known simply as Abdul Aziz in the Middle East, and better known as Ibn Saud in the West. Starting as an exile, he created Saudi Arabia the old fashioned way — he conquered it.

In 1891, the second Saudi dynasty came crashing down when Riyadh fell to their arch enemies, the Al-Rashidis. Driven from their capital, the Al-Sauds fled into the Rub Al-Khali, the vast and forbidding desert called the "Empty Quarter." From there they made their way to Qatar, then to Kuwait, where they came under the protection and patronage of the Emir Mubarak As-Sabah. Among those royal refugees was the 14-year-old son of Abdul Rahman, Abdul Aziz.

In 1901, the Al-Rashidis attacked Kuwait but were driven back, partly due to the Kuwaiti-Saudi forces arrayed against them and partly due to the guns of the British warship *HMS Perseus* in Kuwait harbor. Following that repulse, Abdul Aziz, then in his twenties, asked his father

and Mubarak for permission to attempt to retake Riyadh. Both men readily agreed, and Aziz soon left Kuwait with 40 Bedouin retainers.

Moving by camel and horse, the expedition was armed with a variety of weapons, ranging from swords, daggers and spears to smoothbore, muzzle-loading muskets and Enfield rifles.

Aziz went into the region south of Riyadh where the Bedouin tribes and villagers were friendly to the Saudi cause than those in the north. There he hoped to flesh out his ranks with recruits, but only 20 men joined him.

On 11 November, a messenger arrived from Aziz's father. The Al-Rashidis had somehow been warned of the impending attack on Riyadh, wrote the older man, and were taking steps to thwart it. Surprise had been lost, and he ordered his son to return home rather than continue the now hopeless operation.

But Aziz resisted the recall. Instead, the imposing, 6'4", 200 lb. scion of the Al-Sauds addressed his small band. An opportune moment to strike would still arise, he pro-

mised them, if only they would wait for it. Either due to his passion or personal charisma, or both, the men agreed to follow him back into the Rub Al-Khali, where they then lived undetected until January 1902.

With the apparent disappearance of the threat to Riyadh, the Al-Rashidis relaxed. The coming of Ramadan, the Moslem month of fasting, lulled them further. But as that month drew to a close, Aziz and his men moved stealthily north toward Riyadh, galloping their horses and camels through the darkness.

The night of 15-16 January was *Eid Al-Fitr*, the holiday marking the end of Ramadan. Hoping to take advantage of the cover provided by the festivities, Aziz chose to strike then. In a palm grove outside of Riyadh, he split his force into two groups. Twenty men, led by his brother Mohammed, were left to guard the supplies and mounts, 90 minutes' ride from the capital. Aziz led the remaining 40 into the town.

The men slipped into Riyadh easily, making their way through its streets until they entered the house next to that of the Al-Rashidi governor, a man called Ajan. After binding and gagging the occupants, Aziz, his cousin Abdullah Ibn Jaluwi, and a

half-dozen men, entered the governor's house by standing on one another's shoulders to scale the wall surrounding the residence.

Once inside, they found the governor's wife and sister, but not Ajan himself. The servants said he was in the habit of sleeping in the Mismak fortress, a squat, mud-walled construction across the square from the house. Aziz took some time to think of what to do next, and summoned the rest of his men to join him.

They cut an entrance in the wall between the two houses, and the rest of Aziz's force was thus able to enter the governor's residence unobserved. They waited for dawn, sipping coffee and quietly reciting passages from the Koran. Aziz intended to seize Ajan and make him prisoner when he returned to house in the morning. But the plan had to be rapidly rethought when Ajan left Mismak through its postern gate escorted by ten very heavily-armed bodyguards.

Shouting "God is Great!" Aziz and his men rushed toward Ajan and his party. The guards, surprised, fled back into the fort, abandoning Ajan. With nothing left but his own sword, the governor tried to regain the postern gate unaided. Ibn Jaluwi threw his spear, but missed, and the attackers

closed in on Ajlan, Aziz in the lead.

No coward, Ajlan turned to face Aziz as he charged. Aziz would later recall: "He made at me with his sword, but its edge was not good. I covered my face and shot at him with my gun. I heard the crash of the sword upon the ground and knew that the shot had hit Ajlan, but had not killed him."

Ajlan finally managed to reach the gate, but was tackled there by Aziz. Meanwhile, inside the fort the governor's guards had regained their composure and now reached out to grab their boss's arms and pull him inside to safety. But Aziz grabbed Ajlan's legs and pulled in the opposite direction. Bullets and rocks began to rain back and forth between the fort's defenders and the attackers. Then Ajlan

managed to deliver a kick to the Saudi, who let go, allowing the governor to scramble back inside the fort.

Instantly, however, Ibn Jaluwi pushed past both men and forced his way through the postern gate. Turning around, he threw open the larger entrance. Another short, bitter battle ensued as all the Saudis pushed inside. Ibn Jaluwi killed Ajlan. Half the fort's 40-man garrison were also struck down before the rest surrendered.

Thus was Riyadh reconquered by the Saudis and modern Saudi Arabia born.

— T.W. Daniels

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secret invitations to build prototypes, but Krupp was the first to respond with a two-man vehicle designated the L.K.A. I.

Based closely on the British-built Carden-Lloyd Mark I of the 1920s, the L.K.A. I was armed with two 7.9mm machineguns in a small turret positioned to the right of the hull. The suspension consisted of four large road wheels on each side, with a rear idler that touched the ground. Armor thickness ranged from only eight to 13 millimeters, and was capable of resisting little more than small arms fire.

Since complete secrecy was of the utmost importance, the machine was given the designation *Landwirtschaftlicher Schlepper (LaS)*, or "agricultural tractor."

Though the other invited manufacturers submitted ideas, the Krupp model prevailed. Full-scale production got underway in mid-1934 on a vehicle modified only slightly from Krupp's original prototype. The production model was similar to the L.K.A. I except the wheels were now smaller and leaf-sprung instead of coil-sprung as before. The most obvious change was the

addition of an external beam covering the centers of the rear three wheels and idler.

When the troop-trial stage was reached later in the year, it was discovered the feeble 57hp engine was inadequate to power the six-ton vehicle over difficult terrain. An upgraded 100hp engine was fitted. This necessitated the addition of another 43cm (1'5") to the superstructure and a fifth road wheel.

The need for the disguising name disappeared when rearmament went into the open in 1935. The machines now became known as *Panzerkampfwagen Is* (armored fighting vehicle), or PzKpfw I. The approximately 300 machines with the old 57hp type became the Ausf. A (production model A), and the 100hp models Ausf. B. About 1,500 of the Bs were eventually built.

With the heavier PzKpfw III and IV models still in short supply, over 800 PzKpfw I light tanks filled out the panzer divisions in the 1939 invasion of Poland. Some 523 were still in front line service during the 1940 Belgian, Dutch and French campaigns. A combination of poor Allied anti-tank doc-

Weapons Backdate. . .

The First Panzer of World War II

Even before the Nazis gained a chokehold on German politics in 1932, Heinz Guderian's ideas for a "war of movement" were being heard by receptive ears in Berlin's high places. Guderian's plan, of course, called for massed formations of armor as one of its main ingredients. Guderian, anxious to turn his strategic theory into a reality, had already conducted some training exercises during the summer of 1929, using cars mocked-up to represent tanks. That display had been

enough to convince even the lingering skeptics the time had come to ignore the Versailles Treaty ban on German armor and begin building the real thing.

The first mass-produced German tank began appearing in February 1934. Designed to be inexpensive and simple for fast production, it was to serve as a training vehicle while more powerful vehicles were being developed. Industry competitors — Krupp, MAN, Daimler-Benz, and Rheinmetall — had received



PzKpfw I Ausf. B (Photo-Michael S. Burrier)

trine and superior German blitzkrieg tactics allowed the weak PzKpfw Is to perform beyond their objective capabilities.

Remarkably, even as late as the invasion of the USSR in 1941, some PzKpfw I Ausf. A and B were still in front line service, though relegated to minor tasks. Production was finally phased out during that year.

The little known PzKpfw I Ausf. C, built by Krauss-Maffei and Daimler-Benz in 1939-40, was designed to provide mobile 20mm firepower support to reconnaissance and airborne units. The prototype was the first German

tank with the interleaved wheels that the Panther and Tiger series later utilized. An order for 40 of the vehicles was never filled and the project was abandoned in 1941, giving way to a variant of the PzKpfw II called the Luchs (Lynx), which was in recon service by 1943 and looked remarkably similar to the Ausf. C.

Several other upgrades and variations were also tried over the course of the war. The PzKpfw I *neuer Art verstärk* (new reinforced armor model), for instance, was developed for infantry support in December 1939 as a heavily armored (30-80mm)

panzer with interleaved wheels. A prototype was built in June 1940, but the idea was later dropped.

Other PzKpfw I chassis were converted to engineer vehicles for use in placing explosives on the battlefield. A few of the Ausf. A models were turned into flamethrowers (*Flammpanzer I*) and were used by the Afrikakorps.

In general, though, since the PzKpfw I remained vulnerable no matter how much it was tinkered with, most of the remaining tanks were either up-armored and refitted with larger weapons, equipped with radios to serve as command vehicles, or were

simply sent back to Germany to perform their original intended purpose, training.

—Michael S. Burrier

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I Remember. . .

Desert Storm: Another Woman's Perspective

[Ed's Intro: During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Americans in Saudi Arabia were not only those in the military. Nearly 15,000 US civilians lived in the Eastern and Central Provinces of the Kingdom during that period. One such woman, who lived in Dhahran during the war, recounts her experiences there.]

When I'd complained during the summer of 1990 that life in Saudi Arabia was boring, I didn't expect things to get that interesting that quickly. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait caught everyone by surprise. We stayed glued to our radio, trying to tune in BBC and VOA.

One of the things I learned during Desert Shield was that American soldiers and marines are some of the most decent

people I ever met. We were part of a program that was organized in August to provide the troops with home cooked meals, showers, and the chance to make private telephone calls.

There were also convoys of Americans who drove their four-wheel-drive vehicles up to the "front" (before the shooting started) and set up barbecues for battalions or troops. They estimated by the time the war was over the program had served 170,000 men and women between August and Christmas.

As the final deadline approached, there was a sense of inevitability. It was like waiting for a hurricane to hit — there wasn't anything that was going to stop it. I remem-

ber two headlines in the local English-language papers. One read: "Only God Knows If There Will Be War." The other was even more preparatory: "All Hope Lost, War Only Option," it read.

The next night we were woken up by a phone call from a friend who worked at the airbase. "Desert Shield is now Desert Storm," he told me.

After the phone call, I remember walking outside in the dark — there were clouds that night and you could hear the planes but couldn't see them. They droned on all night — wave after wave. I never knew there were that many warplanes in the world.

When morning came, we all went outside and when the cloud cover lift-

ed you could see them. They flew low over the houses. You could make out the tail markings sometimes, that's how close they were. The next night the SCUDs started coming.

During the first week of the SCUDs, the air raid sirens were next to useless. Our first warning would be the loud "Ka-Boom!" of a Patriot battery firing. Then the kids and I would head for the "Safe Room." Once it was really weird because we got a phone call from the States telling us that a SCUD attack was happening before we knew we were under attack.

Eventually they got things straightened out. What they did was have one of the radio stations stop broadcasting at 9:00 p.m. You'd tune to it, turn the volume all the way up and go to sleep. If anything happened it played loud chords of music and announced: "The danger alert has sounded," in Arabic and English. Then

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you'd wait. If there were not any booms, you'd know the attack was elsewhere, and go back to sleep. If not, or if it was an early evening attack, the kids and I would head for the safe room.

Our safe room consisted of a large, L-shaped storage closet under the stairs. It was big enough for two sleeping bags, and everyone could stand. We equipped it with a few toys, plus emergency provisions and our gas masks.

The boys soon started camping in the safe room, and kept it up for the duration of the war. That way their sleep wasn't disturbed as it had been when we'd brought them down-

stairs each warning. And there were a lot of warnings — any missile aimed south set off everything from Riyadh to the Gulf.

After a night of interrupted sleep, I'd see my husband off to work and eventually get together with my friends around 10:00 a.m. We'd reassure each other that even if the rest of the world thought we were crazy for staying, we were really O.K.

The kids took the war well. Our little one was just a baby and I don't think he ever knew what was going on. It was some kind of game about sleeping under the stairs. The older one was fine, too. He and his friends played sol-

diers in the back yard with their G.I. Joes.

If we had been constantly watching the war on television, apparently the way you people were back in the States, I'm sure it would've been worse than living through it. The media, especially television, had a way of making things seem worse than they really were. The coverage really scared the hell out of our parents in the US. They'd see the missiles and what not, and of course it all looked like doomsday on the screen. Really, it was mostly just noisy.

Life went on more or less normally. I know that sounds crazy, but things

really stayed pretty much the same. I mean, we had dinner at the usual time, went to bed at the regular time, though not in the regular place. Nothing major really changed, though you always half-listened to the radio, or stopped to watch TV if it was on. I still had to shop, take care of the house, fix dinner, and so on. My oldest son went to classes and den meetings.

I guess the things I'll remember most about the war were Charles Jaco freaking out in his gas mask, yelling "Gas! Gas!" And carrying a gas mask around like a fashion accessory.

—Cyndy Tschanz

Movers & Shakers. . .

Of Sterner Stuff

As has been related in previous issues of this magazine, 19th century soldiers and sailors were subjected to medical care that by today's standards bordered on barbarism. The miracle, it has often been said, is that any of them survived the ministrations of their doctors. But, in fact, it may not have been a miracle at all — they may simply have been made of sterner stuff.

For example, Sir Henry Evelyn Wood began his remarkable career as a youth of 17 fighting in the Crimea as a British naval midshipman. Taking a commission in the army, he saw a great deal more active service, eventually rising to the rank of field marshal. He was courageous and competent — but was also the most

sickness- and accident-prone officer in the history of the British army.

Wood started his intriguing string of personal disasters in the Crimea in 1854. While "skylarking" on the *HMS Queen* he fell overboard, but with no apparent harm. Later, while serving with the naval brigade in the assault on the Redan, he was severely wounded in the left arm. The doctor cheerily told him to take a seat and "I'll have your arm off before you know where you are." Wood saved his arm by fleeing, but after it healed he broke it twice more.

Invalidated back to England in 1855, he slipped and fell down a flight of stairs in his barracks. The next year, returning to Turkey as a cavalry officer, he became sick with

typhoid fever, then pneumonia, and finally dropsy. He recovered from them all, and was allowed to rejoin his regiment, which had since been transferred to India. Shortly after arriving there he collapsed from severe sunstroke. Then he fell victim to in-

testinal complaints, indigestion, fever, malaria and acute toothache.

On a bet with another officer he tried to ride a captive giraffe. When he fell off, the beast's hooves cut holes in both his cheeks and made a mash of his nose. He wasn't



Sir Evelyn Wood

even slowed down — he went on to win the Victoria Cross at Sindhara while still suffering from his "face ache."

Back in England again as a major, he fell from a horse and nearly broke his neck. Recovered, he soon broke an ankle in a fall from another horse. Wood was then tormented by "neuralgia of the nerves of the stomach." To treat that his doctor prescribed morphine and inadvertently administered an overdose. Again, Wood recovered.

Later a lieutenant colonel, he collapsed from exhaustion during the Ashanti War. The stretcher he was placed on was accidentally set atop an anthill, whereupon the ailing Wood was immediately

attacked by hundreds of those savage insects. A week later, recovered from his exhaustion and the ant bites, he was hit in the chest with a nail fired from a musket.

Throughout the Gaika War of 1878, he endured severe "neuralgic pain." During the Zulu War of 1879, he suffered from swollen glands and "continuous pains in the eyes, coupled with gastric neuralgia."

During the First Boer War in 1881, Wood was riding in a carriage when it hit an anthill. He was tossed out and struck his back on the head of one of the outside horses. The "irritation set up in the spine was so severe as to make my feet swell to an enormous size," he report-

ed. He also had chronic intestinal complaints that kept him constantly on one medication or another, administered by a variety of doctors. His aide-de-camp complained it was necessary to "carry a chemist shop [pharmacy]" around to treat Wood's many ailments.

In Egypt; during the campaign to relieve Gordon, Wood not only had severe diarrhea, but caught his finger in a folding camp chair. The finger was crushed and its nail had to be removed.

Back in England in 1897, Wood, now a full general, tried to learn to ride a bicycle. In the process he collided, on three different occasions, with hansom cab horses. One bit him severely enough to

put permanent teeth marks on his arm.

During the Second Boer War, Wood, by then serving as adjutant general of the army, was forced to remain in Britain. Still, the relative safety of those isles was not enough to protect him. While riding in a fox hunt his horse threw him, driving the gold crucifix and locket he was wearing on a chain around his neck into his ribs. Once recovered from that, Wood was again assailed by pains in the stomach and began to lose his hearing.

In 1903 he was promoted to field marshal. He held out until 1919, when at the ripe old age of 81 he died quietly in his sleep from natural causes.

— David W. Tschanz

Mysteries Revealed. . .

German-Soviet Peace Talks, 1941-44

The German-Soviet negotiations for a separate peace during World War II were not official talks between high ranking diplomats, but resulted from contacts established at low levels by the secret services of both nations. The first phase of these negotiations took place during the time between the start of the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the Allied Foreign Ministers' Conference held in Moscow in October 1943 (where the Allies agreed to continue the war until final victory).

During this period, German-Soviet peace feelers moved back and forth

between Moscow and Berlin via neutral Stockholm. Edgar Klaus (sometimes spelled "Claus" or "Klauss"), a German agent with contacts in the Soviet embassy in Sweden, was the first to inform his superiors in Germany the Reds were prepared to start talks. Nothing came of this, however, until March 1942, when Field Marshal Keitel, the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, was informed. Still, no official German reaction was forthcoming.

It was the Allied "Torch" landings in North Africa in early November 1942 that strengthened the determination of the

Kremlin to make clear they would like to initiate meaningful peace talks. It seems Stalin had become embittered toward the Western Allies for landing in Africa instead of France. He did not consider the Torch operation to be the second front he had been promised by Churchill and Roosevelt.

On 11 November, Finland's ambassador to Germany informed Berlin word had come to him from the Soviet Stockholm embassy that Moscow was offering a separate Finnish-Soviet peace arrangement. They offered a return to the pre-Winter War borders of 1939. At the same time, however,

the Soviets noted in their message to the Finns such an arrangement would only make sense within the larger context of a German-Soviet settlement. Thus the Reich remained the real target of the Soviet peace feelers. German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop reacted by forbidding the Finns any further contact with the Soviets.

On 14 December, Peter Kleist, the Ministerial Director of Germany's Eastern Ministry (the bureaucracy established to oversee the conquered territories in the east), went to Stockholm and met with Klaus. The agent said Stalin was offering peace on the basis of the German-Soviet borders of late 1939. Again, however, nothing came of this from the German side.

In mid-June 1943, Soviet diplomats began to press for a meeting with a high ranking German offi-

cial. On 18 June, Klaus informed Kleist that Aleksandr M. Aleksandrov, who held a position with the Central Europe Section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, was ready to act as Moscow's official negotiator. This move was still-born, however, when the Swedish press somehow got hold of the offer and began to trumpet the news. The Soviet press agency, TASS, immediately denied everything, and Berlin never reacted at all. Kleist, in fact, was imprisoned for a short time when he returned to Germany from Sweden.

On 4 September 1943, Kleist and Klaus met yet again in Stockholm. This time Kleist came on an order from Ribbentrop to begin talks with Soviet negotiators. Klaus reported that the Soviet's pre-war ambassador to Berlin, Dekanosov, was ready for a meeting in Stockholm. But when Kleist relayed this news to Ribbentrop, the latter reacted by again pulling back and forbidding the meeting — probably on Hitler's insistence.

This marked the end of the first phase of Soviet-German peace feelers. Afterward, because Berlin never reacted in earnest, Moscow threw its efforts into fully and finally arranging for a joint conduct and finish to the war with its Western Allied partners.

The Soviet attempts to start negotiations with Germany in 1941 and 1942 were a direct result of the desperate military situation of the USSR and the still unsolidified nature of the alliance with the western powers. A complete military defeat at the hands of the Germans was not impossible during that

period, and indeed seemed probable at several points. The analogy to the Brest-Litovsk peace of 1918, whereby the Communist state saved itself despite a German peace dictate, cannot be ignored.

The continued Soviet readiness to initiate talks with Germany after the Red Army's victories at Stalingrad and Kursk/Orel can only be explained by the continued and deep disappointment Moscow had toward its Western partners. Stalin was put off several times when he pressed for a second front on the continent, and neither the 1942 Torch landings nor the 1943 Salerno landings went far to satisfy his demands. In fact, during the summer of 1943 the relationship between the West and Moscow reached a low point.

On 4 June, the Western Powers explained they would not launch the second front in France that year. Stalin, whose nation had been carrying the brunt of the war effort for two years, felt betrayed. There was a fear among the Soviets they were being asked to go on bleeding only to further capitalist war aims, and that they might end up getting nothing in return. Further, at that time the Wehrmacht still occupied a large part of the European Soviet Union, and Stalin could not have known how long it would take to win it all back.

The situation had fundamentally altered, however, when in March 1944, Kleist was again sent to Stockholm to arrange for a meeting with Soviet officials. This time it was the Soviets who remained silent.

From 18 June until 22 July, Kleist lingered in the Swedish capital. Then he took the tack of threatening to reveal everything to the press about the German-Soviet and Anglo-German peace feelers that had gone on earlier in the war. Berlin hoped this ploy would draw one side or the other into peace talks. It was very late in the game, though, and no response was forthcoming.

Finally, with Hitler's grudging consent, Kleist made one more attempt to start direct talks with the Soviets between 16 and 21 September. Once again Kleist was unable to gain access to any high ranking Communist official.

These late-war attempts

at diplomacy from Berlin came about because of pressure on Hitler from widely divergent circles within his ruling elite. Josef Göbbels several times tried to convince *Der Führer* of the necessity for a separate peace with the Soviets during 1943. Ribbentrop, SS chief Heinrich Himmler, and the head of the SS Foreign Intelligence Department, Schellenberg, also tried to influence Hitler toward making a solid offer to Moscow. Hitler, however, probably only played along — to the limited extent that he did — because he saw the peace feelers as a method to plant mistrust within the Grand Alliance.

— Ulrich Blemmann

Mysteries Revealed...

Happy New Year, Q. Fulvius Nobilior

Part of Rome's booty in the Second Punic War (218-201 BC) was the Mediterranean coast of Spain, formerly territory of the defunct Carthaginian Empire. The Romans, of course, had no intention of allowing the area to go free, but neither were they immediately moved to launch any campaigns of conquest into the Iberian peninsula. Italian capital and manpower had been exhausted by the Hannibalic War, and the first half of the second century was filled with major conflicts in the Greek east. The result was the Roman conquest of Spain was haphazard and slow, driven by the desire to exploit the land's natur-

al resources and to protect the coastal communities from the natives of the interior.

The Spanish possessions were organized into two provinces in 197, and Roman maladministration led in that same year to the first serious insurrection, the crushing of which triggered the First Celtiberian War (181-179). Relative peace lasted until the outbreak of the Lusitanian War (154-138), during which also occurred the Second Celtiberian War (153-151) and the Third Celtiberian (or Numantine) War (143-133). Three quarters of a century of cruel and bloody warfare were necessary to pacify the peninsula, and

the job was not actually completed until the reign of Augustus, at the end of the first century BC.

For all the misery they caused in the second century, in the long run the Spanish wars produced the most peaceful and thoroughly Romanized provinces in the empire. They also produced a little known incident that 2,000 years later still affects most of the planet.

When in late 154 a number of Celtiberian tribes, encouraged by the Lusitanians, revolted, Rome appointed Q. Fulvius Nobilior commander of the four legions to be sent to quell the rising. Nobilior had just been elected consul, one of the

two annual magistrates who were the executive heads of the Roman state. The consulship, like the subordinate praetorship, conferred upon its holder *imperium*, the superior form of official power. One facet of *imperium* was the all-important power to command troops. The consuls (and to a lesser degree the praetors) were thus also Rome's generals.

The consuls and most of the other important magistrates began their terms of office of 15 March, thereby placing the beginning of the Roman civil year at roughly the vernal equinox (21 March) and the beginning of the seasonal year. The Senate was anx-

ious to get Nobilior to Spain as quickly as possible in order to extend his campaigning season, but until he actually took office some three months hence the consul-elect had no authority to command troops. Preeminently pragmatic, the Romans solved their problem and avoided a constitutional crisis by simply moving the start of the civil year, and thus Nobilior's term, to 1 January.

Exactly when the new year began had never been of much importance in the generally sloppy and con-

flicting calendars of the ancient Mediterranean, and the Romans, seeing no compelling reason to move the beginning of their civil year back again, left it on 1 January thereafter. This day was thus enshrined as the beginning of the year in the Julian calendar, which was passed on to Europe and much of the rest of the world. Because of the Roman Senate and an obscure Iberian war, then, a majority of the human race celebrates New Year in the middle of the winter.

— Richard M. Berthold

Weapons Backdate. . .

The Doves of War

During 1944, the Americans used several squadrons of the US Army Air Corps to conduct "Dirty Trick" raids over Germany. These raids were sponsored by both British and American intelligence services and were designed to encourage resistance movements in Germany and the countries it occupied. In addition, the raids were intended to disrupt and confuse German military and political officials.

In the spring of 1944, the 406th Squadron of the 492nd Bomb Group, 8th Air Force, was tasked with conducting one of the strangest series of such raids imaginable. Their mission was to drop both living and dead carrier pigeons over key German cities.

The first pigeon raid was conducted on 11 April, when 10 live birds were released over three towns. In all, a total of 350 pigeons were dropped

before the program was cancelled.

The birds were dropped from 15,000 feet. The dead ones had false notes attached to their legs intended to deceive local authorities and the Gestapo about the size and mission of the resistance groups. The live pigeons were targeted for the resistance groups. It was hoped their leaders would attach intelligence reports and requests for needed supplies to the birds, and upon release the pigeons would return to their roosts in England.

There is no indication the Germans were deceived by these operations, nor of the resistance sending any information back to London this way. We can only guess at the reaction of the populace at the sudden appearance of so many dead, message-bearing pigeons.

— Timothy Kutta

Humor. . .

Under a Flag of Truce

During the American Civil War, ceasefires under "flags of truce" were authorized to allow aiding the wounded fallen between the battlelines, burying the dead, and sometimes even exchanges — usually of mail — between the two sides. In the latter circumstances, military couriers were authorized to cross from the positions of one opposing army to the other, usually carrying the (censored) mail of prisoners of war, or those invalided in hospitals, for their family on the other side.

In at least one case we know of, however, the practice was abused to meet a more mundane need. On 8 October 1863, the following message was passed across the lines between the army of Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and

the Confederate forces under Gen. Joe Johnston, near Meridian, Mississippi, under a flag of truce. The text read as follows:

If the Medl. Director of Genl. Grant's forces at V'burg would send the Medl. Dr. of Genl. Johnson's forces a few gallons of good Bourbon whiskey, he, the Medl. Dr. of Genl. Jo's forces, being a Kentuckian, would be under obligation, and on occasion would be pleased to reciprocate.

Faternally (underlining in original), *notwithstanding the war,*

D.W. Yandell
Medl. Director

Unfortunately, there is no record of the reply Yandell received, if any, so we'll never know if he got what he asked for.

— Herman Herst, Jr.

Antietam

High Stakes, Lost Opportunities

by Jonathan Southard

The Battle of Antietam, or Sharpsburg, is most often remembered as the bloodiest single day's fighting of the American Civil War. Approximately 80,000 men of the Union Army of the Potomac and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia fought for some ten hours and left 22,000 of their number killed and wounded.

In the end, each side could claim at most a marginal victory: "We do not claim a victory...it was not decisive enough for that...[but] if there was an advantage, it certainly was with us," wrote one Confederate staff officer afterward.

Union Gen. George G. Meade, later commander of the Army of the Potomac, would say only, "We hurt them a lot more than they hurt us."

Why all this slaughter in a few otherwise unimportant acres of Maryland farmland? What were each side's objectives and opportunities, and what were the significant results?

Background

During the Civil War there were three significant Confederate invasions of Union territory: the Maryland campaign (of which Antietam was the climax), Braxton Bragg's Kentucky campaign, and the Gettysburg campaign. The first two occurred at about the same time, the culmination of a summer of hard fighting which reversed the tide of the war, which had gone against the South early in the year.

In Virginia, 1862 had opened with a Union campaign toward Richmond up the peninsula between the York and James Rivers. At the gates of Richmond and victory, the Union forces had been driven back in the Seven Days' Battles (25 June-1 July). In August, John Pope's Army of Virginia was chased out of that state, routed in a second battle on the field of Bull Run (29-30 August), and driven back on Washington.

Some observers in that capital felt the war effort was in danger of unraveling. At the same time, the Confederacy's most successful field commander believed he needed to seek a triumph on northern soil.

As of 1 September 1862, Gen. Robert E. Lee had commanded the Army of Northern Virginia for just three months. During that brief time, however, he had mastered not only his own somewhat unruly forces, but also (and perhaps more thor-

oughly) the mind of his chief opponent, Gen. George B. McClellan.

Stakes & Objectives

Lee believed he could invade Maryland and Pennsylvania, win significant victories in Union territory, and thus secure foreign recognition for the Confederacy. That would eliminate the Union blockade, which was already starting to press the South's economy, and perhaps lead to ultimate victory for the Rebel cause.

In fact, Lee's hopes for foreign intervention had good justification. On reading the news of Second Bull Run, the Prime Minister of England wrote to his Foreign Minister: "It seems not unlikely that even greater disasters await the Union, and that even Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the Confederates. If this should happen, would it not be time for us to consider whether in such a state of things England and France might not address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon the basis of separation?"

But pursuing such an outcome entailed great risks. Any time Lee's army was north of Virginia it was by that very fact in far greater danger than it was while home, and that army was the principal pillar of its nation. The Confederacy, as would be shown in the coming two and a half years, lived only while its armies lived. Lee, unlike the Union commanders, couldn't count on fresh troops to make good his disasters. If he lost his army in an adventure in the North, he lost his war.

Lee, however, appears to have believed that without some bold stroke the war would eventually be lost anyway. Like all good students of military science, he had learned only the offense brings decisive results. Not until after the failure of his two great offensives, when his army was too weak to make another, would he fall back on the slimmer possibility the Union might simply grow tired of the contest and throw Lincoln out of office.

The stakes, then, on that September day in the Maryland countryside, were high, and the opportunities great. A major victory for Lee could set in motion a chain of events that could win the war for the South. A major victory for McClellan might open the way to Richmond and just as quickly win the war for the North.

For McClellan there was an added personal dimension to the battle. Upon assuming command the year before, he had enjoyed the goodwill and confidence of his government, which had only increased with his accomplishments in training and organizing the army. But his timid conduct of operations and repeated defeats throughout the summer had eroded that goodwill to the point where he felt he fought the Battle of Antietam with his "head in a noose." A clear cut victory would rescue his tarnished image; anything less would mean his removal from command and the end of his military career.

The Army Commanders

The personalities, strengths, and weaknesses of the opposing army commanders dominate the study of any Civil War campaign, and that's especially true of the Maryland campaign.

Lee had already revealed his basic traits. He had several strengths George Patton would later name as essential for a good general: strong self-confidence, aggressiveness, and the willingness to take calculated risks. He had displayed, and would continue to display, uncanny insight into the minds of his opposites — again, as Patton would say, Lee would beat the soul of the enemy commanders, not their weapons. (Later, of course, Lee would encounter Grant, whom he never fully fathomed and whose soul was imperturbable.)

In battle, once his orders had been given, Lee left the details of the fighting to his subordinates. But he kept a close watch on the action and made the crucial decisions of when and where to commit reserves. His system was an excellent one in view of the dense "fog of war" that always hung around any Civil War headquarters.

In contemporary terms, Lee gave his generals what the US Army today calls "mission-type orders," trusting to their understanding and skills to carry out the particulars in the best way. This was the same system used by Napoleon, and later by the German and Israeli armies, often with great success. The system worked well for Lee, too, until later in the war when many of his ablest lieutenants had been killed or wounded and were replaced by men of lesser ability.

George B. McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac, was an officer whose qualities were almost the opposite of Lee's. While Lee had strictly limited ambitions — he carefully deferred to President Davis on all matters not within his purview — and boundless nerve, McClellan had boundless ambition and hardly any nerve. He indulged in pipe dreams about taking over the Federal government, and would later run as the peace candidate against Lincoln in 1864. In battle he was timid and vacillating, often refusing to attack, and then attacking with only a part of his force at a time. His last fight, Antietam, showed him at his very worst.

At Antietam, McClellan distanced himself from the action, watching through a telescope from his headquarters at the Pry House. His subordinates, given no orders or appreciations that might have helped them coordinate their separate efforts, were left to muddle through on their own.


The Maryland Campaign

Lee invaded Maryland without a specific plan of campaign, but with the general idea of feeding his army from the countryside and cutting the rail lines that connected the eastern and western portions of the Union. He planned to burn important bridges over the Susquehanna River at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, then strike toward Washington or Baltimore, if possible. Above all, he hoped to force McClellan into a battle on his own terms.

The pursuit after Second Bull Run took until 1 September, when the army moved to Leesburg. There it rested before crossing into Maryland on the 6th.

Initially Lee occupied Frederick, then turned westward. With McClellan groping toward him with his usual extreme caution, Lee felt he could

(Continued on page 17)



The Armies of Antietam

by Chris Perello & Jonathan Southard

The opposing forces at Antietam were "armies" in name only. During the first year of the war, both sides created a number of field forces in and around Virginia. As the fighting intensified, these forces began to coalesce into the two large armies that would fight each other for the rest of the war. Neither had completed the process when the battle was fought.

The Army of Northern Virginia

Lee, in command for just over three months, had completed grueling but successful campaigns against two larger Union armies. The campaigns necessarily interfered with the restructuring of his army, which in mid-September was in flux at almost every level of command.

About two dozen of the 186 Confederate regiments had been moved from one brigade to another during the preceding month, usually as part of rationalization of brigades into single-state units. Two brigades were created from scratch to give command opportunities to promising officers.

Regimental strength varied wildly, depending on the amount of fighting each unit had done. Jackson's (under J.R. Jones) and Ewell's divisions (the heart of Jackson's Valley Army), had been in almost constant action since spring; many of the regiments were barely the size of companies. Other divisions had fought only lightly in the Seven Days, and three missed Second Bull Run altogether.


At the division level, the situation was almost chaotic. Some units, like A.P. Hill's, had kept the same organization for months. By contrast, D.R. Jones' and Anderson's were formed as divisions during the two-week interval since Second Bull Run (in both cases, by merging two smaller formations). Division size varied widely, from Hood's little two-brigade unit to A.P. Hill's huge "Light" Division. The size differences were not necessarily based on the commanders' abilities, but reflected organizational reactions to combat losses.

Above the divisions, there was no formal organization except the army: the Confederate Congress had not yet authorized corps. Lee extemporized a series of "wing" formations under Longstreet and Jackson — Longstreet was officially a division commander, Jackson commander of the Shenandoah Valley Department. These wings would eventually become legitimate corps, but at this time their composition was flexible. For example, McLaws' and Walker's divisions, from Longstreet's wing, marched

with Jackson to Harper's Ferry, and both (along with Hood) fought under him at Antietam.

Longstreet and Jackson were among the war's finest corps commanders, but below them the division and brigade commanders were of uneven quality. This was partly because Lee had not yet been able to clean out all those he did not want, and partly because the South had

The Confederate Army at the Battle of Antietam



a limited supply of trained leaders. The most important reason was the severe losses among senior leaders over the summer meant many commanders were inexperienced at their new posts.

Of the division commanders, only Hood and the two Hills had led their commands during the Seven Days. Anderson, McLaws, and D.R. Jones had led smaller divisions previously, but this was their first battle with full-sized units. Walker was in his first fight as a division commander, while Lawton and J.R. Jones had only taken over their divisions after the regular commanders had been wounded during the Bull Run campaign.

D.H. Hill showed an ability for independent command and a willingness to take the initiative; he would become a successful corps and department commander later in the war. With two exceptions, all the other division commanders would either return to brigade command or leave the army.

The two exceptions were A.P. Hill and John B. Hood. Both had acquired reputations as fierce combat leaders and difficult subordinates, both would be promoted as a result of their divisional exploits, and both would be failures in higher positions — neither could curb his excessive aggressiveness. Hill was occasionally rash, but generally a quiet failure as a corps commander. Hood was a spectacular failure as an army commander in the last year of the war.

Of the 40 infantry brigades, 13 were led by men in the position for a month or less, and a half-dozen more by men promoted since the Seven Days. They were dedicated — another dozen would fall at Antietam — but that could not make up for experience and training. Regimental leadership was in a similar state, with many temporarily being commanded by captains.

One factor mitigating the lack of expertise among the brigade and regimental commanders was the shrunken state of the units, which were thus easier to handle. The unrelenting summer of combat had cost the army more than 30,000 casualties from an original strength of just over 80,000.

Thousands more, perhaps as many as 20,000, fell out of the marching columns during the invasion. Most were broken down by long marches on an inadequate diet. For weeks prior to the invasion the troops had eaten mostly green apples, and for the two weeks just before the battle subsisted mostly on green corn. Worse, many men lacked shoes, a necessity on the stony Maryland pikes.

The jury-rigged Southern war economy, near collapse, could not supply the army adequately. Lee, in advising Jefferson Davis of his invasion plans, cautioned: "The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of the enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes...What occasions me the most concern is...ammunition." In fact, it's puzzling how he expected an army so ill-equipped to achieve his purposes in the North.

But for all its weaknesses, the army had been on an uninterrupted winning streak for three months; morale

was high, and Lee's confidence in his troops well-placed.

The Army of the Potomac

In Washington, McClellan quickly had to form an army out of two defeated armies and a mass of brand new regiments. The distinction between the two former armies should not be minimized: the first three corps McClellan launched into battle came from outside "his" army, and he never did commit two of "his" corps.

Two corps available to McClellan, the III and Sigel's (soon to be christened XI Corps), were too badly shaken after Second Bull Run to take the field immediately. These would be left behind to garrison the capital.

The core of the field force was provided by three corps (II, V and VI) McClellan brought back from the Peninsula (another, the IV Corps, remained behind). Before marching, each of these corps received a new third division. Those in II and V Corps were composed almost entirely of newly raised regiments; that in VI Corps was an experienced unit detached from IV Corps. Each also received one or two other new regiments, which were dispersed among the existing brigades.

The I Corps originally had been part of McClellan's army, but had been detached by Lincoln to protect Washington. Marching much and fighting little, it eventually became part of Pope's ill-fated Army of Virginia, suffering heavy losses in the Second Bull Run campaign. The corps was reinforced for the campaign by several new regiments and Meade's Pennsylvania Reserve Division, which had served on the Peninsula.

The XII Corps had also been part of Pope's army, but had fared better than I Corps. Formed to fight in the Shenandoah Valley, it bore the brunt of Jackson's famed Valley Campaign. It met Jackson again at Cedar Mountain, the opening to the Second Bull Run campaign, and fought him to a standstill despite being outnumbered. Reinforced by five new regiments, it was still the smallest corps in the army.

The last corps McClellan brought was an oddity. Ambrose Burnside's IX Corps was almost a personal army. Raised largely in New England, it eventually would cover more ground and serve in more distinct campaigns than any other corps in the Union army, almost all of it under Burnside's command. Part of the corps had fought at Second Bull Run. For the new campaign, it was joined by Cox's Kanawha Division from the mountain country of west Virginia and seven new regiments.

The corps commanders were not promising material. Hooker had been given I Corps as a reward for excellent work as a division commander (under McClellan, not with I Corps). Despite his later failure as an army commander at Chancellorsville, he led I Corps well until wounded early in the action. Sumner had led II Corps since its formation, but was out of place at corps level, being at heart a cavalry regiment commander. Porter's V Corps had done a large share of the fighting during the Seven Days, and included all the army's Regular infantry and its reserve artillery. Porter was competent, but cau-

tious like his friend McClellan. He would be relieved shortly after Antietam on charges of insubordination to Pope at Second Bull Run. Franklin, another of McClellan's proteges, was similar in character to Porter. Mansfield took command of *XII Corps* the day before the battle, and was killed in the opening minutes, so it is difficult to rate his abilities.


The last commander, like his corps, was an oddity. Burnside scored a number of genuine successes in the war, notably at Knoxville in 1863 and on the North Carolina coast, but as army commander, he would fight the disastrous battle of Fredericksburg. At Antietam, he took very little part in the action. At least part of this was McClellan's doing: on the approach march, he put Burnside in command of a wing, consisting of *I* and *IX Corps*. He never officially relieved Burnside, but deployed those corps at opposite ends of his line. Burnside never resumed direct control of his corps. It is not clear whether Burnside was sulking or honestly confused.

The division and brigade commanders were of somewhat more even quality than in the Confederate army, as there was a larger pool of trained men and they had suffered fewer losses. Among them were the men who would rise to army and corps command in the more successful later years of the war.

The troops themselves, despite the defeats of the summer, were in good spirits, helped no doubt by the fact they were now defending Northern soil instead of invading the South. They were much better equipped and fed than the Southerners ever would be. Only the presence of so many new units in the army made any qualitative difference between the opposing infantry.

One area in which the Union had a clear advantage was artillery. In number and weight of pieces, and most of all in ammunition supply, the Northern guns were much superior. The Confederates had a more centralized artillery organization, though the Union was beginning to realize the advantages of centralization as well. By

The Union Army at the Battle of Antietam



the time of Antietam, all of *XII Corps'* artillery was centrally directed, *V Corps* had an impressive reserve of long-range Parrott guns, and *I Corps* artillery, though still officially distributed to the divisions, was in practice used *en masse*.

(Continued from page 13)

take the risk of dividing his already small army. Part of it, under Jackson, he sent to invest the town of Harper's Ferry and capture its Union garrison of 11,000. He left D.H. Hill's division to screen the passes of South Mountain, and headed west and north with the remainder.

Unknown to Lee, a copy of his orders — "Special Orders No. 191," listing the deployment of his army and its plans for the next several days — had fallen into Northern hands. The familiar version of the story has it that two Union soldiers discovered a copy of the order in a field, wrapped around three cigars. Incredibly, it appears no Confederate court of inquiry was ever convened, and none of the officers involved were cashiered.

Armed with this intelligence, McClellan turned aggressive. He attacked D.H. Hill at South Mountain on 14 September and captured the vital passes leading into the rear of the divided Confederate army. But McClellan's slow movement and Hill's tough defense bought Lee enough time to reconstitute his army behind Antietam Creek, chosen because of its good defensive terrain.

Herein lies another of the hotly debated mysteries of the campaign. Why, knowing he would be so heavily outnumbered, did Lee give battle at all? What did he hope to gain in against such odds? Why not retreat immediately to Virginia and save the more than 10,000 soldiers lost on 17 September?

In discussing this, it's important to distinguish between reasons occurring to the historian a hundred or more years later, and reasons that may have occurred to Lee at the time. We cannot know the latter for certain, but in view of Lee's character and career, two suggest themselves.

One possible reason is that Lee, with his sometimes stubbornly aggressive nature, was simply unwilling to call off his offensive without fighting a battle. This was the same man who, loath to admit the failure of his efforts to trap McClellan on the Peninsula, had sent his troops out to be shot down in thousands on the slopes of Malvern Hill. He also had to consider the morale effect on his troops if they retreated without being beaten in battle.

Another possible reason is Lee had such contempt for McClellan by this time he felt he could win in spite of the odds. Lee had clearly shown this attitude toward his counterpart when he split his force of only 40,000 men into three parts while in the vicinity of the huge Union army.

Deployment and Terrain

On 15 September, the first elements of the two armies arrived on what would soon become a battlefield. On that date McClellan missed his best chance to crush the Rebel army in detail. About 70,000 Union troops were present, faced by no more than 15,000 Confederates, almost all of whom had fought long and hard the day before. The

remainder of Lee's army was still with Jackson at Harper's Ferry (which surrendered that day), or marching hard from the north to join the main body. But Little Mac, as always, overestimated the force opposing him, and in his mind puffed up the enemy numbers to 50,000.

To the amazement of his own juniors and all the Confederates — all except Lee, one suspects — he spent that day and the next merely observing the Rebels and deploying his own units. By the morning of the 17th, about 35,000 Rebel troops were in position, against 87,000 Federals. Lee's entire army was now on hand, except A.P. Hill's division, which remained at Harper's Ferry to collect the mountain of weapons and supplies captured there.

McClellan's fears were multiplied by the nature of the terrain Lee had chosen for his defense. Lee's right flank rested securely on the Antietam, a creek more than 60 feet wide with steep slopes along its banks in many places. The left was secured in several patches of rough woods, with the open area between commanded by artillery posted on a rise near a church of the Dunker sect. In the center, a sunken road made a natural trench.

Lee was thus able to screen his front with a relatively small number of men, holding back the rest for counterattacks. In many places, gently rolling terrain provided reverse slopes that Lee used to hide his men from Union view, ensuring McClellan would remain ignorant of the true Confederate strength.

One disadvantage in the defense was the high ground on the far side of the Antietam, from which long-range Union guns could bombard much of the Confederate position. Another obvious disadvantage was that in the event of a defeat, Lee's army would have to retreat across the Potomac River fords nearby, a difficult operation in the face of an aggressive enemy.


McClellan's Options

In planning his attack, McClellan had many choices. He could have brought most of his army across the Antietam to attack Lee's left flank, or he could have tied down the left and smashed into the center, or he could have tried a double envelopment with the right and left at the same time. With an overall numerical superiority of more than two to one, the troops were available to try any of those options.

Any of those choices would have been better than what actually occurred. It appears to have been McClellan's plan to send Hooker's *I Corps* around Lee's left and to support that attack in some way with Sumner's *II Corps* and Mansfield's *XII Corps*. Apart from that, however, nothing is really certain.

All the corps went into action without clear orders and without coordination. It's also uncertain what orders McClellan gave Burnside (on the

The Battle of Antietam Dawn-7:30 A.M.



Union left), or what role he intended IX Corps to play. The actual course of the battle finally came to resemble that of a modern martial arts movie in which the master fighter is attacked by a bunch of thugs one at a time — never attacking all at once so as not to spoil the movie by quickly beating out the hero's brains. The Union forces made three entirely uncoordinated attacks at different times during the day: first against Lee's left, then in the center, and finally on Lee's right.

Lee, outnumbered, could not help but stay on the defensive initially. But he held most of Longstreet's corps in reserve, and fully intended to counterattack as soon as the opportunity presented

itself. With luck, he hoped to be able to take the initiative later, after McClellan's attack was spent.

Course of the Battle

The I Corps started its attack in the early dawn. The men went into battle without so much as coffee for breakfast; the fires that would have been needed to boil water had been forbidden by the high command for "security reasons." How that order was to provide any security, when Lee's men had two full days to observe all the Union dispositions at their leisure, was not made clear.

The objective of I Corps' attack was the Dunker Church. To reach it, Hooker sent his soldiers

The Battle of Antietam

7:30-9:00 A.M.

Scale in Miles



Larry Hoffman/Command Magazine




marching along the Hagerstown Turnpike and through farmer D.R. Miller's cornfield. Reaching that field, they were enveloped by Confederate guns posted on Nicodemus Hill to their right, then surprised by Confederate infantry concealed in the tall corn. It was characteristic of the poor Union reconnaissance work and unimaginative planning that nobody had given thought to seizing Nicodemus Hill (it remained in Confederate hands all day), allowing the guns there to do signal service in defending Lee's left.

Once the action was joined, there was little maneuvering, only a straight-ahead fight with attack giving way to counterattack, the units of each

side charging and then retreating with heavy casualties, often after only a short time in the intense fire. Jackson's men exacted terrible losses from Hooker's, but they were heavily outnumbered, and Jackson gave orders for Hood to counterattack to try to stabilize the situation. Hood's men were at that moment cooking their first hot meal — in fact, it was their first substantial meal of any temperature — in three days, and they took the interruption poorly. They counterattacked with the special anger of those deprived of food, and drove back I Corps. Their pursuit carried them into the advancing XII Corps. Though successful in their mission, about 80 percent of Hood's men were killed or wounded.

The Battle of Antietam

9:00 A.M.-1:00 P.M.



Lacking clear orders and any information on how Hooker's push was progressing, Mansfield brought his corps in the general direction of the firing, where in ran head-on into the intense Rebel fire. Mansfield himself was among those killed. By that time Hooker had also been wounded, in the foot, and command of *I Corps* devolved on Meade, who immediately withdrew northward to reorganize.

Sumner's *II Corps* now entered the fight, also without liaison with the two other corps on the field, reconnaissance, or direction from above. Hurrying to aid those in action, Sumner led Sedgwick's division forward without deploying

from column. It was caught in the flank by McLaws' charging rebels and routed.

McLaws was just part of a stream of reinforcements received by Jackson. With the Union center and left passive, Lee was able to shift divisions from Longstreet to aid Jackson. By the end of the long morning, Longstreet was left with only D.R. Jones' division and Evans' brigade. McClellan failed to make use of the advantage that usually accrues to the attacker by threatening several points at once. Had McClellan attempted to stretch the Confederates by pushing against multiple points simultaneously, it's doubtful the Rebel defense could have held.

The Battle of Antietam

1:00-4:30 P.M.

Scale in Miles



Larry Hoffman/Command Magazine



Uncoordinated as the Union attacks were, the vigor with which they were delivered and the sheer numbers of the assailants pressed hard on the Confederates. Ewell's, Jackson's, and Hood's divisions had been hammered. The reserve artillery, initially drawn up around the Dunker church, had been severely depleted by Union bombardment.

As the battle died down on the Confederate left, it flared anew in the center. Sumner's remaining two divisions (French's and Richardson's) assaulted D.H. Hill's division, which was holding positions along a sunken road. Joined by Anderson's division, Hill held the line for nearly three

and a half hours, finally breaking only when a brigade mistakenly pulled out of the line. Union troops broke into the position and started an enfilade fire on the remaining Confederates — the dead carpeted the ground so thickly the place was dubbed "Bloody Lane" by local residents (and is still known by that name today).

Behind the victorious bluecoats, Franklin's VI Corps had moved into the area, taking positions near the East Wood. This brought about the greatest crisis the Southerners would face during that crisis-filled day. The Confederate center was now held by no more than a few hundred organized troops, backed by some batteries of undermanned

guns (Longstreet himself served one of the pieces). Franklin's corps was fresh, and beyond the creek was Porter's untouched V Corps. Had McClellan committed even one of those corps to a final assault, there is little doubt Lee's army would have been overrun. But McClellan, misnamed the "Little Napoleon" (now being called, "McNapoleon"), here demonstrated the great emperor's dictum that an army of rabbits led by a lion is superior to an army of lions led by a rabbit. The grand assault was never launched; V and VI Corps remained inert, and the battle ceased in the center.

While all this had been going on, Lee's right had been under sporadic attack by IX Corps. Opposed for most of the morning by one brigade (Toombs') posted on the heights above the Lower Bridge, Sturgis' division attacked directly across the span while Rodman's wandered off to the south to find fords supposedly located there.

Several charges directly across the bridge failed. With no sign of Rodman's flanking division appearing on the far side, artillery was brought up to rake the defenders at close range. Another direct assault, at about 1:00 p.m., succeeded. The regiment that made the assault had earlier been disciplined by the withdrawal of its normal whiskey ration. As their brigade commander exhorted the men to attack, an unknown soldier in the ranks proposed a bargain: whiskey for a bridge. The brigadier agreed, and kept his pledge afterward. Still, a Rebel brigade of a few hundred men had held off an entire corps for half a day.

Having taken the bridge at last, IX Corps pressed on toward Sharpsburg. This was another serious moment for the Confederates, because IX Corps heavily outnumbered D.R. Jones' division, the only organized Southern troops left on that part of the field. A Union occupation of the town would have effectively cut off most of Lee's army from the vital river fords along the Potomac.

But as Burnside's men moved on Sharpsburg, A.P. Hill's division, completing a seven-hour, 17-mile march, arrived just in time, attacked without orders, and crumpled the attackers' flank. The IX Corps retreated back toward the bridge, and the battle was over.

Victory & Defeat

Lee's troops had gained a remarkable success in fighting McClellan to a standstill. Given the Army of the Potomac's huge numerical superiority, the Army of Northern Virginia should have been destroyed at Antietam.

The reasons for the Union failure are straightforward — as straightforward as the principles of war. A few of those principles, as recognized by most armies, include focusing on a well-defined objective, concentration of force ("mass"), and coordination.

McClellan failed to fix on a clear objective and communicate it to his subordinates, sent his army

into action piecemeal, and failed to coordinate the efforts that were made. On the other side, Lee effectively concentrated his forces against each of McClellan's attacks, and made use of interior lines to conduct an excellent mobile defense.

But though Lee escaped disaster in the battle, he also failed to win the decisive victory he had come north to achieve. Indeed, McClellan, still fearing thousands of uncommitted phantom Southerners, expected Lee to reopen the fight the following day. Lee wanted to do exactly that, but it was simply impossible; the Rebel army was too badly shot up.

The two armies warily eyed each other through the 18th, McClellan fearing and Lee hoping for a renewal of the fighting. On September 19th, the Confederates retreated across the river and back into Virginia. Lee had lost more than 10,000 men (13,000 counting the losses at South Mountain) on his gamble for a decisive battle. A draw was as good as a defeat for the South, since Northern losses could be made good much more quickly.

As with Gettysburg a year later, Antietam's significance lay in what did not happen: Lee did not win a victory on Northern soil. Given the overall circumstances of the war, that added up to a considerable Union success. England and France shelved the idea of intervention.

Then, five days after the battle, Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, decisively altering the nature, purpose and course of the war. Prior to Antietam, many people, North and South, thought some kind of compromise peace that would more or less bring a return to the status quo *ante bellum* was the most likely (and most desirable) outcome of the war. Prior to Antietam such an outcome had always been open to the Rebels: return to the Union, end the rebellion, and all is forgotten. But the Emancipation Proclamation spelled the destruction of the plantation way of life the Southern leaders had seceded to preserve. No compromise was possible any longer.

One of those who lamented the change was Gen. McClellan. Failure to destroy Lee's army at Antietam meant the end of his military career. He was relieved about a month later and never commanded again. Two years later he would stand unsuccessfully as the Democratic Party's candidate for president, the very embodiment of opposition to "Lincoln's war."

With McClellan's departure, the first period in the history of the Civil War in the east came to a close. The Army of the Potomac had passed its naive, idealistic adolescence and moved toward maturity. Henceforth the men would be more suspicious of their generals, and more professional as soldiers. Antietam was a painful and incomplete step forward to Northern victory, but a step forward nonetheless.

A Bibliographic Guide

The literature on this topic, as with all great events of the Civil War, is enormous. This listing gives the sources that proved most helpful in researching the article.

Two recent accounts are *The Gleam of Bayonets*, by James Murfin, and *Landscape Turned Red*, by Stephen W. Sears. Both are thorough, lucid, objective and widely available. Murfin's book includes a number of excellent battle maps that the park historical staff described as the most accurate available representations of the terrain.

Volume II of *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* contains a number of graphic and clear accounts of Antietam by participants, including Jacob Cox, James Longstreet and James B. Gordon. The other readily available firsthand account, the reports in the *War of the Rebellion* (Series 1, Vol. 19), is recommended only for specialists and researchers.

Lt. Col. G.F.R. Henderson's two volume *Stonewall Jackson*, an older account by a British professional soldier and military scholar, has a good, brief analysis of Antietam. Basil Liddell Hart summed it up well by saying that Henderson's work has in some places more of Henderson than Jackson, but is not diminished thereby.

Douglas Southall Freeman's classic works, *Robert E. Lee*, and *Lee's Lieutenants*, are blatantly biased in favor of its protagonist, whom they elevate to the status of classical hero, but they also contain solid scholarship and good portraits of many Confederate officers. For an antidote to the usual view of Lee, which Freeman did so much to inspire, see *Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship*, by Maj. Gen. J.F.C. Fuller.

Time-Life's *Civil War* series includes a volume, *Antietam: The Bloodiest Day*, which like all Time-Life products is well-illustrated and highly readable.

Mr. Lincoln's Army, volume I of Bruce Catton's three-volume *History of the Army of the Potomac*, is devoted to McClellan's time as commander, culminating at Antietam. The account of the battle is fairly brief, but McClellan's hold over the troops and his personal failings, as well as the related general failings in the army's command, are discussed in detail.

For an especially scathing and concise analysis of McClellan, see Kenneth P. Williams' *Lincoln Finds a General*, vol. II. His conclusion: "McClellan was not a real general. McClellan was not even a disciplined, truthful soldier. McClellan was merely an attractive but vain and unstable man, with considerable military knowledge, who sat a horse well and wanted to be President."

Finally, no bibliography would be complete without mentioning the Antietam Battlefield. The entire area is preserved as a national park, and except for the addition of paved roads, the rural Maryland terrain is not much different now from what it was in September 1862. One of the best preserved Civil War battlefields, it's well worth a visit. ☐

How to Read Unit Symbols.

Unit symbols are a quick and easy way (once you get used to them) to clearly show the makeup of even the largest and most complex military organizations. The symbols are used to show the location of the unit on a map. When combined with other symbols in a wire-diagram, the symbols can be used to show the strength and weaponry of a single unit (o Table of Organization and Equipment, or TO&E) or show all the units commanded by some higher organization (on Order of Battle, or OB).

Each unit is identified by a box. The symbol inside the box indicates the unit's type, meaning the primary weaponry and equipment the unit uses to carry out its missions. Examples of unit types are:

	Infantry		Rocket Artillery
	Road-Motorized Infantry		Mortars
	Cross-Country Motorized Infantry		Anti-Tank
	Airmobile or Air Assault (heliborne)		Anti-Aircraft Artillery (pre-1945)
	Airborne (or Paratroop)		Modern Air Defense Artillery
	Marines or Naval Infantry		Signals or Communication Troops
	Mountain Infantry		Fixed-Wing Bombers
	Mechanized (or "Armored") Infantry		Fixed-Wing Fighters
	Combat Engineers		Attack Helicopters
	Commando or Special Forces		Supply or Transport
	Horse Cavalry		Replacements
	Armored Cavalry or Reconnaissance		Motorized Special Ops
	Motorcycle Troops		Military Police
	Armored Cars		Motorized Anti-Tank
	Armor or Tank		Self-Propelled Anti-Tank
	Assault Gun or Self-Propelled Artillery		Combined Arms
	Truck-Towed Artillery		Wheeled Marines
	Horse-Drawn Artillery		Motorized Marines

Unit Size

XXXXX - Theater of Operations
 XXXXX - Army Group or Front
 XXXX - Army
 XXX - Corps
 XX - Division
 X - Brigade

III - Regiment
 II - Battalion
 I - Company
 ••• - Platoon
 •• - Section
 • - Squad or Fire Team

Notes

- If a unit symbol displays a heavy band down its left side, or a portion of its symbology is filled in, that unit is armed with "heavy" weapons. For instance, this would mean "heavy weapons infantry," while this would mean "heavy tanks."
- If there is a brocket () atop a unit's size-symbol, that unit is ad hoc in nature. Meaning it was/is not a regular organization in its army, but was created for some special (temporary) purpose or mission.
- The number or word appearing to the side of a unit box is that unit's numeric or name identity. For instance, this unit would be the 1st Mechanized Infantry Division.

Hammer of Victory: The Normandy Campaign, 1944

by Ben Knight

By midnight of D-Day, 6 June 1944, over 156,000 Allied troops had made a 50-mile breach in Adolf Hitler's "Atlantic Wall," the coastal defenses of German-occupied Europe. An estimated 10,000 of these men had fallen. Their blood purchased an opening through which a tide of multi-national armies would eventually pour. That tide would flow more than 600 miles into Europe, washing across France and the Low Countries, breaching Germany's "West Wall" (the border fortifications of the Siegfried Line), and swamping western Germany within 11 months of D-Day. The first 80 days of that flood tide compose one of the war's fiercest struggles: the Normandy Campaign.

Allied Planning

All commanding officers were theoretically aware of the hedgerow terrain, but none had seen it. You cannot imagine it when you have not seen it.

— Lt. Gen. W. Bedell Smith,
SHAEP Chief of Staff

A requisite for Allied success in northwest Europe was control of continental ports. Shipping was not a problem — the Allies dominated the seaways by mid-1944 — having sufficient dock-


space was the problem. The Allies needed ports in France and Belgium not only to unload troops but to unload supplies for their armies and for the newly liberated civilians in those war-ravaged countries.

Two of the reasons Allied planners chose Normandy for the "Overlord" invasion were its ports (particularly Cherbourg) and its proximity to ports in Brittany and along the Seine River. Once the Allies established a lodgement in Normandy, they could drive east to capture Le Havre and Rouen on the Seine, or they could drive south to the Loire River, isolating the Brittany Peninsula before capturing its ports.

The Allies expected enemy defenses to be strongest on the eastern flank of the lodgement — that is, on the direct road to Germany — so they anticipated clearing Brittany before reaching the Seine. They originally hoped to capture Brest at the western tip of the Brittany Peninsula by D+50 (the 50th day after D-Day). As it turned out, though, by D+50 the Allied front line had barely advanced 20 miles from the beaches. Herein lay the major oversight of the Allied planners: they underestimated the terrain difficulties imposed by the *Bocage Normand*.

Bocage is the French word for an area of small fields and stout hedgerows. The hedgerows in Normandy are tall, thickly-overgrown embankments that protect the fields from sea winds blowing across the lowlands of the Cotentin Peninsula. These hedgerows made excellent bulwarks for the German defenders. (See the sidebar "Graduate School in Hell: The American Experience in Normandy" in *Command no. 18* for a tactical analysis of the *bocage* fighting.) There are only two regions in France where *bocage* is a significant terrain feature: in the *Bocage Vendéen* around La Roche sur Yon on the Bay of Biscay coast, and in the Cotentin area of Normandy. The Allied invasion ran right into the latter.

Of course, the Allies knew the *bocage* existed, and they realized it would require infantry rather than tanks to fight through such countryside. The Americans, being on the right flank of the beachhead, had to face the most hedgerows, and they initially dealt with the problem by emphasizing infantry over armored divisions in their build-up schedule. However, the Allies failed to appreciate just how difficult it would be to evict tenacious defenders from such terrain. For this reason, *bocage*





American troops take cover behind the foliage of a thick hedgerow shortly after D-Day.

fighting would dominate the first 50 days of the Normandy Campaign.

Linking the Beaches

Under the Command of General Eisenhower, Allied naval forces, supported by strong air forces, began landing Allied armies this morning on the northern coast of France.


— B.B.C., 6 June 1944

As Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, entrusted the command of the Allied armies in Normandy to Gen. Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, who called for nine divisions to break the Atlantic Wall.


After airdrops by the British 6th and US 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions secured the beachhead flanks, six infantry divisions splashed ashore across five beaches on D-Day. Much has been written about the bloody beach of Omaha, where German fire temporarily pinned down the American assault. Despite this setback, 34,000 troops landed at Omaha on D-Day — more than at any other beach. The Allies had come ashore to stay.

Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley commanded the U.S. 1st Army that landed at Utah and Omaha Beaches on the Allied right flank. Bradley's first task was to link the two beaches. He achieved this on 12 June when the U.S. 7th Corps spearheaded by the 101st Airborne ("Screaming Eagles") fought its way into the small port of Carentan at the base of the Cherbourg Peninsula. Meanwhile, the U.S. 5th Corps advanced inland from Omaha Beach, but it only cautiously explored a temporary, 10-mile

Allied Divisional Order of Battle Normandy, 25 July 1944



gap in the German line near Caumont. In a way, the German Army deserved this respect because they had time and again proven themselves masters at counterattacking exposed Allied units. The 5th Corps' neighbor, the British 7th Armored



Division, learned this lesson the hard way at Villers Bocage.

Lt. Gen. Sir Miles Dempsey commanded the British *Second Army* that landed at Gold, Juno, and Sword Beaches on the Allied left flank. Montgomery had ambitiously tasked Dempsey with capturing the inland port of Caen on D-Day, but resistance from the German *21st Panzer Division* prevented this. During the next two days, the *12th SS Panzer ("Hitler Youth") Division* arrived to keep the Canadian *3rd Infantry Division* out of the city. Montgomery therefore planned to outflank Caen from two sides and then drop the British *1st Airborne Division* behind it to complete the encirclement.

The *7th Armored* formed part of the western pincer. On 13 June this division, which had fought with Montgomery in the open desert of North Africa, found itself strung out along the narrow lanes of the *bocage* — "acting as if they've won the war already," commented the SS gunner of a nearby Tiger tank. The captain of that tank was Michael Wittman, Germany's leading panzer ace. He smashed into the British column with a handful of Tiger tanks and *panzergranadiers*, causing surprise and destruction and turning back the *7th Armored*. Montgomery had to change his plan. (Wittman would die in battle on 7 August.)

German Leadership

There was another famous veteran of the desert in Normandy. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel commanded *Army Group B* and had responsibility for the Low Countries and the northern half of France. He worked under Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, C-in-C West, but the German command structure was such that neither man had full control of his forces. Hitler issued specific directives to them, and Hitler released their units for operations or held them elsewhere along the French coast awaiting the next Allied invasion.

The Allies ran an elaborate deception plan, code-named "Fortitude," that convinced Hitler the Normandy invasion was only a preliminary to the real thing that would soon fall on the Pas de Calais. Because of this, German reaction to the Normandy invasion was not only tardy, but weaker than it might have been.

These three German leaders met for a conference on 17 June in a bunker northeast of Paris. By that date, parts of 16 German divisions (including 4 panzer divisions) were fighting in Normandy. These were enough to slow the Allied advance but not enough to stop it.

Hitler had also released three more SS panzer divisions for employment at the front, of which the *2nd SS "Das Reich"* was close at hand, stained with the blood of hundreds of French civilians it had executed in reprisal for resistance attacks against its column. (Learning of these atrocities, Rommel wanted to punish the offenders, but Hitler told him to mind his own business.) The other two divisions

were *en route* from the Russian Front and would not appear until the end of the month. Without more reinforcements, Rommel and Rundstedt wanted to pull back, either locally or behind the Seine, thus saving their troops and shortening the front in France. Hitler insisted they stand and defend "every square yard of soil."

Rommel and Rundstedt were right insofar as Germany had already lost the war, and they realistically wanted to cut further losses. However, Hitler was right in that Normandy offered the best defensive terrain short of the Siegfried Line. The Allies had already jumped the English Channel, so the Seine River would pose little barrier to them. Further, Hitler believed his V-weapons would change everything (see sidebar), so he desperately wanted to hold a line in Normandy. (In one of those ironic moments of history, a defective V1 flying bomb crashed near their conference bunker later that day.) Hitler's hold-fast policy would not work, though, unless he reinforced Normandy with more troops and sent adequate replacements for the heavy casualties those already there had incurred. These things he failed to do.

Cherbourg & "Epsom"

Even if worse comes to worst, it is your duty to defend the last bunker and leave to the enemy not a harbor but a field of ruins.

— Hitler's message to the Cherbourg commander, 22 June 1944

It is clear that we must now capture Caen and Cherbourg, as the first step in the full development of our plans.

— Gen. Montgomery.

If you doubt what we are doing, get up here and take over this shambles yourself.

— Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt responding to Berlin's incessant interference.

Early the next morning, on 18 June, the U.S. *9th Infantry Division* reached the western coast of the Cotentin, cutting off the remnants of three German infantry divisions in the peninsula. These fell back to Fortress Cherbourg. A four-day Channel storm came to the aid of the Germans, destroying one of the two Mulberry (artificial) Harbors the Allies had constructed in the Bay of the Seine, and doing more damage to Allied shipping than the Germans had managed to do on D-Day. Nevertheless, with the help of air attacks and off-shore bombardment, German morale in Cherbourg soon deteriorated and the U.S. *7th Corps* captured its objective on 27 June, having suffered 22,000 casualties in three weeks of fighting. However, German engineers had so thoroughly mined Cherbourg's harbor and destroyed its installations that it was another three weeks before the Americans could unload cargo there.

Meanwhile, the British continued to build up their forces in the beachhead (delayed somewhat by the storm), and prepared a second operation to outflank Caen from the west, this one code-named "Epsom." For five days at the end of June, the British 8th and 30th Corps fought hard just to make a bulge of a few miles. The newly arrived 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions counterattacked and brought the operation to a close far short of success. The 8th Corps alone suffered over 4,000 casualties in "Epsom."

At his headquarters in Germany, Hitler envisioned making a counterattack with six panzer divisions that would split the beachhead in two, but Rommel could not afford such luxury. He barely had ammunition for defense, his divisions had suffered severe losses, and German daylight movements always came under stiff air attacks. Because of Allied air superiority, the Germans moved mostly by night, became a "walking forest" by day, and developed what they jokingly called "the German look" — heads tilted upward looking for *Jabos* (enemy fighter-bombers). Allied soldiers had no need for such a habit.

Rommel and Rundstedt met again with Hitler on 29 June, this time at Berchtesgaden in Germany. Both field marshals expressed dissatisfaction with the situation in Normandy, and both expected to be relieved of command. In fact, Hitler did replace Rundstedt with Field Marshal Günther von Kluge on 2 July. Changing generals would not solve the problem, though. German losses exceeded 60,000 men by the end of June. One infantry division had been completely destroyed, another withdrawn to southern France for recovery, and three others held on only as remnants. Allied casualties had been just as high, but Montgomery had pumped over 850,000 men into the lodgement area.

Carpet Bombing Begins

Get Caen or get out.

— Winston Churchill to Gen. Montgomery, July 1944

By early July Caen was a city of rubble. Thousands of its inhabitants were dead or wounded, and many more had fled to the countryside. However, its capture would provide more space for Allied armies and airfields. Montgomery also had a political reason for liberating Caen — his critics (there were many, American and British) complained he was dragging his feet. Therefore, Montgomery called in the heavies to help make one last push, code-named "Charnwood."

On the evening of 7 July, 460 strategic bombers of British Bomber Command dropped 2,300 tons of bombs in a target area not much larger than a square mile along the northern outskirts of Caen. This awesome support (called "carpet bombing") apparently missed the Germans, but it gave the watching Tommies of British 1st Corps a much-

needed morale boost. The 1st Corps finally captured its D-Day objective on D+33 (9 July). The German line bent once more but did not break.

Bradley's army was not idle during this time. On 3 July the US 8th Corps opened an offensive on the extreme right that would eventually spread across 25 miles of the front and include three other US corps. Bradley wanted to deepen the bridgehead prior to a breakout attempt, so he set only limited objectives for his troops. Even so, this was some of the worst hedgerow country in the Cotentin. Over two weeks later, on 18 July, the offensive came to an end when 19th Corps occupied St. Lô. Bradley had gained only three to nine miles along his front at a staggering cost. 19th Corps, which joined the offensive on 7 July, lost more than 10,000 killed, wounded, and missing. Bradley could replace those men, but the German Seventh Army opposing the Americans could not make good its losses.

The Germans suffered another blow on 17 July: Rommel was seriously wounded when an RAF fighter strafed his vehicle. He would never return to command. Three months later he swallowed poison rather than face trial for indirect involvement in the 20 July bomb plot to assassinate Hitler and sue for peace with the Western Allies. Kluge took over responsibility for *Army Group B*.


By mid-July the Allies had built up a formidable force on the continent, and Montgomery could contemplate a breakout that would lead to mobile rather than attritional warfare. Dempsey's *Second Army* would try to reach the open country southeast of Caen where tanks could better maneuver. After diversionary attacks by 12th and 30th Corps, a tremendous carpet bombing heralded Operation "Goodwood" on 18 July. Three armored divisions



US troops enter the wreckage of St. Lo shortly after its capture from the Germans.



German Divisional Order of Battle Normandy, 25 July 1944



of 8th Corps then tried to squeeze through the cratered gap in the German line.

By most accounts, "Goodwood" came within a luger pistol of success. Among the debris of the German defenses stood an intact battery of 88mm antiaircraft guns from the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division, barrels pointing upward at the departed bombers while British tanks advanced in front. A regimental commander from 21st Panzer Division arrived and ordered the battery to engage the tanks. The battery officer refused. The regimental commander drew his pistol and ordered again. The battery lowered its muzzles and quickly destroyed 16 British tanks. This caused enough delay among the following units that the Germans were able to establish a new line.

The British lost 400 tanks in this three-day operation that also included the British 1st and Canadian 2nd Corps. For this they advanced only seven miles.

Though "Goodwood" did not produce the hoped-for breakthrough, it helped wear down the Germans and kept German attention focused on the British sector of the front. Panzer Group West (later renamed 5th Panzer Army) had responsibility for this sector. As its name implies, the bulk of the German panzer forces in France were deployed here — seven panzer divisions by 25 July. By comparison, only two panzer divisions faced the Americans in the bocage.

By 23 July, the Germans had lost 117,000 men in Normandy, of whom only 10 percent had been replaced. They had also lost 760 tanks and 190 assault guns. The German line was close to breaking, and Bradley prepared his next operation accordingly.

Operation "Cobra"

The attack we put in on July 18th was not a very good operation of war tactically, but strategically it was a great success, even though we did get a bloody nose.


— Lt. Gen. Sir Miles Dempsey, British Second Army Commander, double-talking about "Goodwood," the breakthrough that almost was.

Only a breakout would enable us to crash into the enemy's rear where we could fight a war of movement on our own best terms.

— Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley

Once more the mighty bomb carpet fell — this time so close to the German main line of resistance that the US 7th Corps suffered 600 casualties from short drops. However, this 25 July carpet bombing shattered the Panzer Lehr division, allowing US infantry to advance over the resultant "moonscape." Next day the US armor rolled through the gap.

The US Sherman tanks were now fitted with metal "rhino" tusks (made from scrapped German beach obstacles), which permitted the tanks to plough through the hedgerows without exposing their soft undersides to enemy fire. The second



phase of the Normandy Campaign had begun. There would still be heavy fighting, but the Allied armies would keep on the move.

The German *Seventh Army* reacted poorly to the breakthrough. Instead of retreating south to form a new line, it retreated southeast across the axis of the American advance. This left an open avenue along the coast for the tanks of the US *4th* and *6th Armored Divisions* to exploit. The Americans captured the small port of Granville and by 31 July reached the corner of Brittany just past Avranches.

Meanwhile, Dempsey supported Bradley's effort with Operation "Bluecoat," a British offensive into the bocage country adjacent to Bradley's army. "Bluecoat" began on 30 July, and the Strategic Air Force conducted its fourth carpet bombing raid in support.

On 1 August, Bradley passed the ball to his best runner, Lt. Gen. George S. Patton. Patton's *Third Army* was made officially operational that day, and Patton immediately directed the *4th* and *6th Armored Divisions* into Brittany to capture the ports desired by Allied planners. He made a £5 bet with Montgomery that his men would be in Brest "by Saturday night" (5 August). He lost. The Atlantic U-boat base of Brest was a fortress city with over 30,000 combat troops. The other U-boat

bases in Brittany — Lorient and St. Nazaire — had another 15,000 and 12,000 defenders, respectively.

St. Malo was the fourth fortress in Brittany, with yet another 12,000 Germans. It was close at hand, so Patton chose to reduce it first as a demoralizing example to the other fortresses. This backfired, too. St. Malo held out for two weeks against two infantry divisions with heavy artillery support. The Allies decided to mask the other fortresses and turn their attention east where better opportunities awaited. (Just after the Normandy Campaign, three US infantry divisions fought their way into Brest in a grueling 25-day battle that cost 10,000 casualties. French resistance fighters besieged Lorient and St. Nazaire for the duration of the war.)

In late July, with the Normandy front obviously unhooked, Hitler belatedly pushed more divisions into the fray. Patton's army got loose before those units could reach the front, so Hitler ordered Kluge to make a counterattack from the Mortain area to recapture Avranches, thus isolating Patton's army from the beachhead. Hitler optimistically envisioned this bold counteroffensive turning northeast to drive back the US *First Army*.

Kluge reluctantly assembled four panzer divisions for Operation "Lüttich," which began early on 7 August. The German attack made little headway and shut down completely when the sky

cleared later in the day and Allied fighter-bombers appeared to shoot up the German tanks.

Encirclement & Liberation

If every effort is not made to move the forces toward the east and out of the threatened encirclement, the army group will have to write off both armies.

— Gen. Sepp Dietrich,
Fifth Panzer Army Commander

Move immediately to Paris!

— Maj. Gen. Jacques Leclerc, Commander 2nd
Free French Armored Division, 22 August 1944

The Allies had by now recognized an opportunity to surround a large portion of German Army Group B in Normandy. Bradley and Eisenhower favored a short hook: Patton could swing 15th Corps north from Le Mans to Argentan while the

V for Vengeance

It seemed likely that, if the German had succeeded in perfecting and using these new weapons six months earlier than he did, our invasion of Europe would have proved exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible.

— Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Should the new weapons in which you place so much hope, especially those of the air force, not bring success...then, my Führer, make up your mind to end the war.

— Field Marshal Günther von Kluge in his suicide note, 19 August 1944.

By the summer of 1943, Axis armies had lost ground on the Eastern Front and had been expelled from North Africa. In addition, German U-boats were losing the Battle of the Atlantic, and Allied strategic bombers were blasting German cities. Hitler needed a new option if he was going to win the war, so he gave priority to the development of long-range missiles (also known as V-weapons, for *Vergeltungs*, or Vengeance—the name was a deliberate mock of the Allied “V for Victory” slogan). The V1 flying bomb was designed to knock Britain out of the war. The V2 rocket would supplement the V1, but it also had a more far-reaching goal.

V1 Flying Bomb

The pilotless V1 pulse-jet carried a one-ton, high-explosive warhead to a range of 185 miles. It was a relatively simple weapon that could be easily mass produced. The V1 flew at 400 mph in a straight line toward its target, invariably an industrial city in southern England. Starting in 1943, the Germans, with the aid of French labor, constructed about 100 launch ramps in northern France between the Cherbourg Peninsula and the Pas de Calais. These 150-foot ramps pointed directly at London, Southampton, Plymouth, or Bristol and soon came under attack from Allied bombers in Operation “Crossbow.”

The Germans constructed about 60 modified sites with 70-foot ramps. These shorter ramps were less vulnerable to Allied air attacks, but they resulted in approximately 15% failed launches. A few launch sites were designed to service unconventional warheads — probably nerve gas, though no such warhead was ever used.

Originally scheduled to begin on 15 February 1944, the main V1 offensive finally started on 13 June and lasted two and a half months. During that period, the

Germans launched about 9,000 flying bombs at London. Allied interceptors and anti-aircraft guns shot down most of them, but Eisenhower nonetheless received heavy political pressure to capture the launch sites.

In material terms, the V1 offensive cost the Allies four times what it cost the Germans. The Germans sporadically continued their V1 campaign from Holland, including air launches from He 111 bombers, but the worst was over for England by September, when Commonwealth ground forces occupied the Pas de Calais launch sites.

V2 Rocket

The 45-foot V2 rocket was a much more complicated weapon than the V1, making it difficult to produce and handle. On the other hand, it had greater accuracy and — because it dropped on its target at Mach 3 — it could not be shot down.

The V2's range equalled that of the V1, so the Germans built about 50 rocket sites in the same areas of northern France as the flying bomb sites. The V2 also carried the same HE payload as the V1, and the Germans prepared several of the rocket sites to handle unconventional warheads — either chemical or nuclear.

Arguably, Hitler did not intend to initiate chemical warfare against the Allies but had to be ready to respond in kind — Churchill considered retaliating against Germany with poison gas after the V1s started falling. However, the Germans worked on an advanced version of the V2 with a range of 3,000 miles (that is, trans-Atlantic range), and they built the world's first missile silos near Cherbourg. These silos could house a missile twice the height of the V2. Given that it would not pay to launch such a rocket with only a high-explosive warhead, Hitler must have hoped for a nuclear or chemical deterrent that would make the US and Britain back off. (Though Germany fell far behind the US in the atomic bomb race, she developed the most lethal nerve gases.)

Superb intelligence work by agents and ULTRA radio intercepts allowed the Allied air forces to cripple and delay production of the V2. This in turn enabled Allied troops to overrun the launch sites in France before Hitler could start his rocket offensive. The Germans moved their operation to Holland, and between September 1944 and March 1945 they fired over 1,000 conventional V2s at England from those new sites — too little and too late to change the war's outcome.

newly operational Canadian *First Army* pushed southeast from Caen through Falaise to link up with the Americans. Montgomery wanted a long hook that would meet closer to the Seine, but he went along with the Americans.

On 7 August the Canadian *2nd Corps* supported by carpet bombing began their move with Operation "Totalize." Montgomery followed that with another carpet bombing attack and Operation "Tractable" on 14 August, and the Canadians reached Falaise by the 16th. (Both carpet bombings produced some Allied casualties through short drops.)

Meanwhile, the US *15th Corps* advanced against little opposition to reach a position south of Argentan on 13 August. At that point, Bradley ordered Patton to halt. There was still a 20-mile gap between the pincers, but Bradley wanted a "solid shoulder at Argentan" rather than "a broken neck" further north. He feared *15th Corps* would not be able to stop a breakout attempt by the Germans. Two days later, he relented enough to allow Patton to lunge east toward the Seine — that is, the long hook option.

The Falaise-Argentan gap did not close completely until 21 August. More concert of action between the Allies might have increased the haul of German prisoners, regardless of which option the Allied commanders had chosen (long or short envelopment).

On 15 August, US and Free French armies landed on the Mediterranean coast of France in Operation "Anvil." This invasion ensured the collapse of all the German armies in France. The Allied forces in Normandy would be the hammer to this southern "Anvil," with the Germans in between.

Kluge personally spent most of that day in a ditch, out of communication and pinned down by ubiquitous Allied aircraft. Hitler jumped to the erroneous conclusion Kluge was trying to surrender his forces to the Allies, and sent Field Marshal Walter Model to replace Kluge on 17 August. Model had just stabilized part of the Eastern Front where the Russians had torn a huge chunk out of Army Group Center, and Hitler now expected Model to maintain a bridgehead west of the Seine, while also turning Paris into a fortress. Model soon recognized the impossibility of those orders, so he ignored them and tried to get as many men out of Normandy as possible.

The US *79th Infantry Division* established a bridgehead over the Seine northwest of Paris on 20 August. Other units of Patton's army were also southeast of Paris by then. In addition, French Forces of the Interior (resistance fighters) started an uprising inside the city.

Hitler gave the city's commander, Maj. Gen. Dietrich von Choltitz, the usual "field of ruins" order, but Choltitz humanely made a truce with the FFI and set up his scant defenses at the city's western outskirts. Gen. Charles de Gaulle and the

Free French troops in Normandy brought increasing pressure on Eisenhower to allow them to liberate the city. He granted permission on 22 August, and the French *2nd Armored Division* wasted no time getting there. However, once past the German defenses, the Frenchmen slowed their advance through the suburbs to receive the full benefit of the flowers, wine, and kisses of the jubilant Parisians. The Americans sent in the US *4th Infantry Division* to hurry things along, and the French soldiers got the hint and increased speed. The two divisions occupied most of Paris by 25 August.

Not only was this a red-letter day for the French, it was also that for the *4th Infantry*. That division had landed at Utah beach on D-Day, and now on D+80 it was liberating Paris. The same date also marked the official end of the Normandy Campaign.

Conclusion

The Allied armies in Normandy suffered 210,000 casualties by the end of August. The Allies also lost 17,000 airmen. Estimates of German casualties range from 250,000 to 400,000, many of whom became prisoners. Altogether, 43 German divisions were destroyed or "severely mauled" in France, and 1,300 tanks were lost.

The heavy casualties also had an impact on the British, and they had to disband the *59th Infantry Division*, plus one infantry and one armored brigade. The Canadians, too, were below strength by some 3,000 infantrymen. However, Allied casualties would have been much higher if Hitler had sent the troops to Normandy that he instead kept guarding the coast elsewhere. Of course, that raises the biggest question of all: would the Allied planners have chosen Normandy for the "Overlord" invasion if they had fully appreciated the effects of the *bocage*? Probably so, but at least they would have developed earlier plans to deal with the problem. ☉

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A Non-Partisan View of World War II Yugoslavia

by Vern Liebl

[Ed's Intro: When watching the tragedy being played out in what used to be Yugoslavia, the question that immediately comes to mind is, "Why has this happened?" Well, here's why. Read it and weep.]

The Situation in 1939

Germany actually had no territorial designs on Yugoslavia at the start of the Second World War. What Hitler initially sought there, if not an ally, was a friendly neutral. Yugoslavia was important to Germany's war economy as both a source of raw materials (bauxite, coal, antimony, copper) and as a conduit for additional resources transhipped from other Balkan countries (Turkish chrome, Romanian oil). A cooperative Yugoslavia would greatly aid the efficiency of the Reich's war machine, while at the same time not requiring a diversion of *Wehrmacht* strength into a secondary front.

In pursuance of his goal, Hitler continually applied diplomatic pressure on the Yugoslav government, then headed by Prince Regent Paul, to sign adherence to the Axis Tripartite Pact. Such adherence would not make Yugoslavia an active Axis ally, but would block any possible alliance between Belgrade and any power hostile to Rome, Berlin and Tokyo. Paul finally signed on 25 March 1941, but only after receiving Hitler's personal assurance Axis troops would not seek transit through Yugoslav territory for the purposes of conducting operations elsewhere.

Fascist Italy, however, did harbor considerable territorial demands on Yugoslavia. Mussolini wanted to annex Slovenia and the entire Dalmatian coast directly to Italy. He also wanted to add the Kosovo region to Albania (then part of the Italian Empire), and set up protectorates over Montenegro and Croatia. These territorial changes would secure Italian control of the Adriatic Sea and considerable amounts of mineral resources, and also give the "New Roman Empire" leverage in all Balkan affairs.

Great Britain, of course, was primarily concerned with keeping the Germans and Italians out of the Balkans, especially Greece. A pro-British Yugoslavia, or at least a truly neutral Yugoslavia, would deny direct German access to Greek territory, thus helping London's defense efforts in the eastern Mediterranean. (German seizure of Greek airfields could directly imperil British shipping routes and the vital Suez Canal.)

Bulgaria had irredentist claims on Yugoslav Macedonia (Vardar). This had been the primary reason for (unsuccessful) Bulgarian participation in

two wars — the Second Balkan War (1913) and World War I (1915-18). Macedonia had also been a major issue in Bulgarian politics during the 1920s and early 30s, when political groups fought over it with each other in the streets of Sofia.

Though less strident, Hungary laid claims to Backa and Prekmurje, two areas that had been part of "Greater Hungary" when it was still part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Within Yugoslavia itself, ethnic and political tensions continually threatened to pull the country apart. Though the central government was a constitutional monarchy supposedly ruling evenhandedly over a coalition of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the capital was located in Serbian Belgrade, and the entire apparatus and bureaucracy of government was Serb dominated. Many Croats felt exploited and oppressed and desired at least autonomy, if not outright independence. Italian support of rabidly nationalist expatriate Croat fascists helped keep the cauldron boiling.

Other groups within Yugoslavia also espoused particular aspirations. The Albanians in Kosovo resented Serbian domination; the Vardar Macedonians preferred unification with Bulgaria rather than continued association with Belgrade; and the Slovenes, the most western-oriented group in the country, having close cultural ties with the Germans, also desired autonomy. Further, a communist movement, which continued to grow clandestinely even after that party was outlawed in Yugoslavia in 1921, despised monarchist rule and helped foster nationalist claims by forming their cells along ethnic lines.

In sum, by 1941, even without the Axis invasion, Yugoslavia had reached a point where it was in danger of falling apart, and along much the same lines that have finally been taken in this decade.

Prelude to Invasion

The main stimulus for the Axis invasion and occupation of Yugoslavia came about, ironically, due to the Yugoslav government's efforts to avoid being drawn into the Italo-Greek War then going on to the south.

On 28 November 1940, during a conference with the Yugoslav foreign minister, Hitler offered to sign a non-aggression pact with Belgrade, and again pressed for their adherence to the Tripartite Pact. He then stated his intention to intervene in the Balkans to aid the Italians in Greece. Once

Greece was conquered and the British influence there removed, Hitler suggested frontier adjustments would be made and offered to give Yugoslavia an outlet to the Aegean Sea through Salonika. The diplomat relayed the offer to Belgrade, but no reply was made.

German military planners, who were at that time sweating over how to invade and conquer Greece (Operation Marita), while at the same time allowing for the rapid redeployment of those forces for the subsequent invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa), repeatedly asked more pressure be put on Yugoslavia to join the Axis. They deemed this essential to their plans because of the lack of direct rail lines between Bulgaria and Greece. Such rail lines existed between Yugoslavia and Greece, and the *Wehrmacht* needed access to them if such a large move south was to be quickly followed by another back to the north and east. Having the Yugoslav rail lines meant cutting four weeks off what would otherwise have been a 10 week operation.

Further German/Yugoslav conferences were held at the foreign minister level, but Belgrade continued to refuse to commit to any agreements. As the projected date for Operation Marita drew closer, Hitler invited Paul to a face-to-face meeting on 4 March 1941. The outcome appeared favorable to the Germans; Yugoslavia would sign on to the Tripartite Pact in exchange for Hitler's personal assurance no Axis troops would transit their territory. Though a political success for Berlin, the agreement still left the vital rail lines unusable by its military.

The signing ceremony took place in Vienna on 25 March, and at it the Yugoslav delegation was handed two documents. These were written guarantees, the first promising Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and sovereignty would be respected, and the second holding a pledge that for the duration of the war she would not be asked to permit the transit of any Axis troops across her territory. Hitler was apparently prepared to take the political victory as arranged, even though it meant frustrating his military planners.

During the night of 26-27 March, however, a *coup d'état* took place in Belgrade led by the Serbian dominated military. The Serbs had been at the center of the Allied cause in 1914, and they remained strongly anti-German in 1941. The new government was headed by Gen. Dusan Simovic, former commander of the Yugoslav air force. At the same time, King Peter II took the throne. The frontiers of the country were ordered sealed; the army was issued orders to mobilize; and anti-German demonstrations took place in Belgrade and other Serbian towns.

On 27 March, the new foreign minister assured the Germans that continued friendly relations were desired, and though Yugoslavia would not ratify its adherence to the Tripartite Pact, neither would

Yugoslavia's Ethnic Makeup in 1941

Ethnic Group	Number (in millions)	Percentage of 1941 Population
Serbs	6.5	41%
Croats	3.5	22%
Slovenes	1.5	9%
Macedonians	0.9	6%
Moslem Slavs	0.9	6%
Montenegrins	0.5	3%
Others	2.2	13%
Total	16.0	100%

any official cancellation of already standing agreements occur.

Despite those assurances, Hitler believed the coup government was anti-German and would sooner or later join the Allies. He also believed the coup had been accomplished solely by Serbs, which led to a desire in him to "punish" that people — a desire that had significant influence on the Germans' subsequent occupation policies within Yugoslavia.

On the evening of the 27th, Hitler called a meeting of his top military commanders and informed them he had decided to "destroy Yugoslavia as a military power and sovereign state." This was to be accomplished quickly and with the participation of those nations having a common



The Axis Invasion of Yugoslavia — April 1941.

border with Yugoslavia. Thus was born "Directive No. 25," the document outlining the course and timing of the invasion of Yugoslavia.

Gen. Simovic realized the Germans were preparing for a military move, and he therefore tried his utmost to unify his government by including Croat members within it. It was not until 3 April, however, that the invited Croat leaders finally agreed to join — that was only three days before the start of the invasion.

The Attack

The German attack began on 6 April with a saturation bombing raid on Belgrade, along with concurrent operations aimed at eliminating the Yugoslav air force. (On 3 April, a Croatian officer in the Yugoslav air force had flown his plane to a *Luftwaffe* base in Germany. There he handed over a

classified list of airfields giving complete information on Yugoslav aircraft dispersal.)

German ground forces moved in strength on 8 April and quickly sliced deeply into Yugoslavia. The fast moving and hard hitting German attacks compounded the problems the defenders were already having due to incomplete mobilization, ethnic factionalism, poor planning and general unpreparedness. Serb troops usually attempted vigorous defenses, but entire Croatian units simply threw their weapons down and quit. In some instances, Croat officers even led their men in attacks against Serbs attempting to hold off the Germans. On 8 April, Croat troops in Vinkovci, the main railroad junction along the Belgrade-Zagreb line, attacked the headquarters of the Yugoslav *1st Army Group*, and held its commander and his staff prisoner until some Serb troops showed up and restored the situation.

The Germans, of course, were well aware of the rift between the Serbs and Croats, and took full advantage of it. Propaganda was constantly repeated about German and Italian desires for the creation of an independent Croatia, along with assurances the military operations underway were really only directed at Serbia. (Privately, Hitler was said to have remarked about the divisions within Yugoslavia: "If they want to bash each others' heads in, let them go ahead.")

On 10 April, an independent Croatian state was declared with full German and Italian support. The next day, Italian forces also crossed the Yugoslav border at several points, encountered little resistance, and began the occupation of the Dalmatia and Kosovo regions. Also on the 11th, Hungarian troops crossed the frontier north of Osijek and occupied the area between the Danube and Tisza Rivers, meeting virtually no resistance.

During the 12 days of actual combat, the Germans suffered only 558 killed, wounded and missing; Yugoslav losses are unknown. Immediately upon official cessation of hostilities, however, the Germans were forced into making a mistake by their tight timetable. They began withdrawing too many of their military units too quickly, in preparation for the upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union. This prevented a thorough mop-up of all Yugoslav military units. Many were able to destroy their personnel records, cache their weapons, and disband their soldiers into the countryside without German interference.

Only 344,162 officers and men (about half of all the Yugoslav military) were captured. Of those, a considerable number were Croat, ethnic-German ("Volksdeutsch"), ethnic-Hungarians, or ethnic-Bulgarians, who were soon released. That left only about 254,000 prisoners, nearly all Serbs, to spend the duration of the war as POWs in German camps. It's estimated over 300,000 Yugoslav soldiers — again, mostly Serbian — disobeyed the capitulation order and evaded capture.

The Bulgarian Occupation

On 19 April 1941, Bulgarian troops entered Macedonia to replace the German forces rapidly withdrawing from there. The *5th Bulgarian Army Corps* (of three divisions) moved in and set up headquarters in Skopje. The former Yugoslav citizens greeted the newcomers tumultuously, most welcoming the proclamation uniting Macedonia and Bulgaria: "One people, one Tsar, one Kingdom." The warm reception came about largely as the result of Macedonian resentment of three decades of Serbian dominance characterized by administrative brutality, Serb chauvinism, political corruption and economic exploitation — all more flagrant than occurred anywhere else in Yugoslavia.

As with the Hungarians, and for the same reasons, the Bulgarians also sought to institute what they viewed as a benevolent occupation policy; however, it didn't last long. Bulgarians, not Macedonians, replaced the departed Serb officials; all matters of importance were decided in Sofia; and a thorough program of "Bulgarization" was put in place. Over 800 Bulgarian schools were established, and in July 1942 all Macedonians had to accept or reject Bulgarian citizenship. Those who refused, nearly 120,000, were deported to German occupied Serbia. The Bulgarian practice of sending only second- and third-rate officials to Macedonia also aggravated a worsening situation.

Rapid Macedonian disillusionment led to hostility, which led to increasingly harsh and arbitrary policies by the Bulgarian occupiers. The army that had been greeted so enthusiastically soon became an object of disgust and fear. By October 1942, a German intelligence report on the situation in Macedonia stated: "The Macedonians, who during the period of Yugoslav rule had regarded everything Bulgarian with admiration, now are exceedingly disillusioned after being acquainted with a completely corrupt as well as incompetent Bulgarian administration."

Beginning eight months after their arrival, anti-Axis Macedonian guerrilla activity led to Bulgarian reprisals so savage that at times even the Germans intervened to restrain their scope and severity.

Yugoslavia Partitioned: Italo-German Friction

Because the invasion had been ordered and planned so suddenly, the Germans lacked any clearly defined plans for Yugoslavia's postwar disposition. Since the war effort elsewhere prevented them from maintaining a large and permanent military commitment there, they soon turned over the administration of most of the conquered country — except Serbia, which remained under German military occupation until late in 1944 — to their allies and native collaborators.

German and Italian interests within Yugoslavia began to clash almost immediately. The Italian territorial demands seemed excessive to the Germans, who did not want the "New Roman Empire" to establish hegemony in the Balkans. Though both Axis partners agreed in principle to allow the existence of an "independent" Croatia, Mussolini wanted it to be only a rump state firmly under his control, while the Germans wanted a larger Croatia bound to Berlin and free of Rome's influence. Germany also wanted complete control of the Zagreb-Belgrade-Nis rail line, and both wanted the bauxite mines at Mostar.

Possibly the greatest issue dividing the Axis conquerors, however, was the resolution of the Slovenian question. Italy considered all of the Carniola area to be properly Italian and part of their Provincia di Lubiana (Ljubljana). But the Germans not only wanted Lower Styria, they also wanted to attach Upper Carniola directly to their Gau Carinthia.

The division of Slovenia, of course, was dictated by the Germans, much to the dissatisfaction of Italy. Though Ljubljana was allocated to Rome, Upper Carniola and a strip of land on the southern bank of the Sava River became German, thereby giving the valuable coalfields and railroads of that area to Berlin. The Italians' displeasure ultimately led to a covert proxy fight between the two occupiers in Yugoslavia, fought out by the clandestine Italian-supported Serbian Chetniks and the German sponsored Croats and Bosnian Moslems.

Elsewhere in the conquered country, Germany retained direct military rule in a rump Serbia and the western Banat, annexed the northern half of Slovenia, and maintained influence, if not an actual physical presence, in Slavonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina north of and including Sarajevo. Italy annexed Dalmatia, the rest of Slovenia and Kotor, occupied Kosovo (uniting it with Albania), and controlled and eventually occupied Montenegro. Hungary reclaimed its "Greater Hungary" areas; Bulgaria got most of Macedonia, and Croatia ruled over what was left (see sidebars).

Prior to and immediately after the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, German authorities approached Vladko Macke, a leader of the Croatian (Continued on page 38)



The Albanians

In April 1941, the dreams of many Albanians in the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia were seemingly realized with the unification of that area to Italian occupied Albania. This "Greater Albania," even though created under the aegis of the Italian crown, meant the reversal of decades of forced Serbification in Kosovo and a unified Albanian homeland. The Kosovo Albanians immediately took possession of the Yugoslav military depots and weapons in their area, organized Moslem militias, mostly accepted their new Italian citizenship, declared their support for the puppet regime of Mustafa Kruje, and began to settle scores with the Serbs they could reach.

Kruje advocated making Kosovo a pure ethnic entity by forcing out the long time Serbian residents and liquidating the more recent settlers. Of course, many Serbs reacted violently by ambushing and counter-massacring Moslems — actions that provoked an escalating spiral of violence centered on ethnic and religious hatred.

Between 70,000 to 100,000 Serbs were forced out of Kosovo, and were mainly relocated to two major concentration camps, Prishtina and Kosovska Mitrovitsa. These camps in turn served as labor reservoirs for the German-controlled Treпча mines and for other Italian projects in Albania. Many other Kosovo Serbs ended as forced laborers elsewhere in German-occupied Europe, were transferred to other camps in rump Serbia, or were executed in reprisal for actions carried out by one or another Yugoslavian resistance group.

The general populace in Kosovo, being Albanian and Moslem, were openly hostile to both the communist Partisans and the royalist Chetniks. When Italy capitulated and the Germans replaced them, those new occupiers continued Rome's policy of fostering Albanian ethnic primacy. They organized the Kosovo Regiment, a racist Moslem unit that fought to ensure Albanians retained their new privileged status well into 1945.

The Croats

Through various machinations and for various reasons and aims, the Independent State of Croatia was proclaimed on 10 April 1941, with its capital at Zagreb. Ante Pavelic, the Poglavnik, initially had only limited support among the Croatian populace. His Ustashi movement had only about 40,000 members, approximately six percent of the population of Croatia.

The largely rural Croats were traditionally loyal to the Peasant Party and its leader Macek. Though the Ustashi considered Macek an enemy because he opposed their terrorist methods and had made compromises with the Belgrade government before the war, they tried to win him over to a collaborationist posture. That failed, but Macek's proclamation urging cooperation with the new regime had considerable effect and helped Pavelic consolidate his power.

Pavelic ruled Croatia dictatorially, partly because such policies were in line with Ustashi-fascist philosophy, and also through necessity. Though nominally "independent," in reality Croatia was divided into Italian and German occupational "spheres." Its army, (also called "Home Guard") was regulated by the Pact of Rome and other arrangements made later.

Theoretically, the Italians were responsible for the training of the Croatian Home Guard, but in practice they were never able to carry out that task because both the Croats and Germans resisted their every effort to do so. Most Croatian Home Guard training ended up being conducted by German army instruction teams, and by sending selected Croat units to Austria to spend time in German army facilities there.

The Croatian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while enlarging Croatia and gathering in numbers of Croats, also added nearly two million Serbs to the population. This new Serbian presence almost guaranteed the Ustashi would have to use strong arm methods to keep control, but Pavelic immediately compounded the problem by deciding to solve the "Serb Problem" by applying a formula. That is, he intended that one-third of the Serbs in Croatia would be expelled to rump Serbia; one-third would be converted to Roman Catholicism (the dominant Croat religion, the Serbs were and are mostly Orthodox), and the remaining third would be exterminated along with all the "Jews and Gypsies" that might be rounded up.

This policy, combined with traditional ethnic rivalries, lack of governing experience, and the general unconcern of the Italian and German authorities, goes far to explain the explosion of violence and killing throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and the viciousness practiced on all sides. It's estimated that by the time the Partisans finally won control over Yugoslavia in 1945, nearly 150,000 Serbs had been expelled from Bosnia-Herzegovina; close to a quarter-million had been converted to Catholicism; and about 500,000 had been killed in concentration camps or massacred outright where they lived. Many non-Ustashi Croats were sickened by these actions and either joined the Chetniks or, increasingly as the war went on, the Partisans.

The actions used by Pavelic in his Catholic-conversion program were largely supported by the Church at the time, and ranged from intimidation to massacre. Archbishop Stepanic of Sarajevo wrote a poem praising Pavelic, rejoicing in the "progress of Christianity," and some Franciscan friars even participated in killings and helped run concentration camps. The Curia in Rome, excepting Cardinal Tisserant, were favorably inclined toward the Ustashi state, and the Pope received Pavelic with the honors due a head of state.

Pavelic's deportation program neatly dovetailed with German plans for Slovenia and Serbia. In May 1941, Croatia indicated a willingness to receive 250,000 Slovenes from German-annexed territory there if in return they were allowed to deport an equal number of Serbs to German occupied Serbia. Berlin's ultimate goal was the Germanization of Slovenia with resettled Volksdeutsch and Reichsdeutsch, while Zagreb would be rid of its large Serbian minority (the already Catholic Slovenes were to be put in as a buffer in Bosnia-Herzegovina).

The resettlement-trade plan eventually broke down due to logistical and administrative problems, as well as local resistance to the deportations. It was finally overturned late in 1942 by the German decision to elevate all Slovenes to the status of Volksdeutsch.

The September 1943 surrender of Italy caught both Germans and Croats by surprise. Many of the Italians then in Yugoslavia surrendered, but several thousand fled into the countryside and joined the Chetniks and Partisans. Enormous quantities of ammunition, weapons and other military stores were seized by the Partisans (and to a lesser degree by the Chetniks).

The new and ever more confused situation provided Pavelic with an opportunity to impress his populace by allowing him to make a show of force against the former Italian overlords. Detachments of Croatian troops and Ustashi units occupied Dalmatia, also capturing large amounts of arms and equipment in the process (but less than that obtained by the Partisans), and rounding up many Italian prisoners.



Two commemorative stamps issued by the puppet Croatian regime to honor its troops serving with the Axis on the Eastern Front. Note the attention to Balkan "political correctness," in that the one on the left is shown in German garb, and the other is dressed in Italian uniform.

Shortly after the establishment of Independent Croatia, the German army attached one of its generals to the office of the Poglavnik. This military attache was responsible for safeguarding German military interests, offering aid as needed and when available, and assisting in the training of troops and the procurement of materiel.

In the Austro-Hungarian army of World War I, Croatian units had enjoyed considerable prestige and their soldiers were regarded as uncommonly brave. Berlin therefore expected Croatia to make a valuable contribution to the Axis war effort. But several factors worked against the fulfillment of that German hope. The inexperience of Ustashi authorities in raising and equipping armed forces caused confusion; the unsettled nature of the countryside and lack of broad based loyalty to the Zagreb regime compounded those problems.

Further, while they were still around, the Italians had hindered the training and operations of Croatian troops at every opportunity, never permitting an orderly conscription in their sphere. The Germans, despite their hopes for an effective new ally, could never really overcome their distrust of everything Balkan and bring themselves to permit the large scale formation of new Croatian units. They supplied weapons and equipment only at moments and for operations that suited German interests. Thus the growth of the Croatian armed forces was never able to proceed in an orderly and systematic way; improvisations, half-measures, and almost daily changes in programs and plans became the norm.

The Croatian armed forces, as well as the entire Croatian state apparatus, were engaged in two simultaneous wars. The first was the larger war in which their real rulers, the Germans and Italians, exploited them to help gain Axis war aims. The second war was a struggle to preserve the Croatian state against royalist Serbians (the Chetniks) and the communist Pan-Yugoslavs (the Partisans).

A third, internal, fight further hampered Croatian military efforts. This was the struggle between the Croatian Home Guard and the Ustashi to gain the status of being the central military establishment of the nation. It was similar in nature the conflict between the regular German army and the S.S., but the Croatians carried things to much more lethal extremes. Violent conflict between the officers of the rival armies was common, assassinations occurring daily.

Within the Home Guard itself there were conflicting traditions and views among the officers and senior enlisted. One faction was made up of those who had formerly served in the Austro-Hungarian armed forces and were pro-German. The other faction had only Yugoslavian army background and had much less liking for the Germans. To cap it all off, Pavelic made frequent changes in the office of Minister of War to preserve his personal military power and prevent a coup.

All this, combined with the Croatians' traditional and passionate hatred of Serbians, and officers who encouraged and participated in atrocities, and the explicit directives of Pavelic to drive out or exterminate the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, engendered great slaughter, fol-

lowed by equally brutal responses from the Partisans and Chetniks. Ultimately, Ustashi policies degenerated into nothing more than a savage drive to exterminate all non-Croatian elements within the population. The extremes reached in this sometimes even caused friction with the amazed German occupation troops — men not otherwise or elsewhere known for squeamishness.

Shortly after the invasion of the USSR, the Croatian government suggested the Axis war effort there might benefit from the provisional incorporation of Croat units within German or Italian forces. The idea was accepted, and a Croatian Volunteer Legion consisting of a reinforced infantry regiment (with German officers and NCOs) and an artillery group was attached to the German *100th Light Infantry Division*. This unit, finally designated the *369th Regiment*, was eventually destroyed along with its parent division in the Stalingrad pocket. At the same time the Volunteer Legion was raised, another battalion-sized unit was organized and incorporated into the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia (later the *Eighth Army*), mainly for reasons of prestige and maintaining political balance.

By September 1943, when the Croatian military reached its peak, 262,326 men were carried on its rolls. Troops under direct German command made up one category totalling 170,080. Troops under Croatian command amounted to 92,246. Of that second total, 28,500 were Ustashi militia and Pavelic's personal guard; 18,000 were gendarmes, and 45,746 were in the Croatian Home Guard.

Both Home Guard and Ustashi units were organized into brigade-sized groupings of battalions lacking heavy weapons and artillery. The Home Guard brigades were designated as mountain infantry, but they actually lacked the specialized training and equipment that goes with such status; the title was purely honorific.

Croatian Home Guard training was conducted either by German cadres in training schools in Zagreb and Varazdin, or after 1943 by the German-Croatian Training Brigade at Stockerau, near Vienna. The Ustashi received little recruit training, but some unit training was carried on at the Brod training school by German Waffen SS personnel. (Training there was conducted under especially difficult circumstances, as it often had to be interrupted to fend off Partisan attacks.)

Nearly all Croatian military activity was army-oriented, with only small resources being allotted to the Croatian air force and navy. Only a few aircraft were ever flown by Croatian pilots. The Croatian naval effort was only marginally larger, mainly due to the Italian annexation of Dalmatia and Rome's prohibition of a standing Croatian navy. However, to assert the existence of a navy, a detachment of officers and men, formerly of the Yugoslavian navy, were sent to the Black Sea, where they cooperated with the Germans against the Soviets, manning patrol boats and other small vessels.

The aggregate of Croatian forces in Yugoslavia were organized into three corps for administrative control and supply. All three corps remained within Croatian borders until May 1945, when they withdrew into Austria and Italy to surrender to the Western Allies.

Bosnian Moslems

The Bosnian Moslems proved to be the most unfortunate group in Yugoslavia during World War II. Ethnically Serbian and speaking Serbo-Croatian, they were despised by their Christian Serb neighbors, used by the Croats to fight those Serbs, repudiated by the Albanian Moslems for being closet-Serbs, and exploited by the German SS as a ready manpower source.

In the Italian occupation zone, the Chetniks set out almost immediately to destroy the Bosnian Moslems. The killing was merciless. In the town of Foca, before executing a Moslem who appealed to them for mercy on the basis of his record of Serb patriotism, the Chetniks explained themselves this way: "In as much as you were a Serb, you sullied the Serb name, because you are really a Turk. But since you helped us, we shall not torture you." They shot him in the head instead of cutting his throat.

The growing demand of the Germans for more troops eventually overrode the fact the Bosnians were non-Aryans. The Waffen SS raised two Moslem divisions, allowed on the rationale the Bosnians were actually descendants of Christian mountaineers who had been forcibly converted to Islam by the Turks during the Middle Ages. These units performed poorly, their main interest proving to be the massacre of Serbian Christians in defenseless villages rather than combating armed Partisans. They were disbanded as failures before the war's end.

The Volksdeutsch

Approximately 600,000 ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsch) lived in prewar Yugoslavia, and once German occupation became a fact, most were relocated either to settlement areas in territories annexed to the Reich, or to Germany proper.

The Volksdeutsch often ended up in resettlement camps, idle, frustrated and bitter. Their young men were actively recruited by both the regular German armed forces and the SS. These men then often served as cadres for other ethnic units raised in occupied territories. One regular German army division was composed primarily of Volksdeutsch from Croatia and Serbia and fought on the Russian Front. Five additional ethnic divisions, all with Yugoslav Volksdeutsch cadres, were raised by the Waffen SS. An additional SS armored infantry division made up entirely of Volksdeutsch was also raised from throughout the Balkans in 1944.

So consuming was the Nazi effort to control all expatriate Germans that the Volksdeutsch who remained in Ustashi Croatia were required to take a loyalty oath to Hitler. As the war continued and native German manpower reserves were exhausted, Berlin resorted to the expedient of declaring certain peoples in occupied Europe (for example, the Slovenes) as racially German (Volksdeutsch), thereby making them provisional German citizens subject to conscription.

(Continued from page 35)

Peasant Party. Its platform contained many pro-fascist and pro-Nazi ideas, favored harsh anti-communist measures, and took German economic efficiency and "orderliness" as its ideal. Macke, however, refused the Germans' offer to form a Croatian government, agreeing only to issue a proclamation exhorting his countrymen not to oppose the occupying forces and to cooperate with whatever new regime was set up. His refusal to go farther led to his arrest and exile within the confines of his native village, and through the end of the war he took no part in politics.

This German political misfire led the Italians to put forward their own candidate who, while not widely popular in Croatia, was beholden to Rome. Ante Pavelic, cofounder and leader of the Croatian Revolutionary Organization (the Ustashi), an ultranationalist and secret group with the goal of achieving independence through terrorism and armed struggle, was offered up by Mussolini and accepted by Hitler.



Ante Pavelic, feared and hated dictator of puppet Croatia, glowers out from this stamp issued to honor his birthday on 13 December 1943.

The Italians, feeling they'd scored a huge political success over their German ally, fully sponsored Pavelic's regime in return for his support of their annexation of Croatian-populated Dalmatia. An Italo-Croat dynastic union was established when the Duke of Spoleto, nephew to the Italian King Victor Emmanuel, was crowned King of Croatia. But the new monarch preferred to remain in Rome and in fact never set foot in Croatia. That left Pavelic as the real ruler, and he was proclaimed "Poglavnik" (chief).

Italy's political victory was also more apparent than real in another way. When Hitler accepted Pavelic's assumption of power in Croatia, he felt sure there would be an inevitable falling out between that regime and Rome. *Der Führer* wasn't the only one who believed that. Soon Pavelic himself was bluntly telling the German minister in Zagreb that he was relying on the eventual disintegration of the Italian army to open the way for the reassertion of Croatian rights along the Adriatic.

While Croatia remained overtly loyal to both major Axis partners prior to Italy's dropping out of the war in 1943, clandestinely her politicians put great effort into creating closer ties with Berlin. At the same time, the Germans' diplomatic efforts in the area were constantly aimed at undermining Italian territorial designs and efforts at integrating

Dalmatia and Kotor into a "Greater Italy." Ever increasing Italian-Croatian hostility soon worked to prevent any effective coordination of policies, resulting in political and economic anarchy appearing in large portions of Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Watching all this take place around them, the Italian army units in Yugoslavia became increas-

ingly anti-Ustashi and pro-Serbian, and by late 1941 began to provide covert support to Chetnik guerrillas engaged in attacks against German and Croat forces (see sidebar).

"Independent" Croatia had been divided into Italian and German "spheres for military activity." In the Italian sphere, Mussolini's units generally tried to reach a state of mutual toleration with any

The Serbs

German-occupied Serbia was at first kept under complete military administration, but only incomplete occupation, by three low-grade infantry divisions and several headquarters organizations. The occupation tasks were made even more difficult by the presence of various SS and German police agencies that were not responsible to the army authorities in Belgrade. Additionally, local army commanders were not permitted to control or restrict the activities of the SS and police. Other German civilian government agencies, such as the Foreign Office, also set up shop in Serbia, further complicating administration.

German occupation policies were more stern, but also more consistent, than those practiced by the Italians, Bulgarians and Croats. However, the Serbs deeply resented the loss of their former position of pre-eminence in the Yugoslav state and were also traditionally hostile to all things Germanic.

The first Serbian puppet government set up was the "Administration of Commissioners," headed by Milan Acimovic and established on 30 May 1941. Its members were all associated with prewar Yugoslav governments, were firm believers in German military superiority, were strongly anti-communist, and advocated Serbia's joining the Tripartite Pact. Ironically, even though they were willing collaborationists with the Germans, they were never trusted, especially by Hitler, simply because they were Serbs.

Acimovic's government proved capable of carrying out routine administrative matters, but lacked the forces necessary to cope with the mass Serbian uprising that started in July. Since the German military authorities were also short of troops, they decided to appoint a new Serbian government made up of people more acceptable to Berlin, and then allow it to build larger police forces so the Serbs themselves could take over the task of subduing the uprising.

The man chosen to lead the new government was former Yugoslav Gen. Milan Nedic, who had been relieved as Minister of the Army and Navy in November 1940 for urging that Yugoslavia join the Axis. Nedic organized on 29 August 1941 what he called the "Government of National Salvation," and posed as the champion of the Serbs fighting the autonomist pretensions of the Croats and Bosnians.

Initially having adequate authority to enforce his decisions, the ever suspicious Germans began to restrict his power, gradually reducing it to nothing by the end

of 1943 (though officially he continued in office until the end of German rule in Belgrade in October 1944). At first he also seemed to have the support of a sizable number of his countrymen. Many believed Nedic had saved lives by cautioning against acts of violence and sabotage and urging Serbians to disregard the BBC's and Radio Moscow's calls for rebellion. But his Serbian support steadily declined as the war progressed and German defeat became more and more certain.

In September 1941, Nedic established the Serbian State Guard, which absorbed the old gendarmerie and was commanded by former Yugoslav army officers. It was never allowed to exceed a strength of 17,000, and it had three components: the Rural Guard, the Frontier Guard, and the police forces in the cities. The entire State Guard quickly became infiltrated by Chetniks, and throughout its existence was a poor and unreliable armed force. It was supplied with booty captured by the Germans in various parts of Europe, and was closely controlled by higher SS authorities in Serbia.

The Serbian Volunteer Detachments also came under Nedic's jurisdiction for a time. They were organized by the Serbian fascist leader Dimtrije Ljotic, and were also nominally commanded by former Yugoslav army officers. Reaching a strength of about 3,700 by January 1942, they were eventually placed under the direct command of the German army in Serbia. The Volunteer Detachments fought well against both Partisans and Chetniks; in fact, they became the only armed group of Serbs on the collaborationist side the Germans trusted and thought worthy of any praise.

The Nedic government also had at its disposal two Chetnik units, one under Kosta Milovanovic Pecanac, and the other controlled by Draza Mihailovic, together totalling some 13,000 by May 1942. But the Germans (rightly) didn't trust these units and regarded their loyalty to Nedic as only a temporary and convenient fiction that would be dropped as soon as the Chetniks decided the time was right to turn their guns the other way. Consequently, the Germans began disarming and disbanding these units in the summer of 1942, transferring the few they considered reliable to the Volunteer Detachments, and placing the rest in the Serbian economy to produce war materials. By the end of the year, well over 12,000 had been disbanded, effectively removing this auxiliary force from the scene. (One additional force was raised by the Germans in Serbia, the Russian Rifle Corps. For details, see the following article.)

and all guerrilla forces, and took little or no action to restore the war-devastated economy. On the rare occasions when they actively prosecuted anti-guerrilla operations, Italian performance was haphazard at best. When a successful military action was completed, it was often followed by harsh, arbitrary and indiscriminate killing of civilians and destruction of property. The local populace quickly grew to both disdain and hate the Italians as incompetents.

The Croatian puppet forces operated only occasionally in the Italian sphere, there terrorizing and

murdering Serbs, Moslems, anti-Ustashi Croats, and — whenever possible — the odd stray Italian.

This confused situation encouraged the Chetnik guerrillas to cease operations against the Italians and concentrate on attacking the Ustashi and German forces. The Italians, in fact, began to use Chetniks as auxiliaries in their own operations. This only reinforced the bitterness already existing between the Croat Ustashi and Serbian Chetniks in Bosnia. The feuding quickly escalated in bloodiness and soon rose to the point where the populace of entire villages were being tortured and massa-

The Chetniks

The Chetniks (the name means "men in armed bands") were the first, and for a time the only, organized guerrilla force to combat the Axis conquerors of Yugoslavia. Predominately Serbs, their leader, Yugoslav army Col. Draža Mihailovich, was determined to preserve the monarchy and with it the traditional Serbian dominance within the government.

Pursuing a cautious strategy of low level harassment to avoid provoking massive counterattacks or civilian reprisals, the Chetniks' eventual aim was to mount a full scale uprising, but only after the Axis occupation forces had been severely weakened by attrition. Their overall loyalty was to the emigre Yugoslavian government in London, and they were anti-communist at least as much as they were anti-Axis. In practice, this strategy of low level irregular warfare, postponing aggressive resistance, and confining anti-Axis operations to isolated acts of sabotage and terror was not feasible, given the realities of the occupation and the nature of Yugoslav civil conflict.

The Axis imposed a brutal occupation and political settlement. The Nazis meted out punishment for the Serbs, Germanization for the Slovenes, and satellite status for the "Aryan" Croats; while also working to eradicate the very idea of a Yugoslav state. At the same time, Berlin never provided enough of its own forces to back up its policies and make them stick. The resultant territorial arrangements were at best makeshift and hasty and satisfied no one. Policies of terror and mass reprisals became so widespread as to appear almost random. In Croatia, Ustashi paramilitary forces and the regular army targeted Serb villages in their own country, Slavonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina for massacre.

In this anarchic situation, a spontaneous revolt occurred in practically all Serb-dominated areas. Though seemingly suppressed at various times and in various places (mostly urban), this revolt continued through the end of the war, with both immediate and long term effects.

The Chetnik "wait and see" strategy made Tito's communist Partisan movement attractive to the many Yugoslavs who wished for immediate action. The initial "pact" between the Chetniks and Partisans proved only short lived, and its breakdown — along with the other

conflicts discussed — initiated what amounted to a Yugoslav civil war being run simultaneously with the anti-Axis struggle. The Chetniks and Partisans (both primarily Serb) fought each other while also clashing with the Croatian Ustashi and German-raised Moslem forces, as well as with collaborationist Serb forces.

To better carry out so many parallel wars against their domestic and German foes, the Chetniks reached an accommodation with the Italians, who in return began to make available stocks of supplies and weapons. This accommodation was strongest in the Italian sphere of Croatia, where Serbian villagers would often flee to Mussolini's garrisons for protection from marauding Ustashi or Moslem units. Consequently, it proved a relatively easy next step for the Italians to get the Chetniks to operate against the Ustashi and Moslems. In return, the Italians would sometimes conduct anti-Partisan operations.

The accommodation with the Italians brought about a temporary upswing in Chetnik fortunes in 1942, but at the same time it kept increasing numbers of anti-German Serbs from joining their ranks. Instead, those would-be recruits sought out the Partisans, who espoused a Pan-Yugoslav national liberation theme against all occupiers. The drying up of manpower reserves forced the Chetniks themselves to choose between deserting to the Partisans or cleaving even more openly to the Axis.

By September 1943, when Italy surrendered to the Allies, enough Chetniks had already switched allegiance to the Germans for those occupiers to form entire security units, such as the "Blue Guard" of Novak. Some Chetnik units even concluded formal pacts with their arch enemies, the Ustashi, so as to be able to continue their work of exterminating Moslems and antiroyalist Serbs.

In 1945, about 10,000 Chetniks managed to withdraw to Italy and Austria along with Croatian and German troops, where they surrendered to the Western Allies. Nearly all were returned to the victorious Partisans. Their leader Mihailovich was tried for treason, found guilty and executed by firing squad on 17 July 1946. His body was cremated and the ashes scattered to deny the royalists a martyr's grave to rally around.

cred. Eventually both the German and Italian authorities openly criticized the Ustashi for the chaos created.

These various Italian and Croatian misdeeds of course infuriated the Germans, but they could do little because of their lack of troops (the Eastern Front was sucking in every available unit). A January 1942 Armed Forces High Command report stated:

The Italian attitude toward the insurgent movement makes a lasting success of the German efforts doubtful. The inactivity of the Italians against the insurgents until now, the obvious denial of Italian help during the current operations in Croatia, and the attitude of the Croatian government...are responsible for the continued increase in the number of insurgents. Their [the insurgents'] retreat into the Italian occupation zone makes a quick suppression of the insurgents in Croatia impossible.

The View From Berlin

The Germans considered the guerrilla movement in Yugoslavia, somewhat simplistically, as a criminal uprising against the legally constituted authority. They believed the majority of the population was either neutral or favored the Axis-sponsored regimes in Serbia and Croatia. Thus, they repeatedly referred to the Chetniks and Partisans as "insurgents," "rebels," or "bandits." Only late in the war did the Germans drop the use of the term "bands" when describing guerrilla military units.

While local German and Italian field commanders often drew distinctions between Chetniks and Partisans, and continuously tried to play the two guerrilla forces against each other, the high command in Berlin regarded that as a dangerous game. It didn't matter to them the two main guerrilla organizations had antagonistic ideological dif-

The Slovenes

By June 1941, only two months after the Axis conquest, a covert civil war began in Slovenia between the communists of the "Liberation Front" and the non-communists who were actively resisting the occupation. (Slovene resistance at the time generally took the form of industrial sabotage, cutting of telephone wires and, later on, draft evasion.)

The occupying Germans and Italians were confused about the killings that suddenly began to go on all around them. The occupation government even went so far as to ban the use of bicycles late in 1941, since most of the killings were being committed by young men riding up on them, shooting their victims, and then pedaling away.

These Slovene-communist killings drove many of their countrymen to join the Italian occupation forces to obtain weapons for self-defense. By the late summer of 1942, the "White Guard" (so named by the Partisans) had been formed, composed of a defensive militia, the Village Guard, and an anti-communist mobile arm, the Legion of Death. By August 1943, some 8,000 White Guardsmen were serving under Italian auspices.

A Slovenian Chetnik movement was also established and was comprised of three branches: the Catholic Slovenian Legion, the Liberal/Socialist Falcon Legion, and the National Legion, formed from a multitude of smaller political parties and unaffiliated peoples found within Slovenia. Each had its own command and was founded to protect against communist violence and to resist the Italians. All three recognized Mihailovic as their supreme commander, and were lumped together in a parent organization called the "Blue Guard."

The total Blue Guard never developed much effective strength (perhaps 1,000 men), and limited itself mostly to propaganda and organization for postwar conflict with the communists. They received most of

their supplies from the White Guard, and eventually assumed a neutral stance toward the occupying Italians, who happily procured.

After the Italian capitulation and the follow-on German occupation of the formerly Italian Slovenia, the previous Italianization policies were of course reversed, and the introduction of Slovenian and Croatian language schools was allowed in the zones not slated for absorption into Greater Germany.

The mayor of Ljubljana, Leon Rupik, a former Yugoslav general and one-time officer in the Austro-Hungarian army, then agreed to form a "Home Guard" out of the White Guard, the Blue Guard, and any new volunteers who would come forward. This Home Guard was much better armed than its predecessors, maintained a cohesive military organization built around unified headquarters, village and town garrisons, mobile anti-Partisan battalions, and an effective secret police and propaganda apparatus. The single goal of the Home Guard was to defeat the communist Partisans.

In April 1944, the Germans managed to get the members of the Home Guard to swear an oath to fight side by side with German troops against the Soviets and Western Allies. This was and remains a surprising development, since the Home Guard's leadership was pro-West, and believed that in combating communism they were simply taking the lead in what would become Europe's paramount struggle once Nazi Germany was beaten.

In June 1944, a Col. Vauhnik offered the services of the Home Guard (along with some willing Croats and Chetniks) to the British. The offer was refused. At war's end, over 12,000 Home Guardsmen fled Slovenia to British occupied Austria. They were handed back to the Partisans.

The Hungarian Occupation

The Hungarian occupation of a portion of Yugoslavia proved generally lenient, except for one incident at Novi Sad. There Hungarian troops committed cruel excesses against the populace at the behest of the German high command. The Hungarian government reacted by condemning to death the four Hungarian military commanders who were responsible for the massacre. But then, just prior to their execution, those officers were abducted by the Germans and inducted into the SS with full rank (thereby proving in whose interests they had acted at Novi Sad).

After that, the Hungarian occupation continued without serious incident until mid-1944, when Budapest's aborted attempt to switch sides in the war resulted in the immediate German occupation of all key towns and road junctions.

One reason for the relative leniency of the Hungarian occupation, apart from the fact a considerable minority of the population in their allotted area were ethnic-Hungarians, stemmed from the local Serbians' preference for Budapest's, rather than Berlin's, rule — they therefore behaved themselves accordingly.

ferences that could be exploited; "the enemy," whether royalist or communist, was to be smashed wherever and in whatever guise he appeared.

Conflict developed between local German commanders, anxious to spare their soldiers' blood by exploiting guerrilla differences or by striking local truces, and with higher ups who continually ordered a policy of no collaboration with the "bandits." The Italian field commanders were much less fastidious and more unscrupulous than their German counterparts, trading supplies and aid to the Chetniks in return for tranquility in their own areas.

At one point the Germans, hard pressed in other theaters and seeing no way to end the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia that had been created by the Ustashi terror, even considered withdrawing completely and turning it all over to the Italians.

The German high command at first considered the Balkan theater to be a secondary war zone, a rear area that the German soldier preferred to the Russian or North African fronts, but less preferable than occupation duty in France or the Benelux. That conception gradually changed. Gen. Rendulic, appointed in 1943 to run an anti-guerrilla cam-

Yugoslavs in the German Army and Waffen SS

The following is a list of the major German army and Waffen SS formations raised in Yugoslavia.

100th Light (Jäger) Infantry Division. Initially formed in Vienna in December 1940 and composed of Austrians. The *369th Reinforced (Croat) Infantry Regiment* was attached to the *100th* and remained there until both formations were destroyed at Stalingrad in January 1943. The division was reformed (minus the *369th Regiment*) in Belgrade in May 1943, from survivors of the earlier unit and from Yugoslav Volksdeutsch. Transferred to Albania in the summer of that year, it was subsequently moved to the Russian Front in March 1944. It participated in the withdrawal from the Bug River, and was involved in the fighting in southern Poland late in 1944. It was still fighting the Soviets in Czechoslovakia when the war ended.

369th (Croat) Infantry Division. Nicknamed the "Devil's Division," it was manned mainly by Croats, with a cadre of German officers and NCOs. This division was formed early in 1943, after its forerunner, the *369th Infantry Regiment*, had been destroyed at Stalingrad. It served mainly in Croatia, protecting lines of communication and fighting Partisans. It also suffered heavy desertions, and was considered an unstable and relatively poor combat unit (unlike its predecessor). By early 1945, the *369th* was down to battlegroup (regimental) strength and was engaged against the Soviets.

373rd (Croat) Infantry Division. Like the *369th*, this was a Croatian division led by German cadres. Raised early in 1943, it spent most of its career fighting Partisans in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Considered only a fourth-rate com-

bat unit, it suffered excessive rates of desertion throughout its existence. In the last few months of the war it saw action against Soviet forces before surrendering to them.

392nd (Croat) Infantry Division. This division was formed in the autumn of 1943 in Croatia and was similar in composition to the *369th* and *373rd*. However, the *392nd* was sent to Austria for training and then returned to Croatia in 1944. It proved much better than the other German-Croat divisions, and was even cited for distinguished action against the Partisans. It also engaged the Soviets for several months prior to surrendering to them at the end of the war.

The Waffen SS recruited throughout Yugoslavian territory by agreement with the various territorial governments and administrations. By the end of the war, the SS had not only recruited among the Volksdeutsch, but had inducted the following numbers of other ethnic groups: 16,000 Albanians, 18,000 Bosnians, 8,000 Croats, 6,000 Slovenes, and 4,000 Serbs.

The 7th SS Volunteer Mountain Division "Prinz Eugen." This unit was formed in northern Serbia in the spring of 1942 from Volksdeutsch (Banat Swabians) mainly from Yugoslavia, but also some from Hungary and Romania. The following spring it was transferred to Bosnia and the Dalmatian coast, where it conducted operations against the Partisans. In October 1944, it was shifted to the Belgrade area to cover the eastern flank of the German withdrawal through Yugoslavia, and suffered heavy casualties in that fighting. Those losses were made good in December, when some of the more reliable elements of the disbanded *21st SS Mountain Division*

paign in Croatia, reported that soon after assuming his post over 1,000 German soldiers requested transfer to *any* other area, even the Eastern Front. They viewed a tour in the USSR as better than having to go on facing the savage, no quarter combat conditions in Yugoslavia. (In fact, the mortality rate for the Germans in Yugoslavia was not high, but neither was it negligible. Nearly 15 percent of the German soldiers in Yugoslavia became casualties of one kind or another.)

The End

In the Spring of 1945, as part of the general German retreat from the Balkans, Croatian forces gradually and under great pressure withdrew northward through their national territory. Despite the desperate political and military situation (by this time it was obvious to all the Germans had lost the war and Croatia was on the wrong side), the Croatian forces maintained discipline and fought their last battles determinedly, hoping for some miracle to save them.

On 4 May 1945, the Ustashi government abandoned Zagreb and moved to Klagenfurt. From there they attempted to establish contact with the

Western Allied military authorities. Then, on 6 May, Pavelic was informed the Germans were surrendering and that all responsibilities of command over Croatian troops had been passed to him. He ordered an acceleration of his army's withdrawal (though most of it was already in Slovenia), and directed that it should cross into Austria, there to surrender to the British rather than the Partisans. He then fled, leaving his nation and its small army to its fate. (Disguised as a monk, he escaped Europe aboard an Italian passenger ship and made it to Argentina. He lived there until 1957, when he was seriously wounded in a failed Yugoslavian assassination attempt. He moved to Spain and died there of his wounds in 1959.)

The withdrawing Croatian forces continued to fight running battles with the Partisans, past V-E Day, until 13 May when they crossed the Drava River. The next day the Croats reached the vicinity of Bleiburg, Austria, and formally asked to surrender to the British forces there. At first the British appeared amenable and ordered a mustering of the Croat troops. But the next day the British surrounded the Croats with tanks while allowing the Yugoslav Partisan units to come up. The Croats

"Skanderbeg" were absorbed into the 7th. At the end of the war, the division surrendered to the Soviets. This division earned one of the worst reputations for the commission of atrocities of any body of troops in World War II, and its actions provided the primary rationale for the postwar expulsion of about 250,000 Banat Swabians from Yugoslavia.

13th SS Mountain Division "Handschar." Possibly the worst combat unit in the Waffen S.S., the 13th SS was formed in the spring of 1943 in Croatia, initially called the "Bosnian-Herzegovinian" or "B.H." division. It first consisted of Bosnian Moslems and Croat volunteers formed around cadres drawn from the 7th SS. When volunteering began to lag, Roman Catholics and Croatian Home Guardsmen were induced to join this new SS division. The 13th had many of the trappings of the Moslem regiments of the old Austro-Hungarian army, including the fez and regimental Imams to lead prayers. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, a refugee from British justice in Palestine, was installed as the division's religious overseer.

Sent to south-central France in mid-1943 for training, the 13th SS mutinied, a rebellion the Grand Mufti helped quell. Steadfastly refusing to operate outside its own area, the unit had to be returned to Yugoslavia in late 1943. Once back in the Balkans, it refused to operate in coordination with other German and Croatian units and generally avoided combat with Partisans. The 13th SS instead mostly confined its activities to massacring Christian Serb villagers, while also racking up record high desertion rates. In October 1944, during the German retreat from the Balkans, the *Second Panzer Army* disbanded these well equipped but unreliable troops and

took those weapons and supplies for redistribution to German units. Finally committed to combat against the Soviets later that year in Hungary, it performed so poorly it had to be withdrawn, returned to Yugoslavia and disbanded shortly into the new year.

21st SS Mountain Division "Skanderbeg." Formed in the summer of 1944 from Albanians and ethnic-Albanians from Kosovo, this unit also proved unreliable. The division never fully formed because the troops refused to operate outside ethnic-Albanian areas, preferring instead to stay close to home and there rape, pillage and massacre Christian Serbs. It was disbanded in late 1944, and its more reliable members were transferred to the *14th SS Mountain Regiment of the 7th SS Mountain Division*.

23rd SS Mountain Division "Kama." As with the other two Moslem SS divisions, this unit was another unsuccessful experiment because its soldiers were too difficult to discipline. It was partially formed in the late summer of 1944 in Bosnia, from Moslem and Croat volunteers, with cadres of German and Yugoslav Volksdeutsch. It was ordered disbanded late that same year.

Others. Several additional German army and Waffen SS units contained significant numbers of Yugoslavs (Volksdeutsch, Backa-Hungarians, Slovenes, Croats, ethnic-Italians, etc.), but not a majority: *42nd Light (Jäger) Infantry Division*, *92nd Infantry Division*, *297th Infantry Division (raised in Serbia)*, *5th SS Panzer Division "Wiking,"* *11th SS Panzergrenadier Division "Nordland,"* *16th SS Panzergrenadier Division "Reichsführer SS,"* *17th SS Panzergrenadier Division "Gotz von Berlichingen,"* *18th SS Panzergrenadier Division "Horst Wessel,"* *22nd SS Cavalry Division "Maria Theresa,"* and the *24th SS Mountain Division "Karstjäger."*



The tens of thousands of German and Axis troops who took part in the last, savage, chaotic, and ultimately lost, Balkan Campaign, were authorized to wear this commemorative shield on their uniform sleeve. In the confusion of the war's last days, however, it's estimated no more than 250 of the authorized recipients actually received them before the capitulation.

The Partisan View

We chose the title of this article carefully. That is, we wanted to show how the World War II situation in Yugoslavia — and the situation that has grown from it in the present day — was actually far more complex than the commonly presented “Partisans vs. Germans” story. It would be inappropriate, though, to end this piece without sketching in the critical role played by Josip Broz Tito and his Partisan movement.

As head of the outlawed Yugoslav Communist Party, Tito had to continue laying low after the Axis conquest of his country. The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact mandated, through the auspices of the Comintern, that all communist parties in German-held territory behave themselves. Of course, once Operation Barbarossa began, that stricture was removed.

Two things clearly separated Tito's movement from the others competing in Yugoslavia at the time. First, Marxism provided a doctrine of internationalism that allowed him to get above the many ethnic and religious conflicts going on in the country and concentrate on the primary struggle — the one against the “reactionary” Axis occupiers (and their running dog collaborationist lackeys, etc.). Second, the pragmatism of revolutionary Leninism provided a methodology whereby the Partisans could use those aspects of localism and ethnicity that furthered the overall cause (organizing local units along ethnic lines, etc.).

The difference Tito's approach made in the struggle against the Axis was immediate and was appreciated throughout and far beyond the Balkans. Thousands of Yugoslavs, from all ethnic groups, and no matter how they may have felt about communism, were drawn to Tito's banners simply because he was unequivocally *fighting the Axis*. At the same time, the Western Allies were drawn into fully supporting the Partisans with materiel. That was made possible, especially after mid-1943 when the Allies became firmly established in south and central Italy, by Balkan geography, coupled with the surety Washington and London felt about the use to

were ordered to lay down their arms immediately, and were given assurances they would be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

Approximately 100,000 men laid down their weapons; but some 20,000, fearful of being handed over to the Partisans, fought their way out and escaped, at least temporarily. Another column of almost 100,000, made up partly of army units and partly of civilian refugees, and which had not yet reached Bleiburg, broke up and surrendered in various places.

The British herded this mass together and then turned them all over to the Partisans. Apart from the civilian refugees, over 120,000 Croat soldiers, 11,000 Slovenes (Slovenia had tried to declare its independence during the last weeks of the war), about 10,000 Chetniks, and several thousand Serbs

which their supplies would be put — *fighting the Axis*.

All this came together to turn the Partisans into an ever more potent fighting force. In January 1943, Tito commanded some 45,000 effectives; six months later he had 60,000. By mid-1944, the Partisans numbered 300,000, and by January 1945, totaled 800,000. In effect, inside the German occupied Balkans, Tito had succeeded in creating a new Allied army. (In contrast, the Chetniks never fielded more than 70,000.)

This force eventually came to be organized into 53 divisions, containing 175 brigades. (Partisan divisions were smaller than most in Europe at the time, numbering usually 2,500 to 3,500 men — but they might be reinforced for special operations up to 10,000.) With the help of six Soviet and Bulgarian corps to take Belgrade, along with copious amounts of Western supply, Tito finally used the “Partisans” (actually now the new Yugoslav armed forces) to liberate Yugoslavia in what amounted to a conventional military campaign fought during the last year of the war.

Sadly, with the Germans gone, the old patterns of ethnicity reasserted themselves. Tito's government of “national liberation” was not one of “national reconciliation.” For a time the Cold War served as a kind of pressure lid that allowed him to keep Yugoslavia's various groupings working together for the ostensible reason of maintaining the country's independence between the two camps. (Indeed, Tito portrayed himself as a primary leader in the postwar “non-aligned nations” movement.)

That fiction outlived Tito (who died in 1980), but not the political situation that gave it underpinning. With the Cold War over and Marxism, for practical purposes, relegated to the dustbin of academia, there simply were no reasons for the Yugoslavs to hang together any longer. The one thing Tito had failed to do for Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians, etc., was make them believe they belonged to one nation — that, probably, was a task too big for any man or any doctrine.

— Ty Bomba

who had been involved in the German puppet government, were similarly handed over.

The partisans formed their new prisoners into several columns and began to march them back into Yugoslavia. As soon as they were out of the sight and control of the British, however, the executions began. Some 5,000 were shot before reaching the first town inside Yugoslavia. The remainder were enclosed in barracks and depots at Tezno, and in the following days some 40,000 more were killed and their bodies thrown into the anti-tank ditches of the old Yugoslav fortifications there. The rest were marched on to several POW camps in Croatia, the largest of which was at Precko, a suburb of Zagreb.

At the end of May, so called "Death Columns" were organized, and the men in them were marched without food or water toward Vrsac. Anyone unable to keep up was shot and his corpse left on the road. Villagers were prohibited from offering aid to the passing prisoners, and sometimes bystanders were shot for having done so. On reaching Vrsac, a series of show trials were set up in which many of the remaining prisoners were sentenced to death. Only a few ever returned to their homes. Of the nearly 150,000 troops and auxiliaries surrendered to the Partisans at the end of the war, it's estimated at least 100,000 soon lost their lives.

Thus World War II ended in Yugoslavia. Not surprisingly, the "peace" that came out of such circumstances proved to be only temporary. ☐

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For Czar and Country: A History of the Russian Rifle Corps, 1942-1945

by Antonio J. Muñoz

Most students of World War II are acquainted with the Russian volunteer movement that aided the German war effort, and are probably also familiar with the "Russian Army of Liberation" headed by the Soviet turncoat Gen. Andrei Vlasov. The German army's Cossack units, under Gen Pannwitz, are even more famous. Less well known, however, is the "Russian Rifle Corps" (in German, *Russisches Schützenkorps*).

The "Russian Volunteer Corps," as it was more commonly called by its own men, served under the German army performing garrison and other security duties in Yugoslavia during the war. The formation was made up of former Czarist army officers and men who, after having fought on the losing side in the Russian Civil War, had emigrated to various countries in Europe. The "corps" eventually comprised a total of five regiments. The overwhelming majority of these men were in their sixties and seventies when the Second World War broke out.

A Czarist Emigre Army

The defeat of the Czarist forces in the Russian Civil War of 1918-21 forced the survivors of those "White" armies to flee Russia. Most brought their

families with them and settled throughout Europe, notably France, Germany and Poland. To this initial batch of Russian refugees was later added men who became disaffected with the Bolshevik revolution and those who had fallen from grace in the eyes of Lenin or Stalin. Most of the exiles harbored hopes of one day returning to their homeland, and organized themselves accordingly.

Of course, as events unfolded in Europe during the next two decades, no real opportunity to begin the fight again presented itself until the German invasion in 1941. As soon as that phase of the war began, the overwhelming majority of Russian exiles stepped forward to offer the invaders their help. Whatever political and ideological shortcomings they saw in the Nazis didn't really matter. In the view of the exiles, here at last was a great power willing to attempt the destruction of the hated communist regime — all other considerations were secondary.

At first, most of these volunteers were rejected by the Germans simply on the basis of Nazi arrogance. After all, in the summer of 1941 the German army had not yet suffered a defeat, and it didn't appear any was looming. But some Russians, the younger generation of exiles who had grown up outside Russia, and especially the ones in Germany, were able to join the campaign because legally they were German citizens. Many of those men ended up in the German commando formation called the "Brandenburger Regiment," whose special operations units spearheaded the drive into the Soviet Union. The Czarist exiles also made requests to have Berlin use them as a "Russian Government in Exile," but that idea was rejected outright.

Though disappointed, the exiles nevertheless maintained their support for what had come to be referred to in German propaganda as the "European crusade against Godless Communism." The farther the *Wehrmacht* penetrated into the USSR, the closer — or so it seemed to the exiles in the early stage of the war — they were coming to seeing their nation liberated.

An Aging Army Goes to War

The first sign the German invasion of Russia was not going as planned came on 5/6 December 1941, when their forces in front of Moscow — strung out, depleted, and freezing in the coldest



Two riflemen of the World War II German army's "Russian Rifle Corps" are shown here in their distinctively modified uniforms. Though aging, the determination of these men can still clearly be seen in their faces. Source: National Archives.

winter in years — were sent reeling back by the first Red Army winter counteroffensive of the war. German losses began to mount rapidly, much faster than they had during the summer and autumn battles.

One effect of the new situation was a sobering of the German high command's attitudes concerning how long, how many troops, and how much effort, it would take to defeat the Soviet Union. Men on leave, reserves, and a few previously demobilized divisions of the German army were called back into service to help make up the losses suffered in Russia. Requests for replacements were sent to German commanders throughout the occupied areas of Europe. In sum, all rear-area commands — especially the Balkans — were stripped to bare bones. Only in France, where the Germans still faced an undefeated England across the Channel, did they keep a sizeable first-line infantry force.

Thus, in the spring of 1942, a chastened German high command began to seek out the Russian exiles whose offers of support they'd so contemptuously spurned the year before.

The Russian Rifle Corps is Formed

The official date of the formation of the Russian Rifle Corps has gone unrecorded, but we know it was created sometime late in 1941. The first German mention of its existence was made in December 1941. At the time, the Germans were undertaking their first large-scale anti-guerrilla operation in Yugoslavia, committing approximately four divisions in Serbia. During that operation the Russian Rifle Corps' components were forming in Belgrade.

The first anti-guerrilla drive was followed by another in mid-January 1941, since the German military commander in Serbia wanted to get the maximum use out of his available units before their scheduled transfer to the Russian Front. This operation was aimed at a concentration of roughly 4,000 Partisans in the Sarajevo area, and it marked the first time troops of the "Independent State of Croatia" were employed in German army operations. Still, the Russian Rifle Corps remained relegated to garrison duties around Belgrade.

In Yugoslavia one anti-guerrilla drive followed another during the spring and summer of 1942, but none achieved any significant successes against the communist Partisans or the royalist Chetniks. During this period the Russian Rifle Corps was maintained in passive security duties in central and western Serbia. It operated well in that role and began to establish a good reputation with the German command.

Continuous pleas by its commander and officers to have the Corps transferred to the Russian Front were denied. The Germans offered the excuse that the men in the Corps were simply too old to stand up to the rigors of combat in the East.



A. This schematic illustrates the organization of the Russian Rifle Corps in the fall of 1941. It initially had three infantry regiments, which were considered "static" units because of the advanced ages of most of the men. Corps support troops included two field hospitals, one supply company, a reinforced signals company, a veterinary company and a replacement company. The honor guard contained the most elderly ex-Czarist officers in the Corps and was used mainly for parades and special occasions.

B. In the spring of 1942 a fourth regiment was added to the Corps. The regiments were not only numbered, but also had titles: 1st "Zborovskogo," 2nd "Merzhanov," 3rd "Gontarev," and 4th "Gesket."

C. A fifth and final regiment was formed early in 1943 by recruiting ethnic Russians in Bulgaria. It had a large proportion of youths from the *Beli Orlovi* (White Eagles), which resembled the Hitler Youth Movement in its military training and activities. These young men were the sons and grandsons of the original emigres. The fifth regiment was titled "Rogozhin."

D. Each regiment had an anti-tank platoon with three 37mm AT guns, and a weak infantry howitzer platoon with two 75mm guns. A cavalry squadron for reconnaissance, and an engineer company, rounded out the support elements in the rifle regiments. The core of the regiment was, of course, the three rifle battalions.

E. Each rifle battalion had three companies. The third company in each battalion was a "heavy weapons" company, containing 12 machineguns, four heavy machineguns and four 81mm mortars. The regular line companies had 12 machineguns a piece. Armament was mainly drawn from ex-Yugoslav army weapons, with a sprinkling of Czech and German equipment. The honor guard company in the Corps support troops had one heavy MG-42 per platoon (total of three).

The real truth, of course, was that Hitler's plans for the Soviet Union did not in any way allow for its communist regime to be supplanted by a monarchist one. Russia was to become a national non-entity, most of its people deported or starved or worked to death, and its vast area opened to Germanic colonization. The Russian Rifle Corps didn't figure into that scenario at all.

The continued refusal of Berlin to let the old Czarists fight against their hated enemies in Russia began to sap the morale of the Corps. Many of the men questioned the rationale behind their role in Serbia, fighting against a people with whom they had many things in common, including a shared religion (Eastern Orthodox). The persecution of the Serbians by the Roman Catholic Ustashi, and the subsequent arming of Bosnian Moslems by the Germans, only further depressed morale.

The first three months of 1943 found the Corps increasingly engaged in bitter fights with small- and medium-sized Chetnik and Partisan bands. During that period those bands were responsible for 985 recorded incidents of sabotage, ambush, train derailments, and assassinations. At the same time, aside from the Corps, the only sizable Axis units in Serbia were the German 704th Security Division and the Bulgarian 1st Corps, with its three infantry divisions, the 22nd, 24th and 27th.

The German command thus lacked the forces necessary to adequately garrison all of Serbia. Accordingly, they adopted a haphazard strategy through early 1944, wherein they garrisoned most places with a bare minimum of force, while concentrating everything else in a selected area to conduct a quick but intense anti-guerrilla operation.

This was the plan behind "Operation White," during the winter of 1942-43, when the Germans brought together a large force for a sweep inside Croatia, leaving only the Russian emigres and the Bulgarians to secure most of Serbia.

White was begun in the second half of January 1943. In the end it cost the Germans 335 dead and 1,010 missing, with the Ustashi brigades losing 500 or so. The official Italian history of the battle claims their units were hardest hit, losing some 2,000 prisoners to the Partisans. The "Re" Division lost 115 dead, 420 wounded, and 42 missing. The "Sassari" fared worse, suffering a total of 1,000 killed; while the "Lombardia" lost about 500 killed. Partisan losses

were estimated at 8,500 dead and 2,010 captured.

In spite of these high casualty figures, many of Tito's men were able to escape through the Italian lines — not between the gaps as the Germans claimed. Clearly, if the Italian numbers are to be believed, we must assume the Partisans shot their way out of the trap set for them. The 2,000 Italian POWs also indicates many of those men had no wish to die for the Axis cause in Yugoslavia.

Operation White was soon followed by White II and White III in February and March. Again, though, only negligible results were achieved. Then came Operation Black, in May and June against Chetnik bands in Montenegro. The guerrillas were forced to withdraw into Serbia, losing 4,000 men along the way.

Axis forces continued to harass the Chetnik and Partisan forces in Serbia throughout the summer of 1943, but no major operations were launched. One milestone for the Russian Rifle Corps was reached during this period, however, when its recently formed 5th Regiment defeated a medium-sized Partisan band on 7 August. The 5th quickly became the best unit within the Corps — its "Shock Troops."


Despite these successes, the Yugoslav guerrillas — in particular the anti-communist, royalist, Orthodox Chetniks — proved effective at persuading many of the Russian legionnaires their fight should not be against the Serbs. The German counter-propaganda to the Corps centered on the idea that in fighting in Yugoslavia the exiles were, by extension, also fighting to help defeat Stalinism.

These conflicting interests became so great the men of the Corps began to prefer combat only against Tito's communist Partisans. There were numerous incidences when the Chetniks and Corps maneuvered to avoid battle with each other.

By 10 September 1943, the Corps had shrunk to 4,769 men, including the small German cadre staff. Morale was at an all time low, and on the 27th, 17 men deserted. A German investigation of the incident concluded they had gone over to the Chetniks rather than take part in the latest Axis plan to intern the rural male population of Serbia (that operation was codenamed "Corncob").

To replenish its dwindling numbers, the Corps was authorized by the German high command to conduct a recruitment campaign among Russian emigres living in Romania and Bulgaria. However, a 15 January 1944 report passed from Corps headquarters to all its depleted line units indicated the recruitment had not gone well. On arrival in Belgrade, the recruits were given background checks. Many of them were revealed to be communists. It seems either Tito's or Stalin's intelligence apparatuses wanted to infiltrate the Corps.

Throughout the summer of 1944, the Corps' overall strength was kept, with difficulty, between 4,000-5,000.



The Corps Engages the Red Army

On 23 August 1944, King Michael of Romania surrendered his country unconditionally to Soviet forces. Three days later, while troops of the Red Army's 3rd Ukrainian Front reached the Danube River, Bulgaria began surrender negotiations with the Allies. Though they were never technically at war with the Soviet Union, the Bulgarians nevertheless knew they had good reason to fear a Soviet invasion.

On the 27th, units of the 2nd Ukrainian Front pushed through the Focsani-Galati gap and captured Galati, the third-largest city in Romania. It was also on the 27th that Romania's newly proclaimed communist government declared war on Germany. The Bulgarians also switched sides that month, and soon six of their divisions were moving into eastern Serbia, seeking to engage their former allies. The entire German situation in the Balkans was crumbling and in turmoil. By 25 September, Soviet forces were just east of the Yugoslav capital.

On 26 September, the Russian Rifle Corps, with elements of the German 2nd Brandenburg Regiment and a battalion of the 1st Mountain Division, were engaged against the Soviets on an arc running from northeast to southeast of Belgrade. This first Red Army try for the city continued through the 27th, but though well-supported by artillery, it failed to break the combined German-Czarist defense. The Corps' first engagement against their true enemy had gone well.

As the days passed, however, more and more pressure was placed on the Axis forces east of Belgrade. They were forced back slowly, until on 14 October Soviet and Yugoslav Partisan forces began a combined assault into the city itself. Five days later, the place had been secured by the communists.

The Battle of Belgrade cost both sides dearly. The Germans lost an estimated 15,000 men, among them were several hundred from the Rifle Corps. No exact number for the Corps' losses can be provided because by this point it was fully integrated into the German army, and no separate records were kept for it.

End of the Russian Rifle Corps

After the Battle of Belgrade, in which the entire Corps participated and acquitted itself well, the unit was considered too weak for further frontline service and was withdrawn from combat. It was transferred to central Bosnia and relegated to the (somewhat) less hazardous task of policing the German rear areas and keeping them clear of Partisans.

This period of relative calm was interrupted when the Corps was split up and its components allocated to several sectors. On 13 January 1945, some elements were fighting under the command



of the German 24th Corps. This group was attached to the regimental *Kampfgruppe* (battlegroup) of the otherwise disbanded "Skanderbeg" SS Division. Meanwhile, in Montenegro, the bulk of the Corps' units that were still relatively intact (the 4th and 5th Regiments) were transferred to the 21st Mountain Corps and attached to the 104th Jäger Division. A third part of the Corps was assigned to fight with the 1st Cossack Cavalry Division, part of the 69th Corps.

After January 1945, no further mention is made of the Russian Rifle Corps in the official German Army or German Army High Command War Diaries. It is known, though, that the scattered elements of the Corps continued to fight in Yugoslavia through February and March. Then, as the German withdrawal from the Balkans neared its conclusion, an attempt was made to bring the Corps together again and assimilate it into the nascent 25th Cossack Cavalry Corps of the Waffen SS.

By that point, though, the mood of the emigre soldiers was not conducive to the formation of new units — they wanted to move into Austria and surrender to the advancing British. It was rumored the British "understood" the Corps' delicate situation. After much deliberation, the nearby Cossacks reached the same conclusion. The final withdrawal from Yugoslavia was not an easy enterprise for any of the German and Axis units involved, but by April the bulk of those forces had crossed into Austrian territory.

The Reckoning: Forced Repatriation

There were three categories that outlined the policy of forced repatriation of "Soviet citizens" by the Western Allies. All of the following were to be

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turned over to the Red Army: 1) Soviet citizens captured in German uniform; 2) former members of the Soviet armed forces (who might be deserters); 3) any Soviet citizens who, though not captured in German uniform, had voluntarily rendered aid and comfort to the enemy.

That last category was the broadest, and had the most sinister effects. It virtually condemned entire families to death, and many instances of mass suicides were documented among the returnees.

Fortunately for the members of the Russian Rifle Corps, fate stepped in at the last minute to spare them from the end awaiting the others handed over to the Soviets. This occurred on the morning of 29 May, as the men of the British 6th Armored Division were handing over the soldiers of the 1st Cossack Division. A staff officer at division headquarters noted in the fine print of the Yalta Agreement on Repatriation that "only individuals who were citizens of the Soviet Union after 1 September 1939 are to be repatriated." The repatriation of the Cossacks was halted temporarily, and 50 soldiers among them were saved by this technicality.

Word quickly spread among the remaining Russian internees. Those who could prove this exemption were saved. All the men in the Russian Rifle Corps, either long-time expatriates or their foreign-born sons, were thus able to avoid falling into the clutches of the vengeful Moscow government. After their release, most members of the Corps chose to settle again in Germany, Austria or Italy, though some also emigrated to Canada, Australia, South America and the United States. ☐

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The author offers special thanks to Ron Mazurkiewicz for his aid in researching this article.

Some Thoughts on World War II

by Gerhard L. Weinberg

[Ed's Intro: This article originally appeared in the October 1992 issue of The Journal of Military History, and is reprinted here with their permission. Admittedly, I've got so much excellent original material cramming my files I probably shouldn't do reprints. Every so often, though, I see a piece that's so excellent I can't resist giving it a wider audience. This is one such article. It deals squarely with the oft-heard fallacy: "history is boring — it's so dry and unchanging; it's dead." History itself — the actual events that went into the past's making — is certainly unchanging. However, the things each new generation can take from the record of those events, in terms of deciding what are significant facts and "lessons," presents an ever-evolving vista. Read on and be surprised, entertained and perhaps provoked. My thanks to our good friend Jack Greene for tipping us to this one.]

The fact World War II is now 50 years in the past has stimulated a great deal of interest. From the 50th anniversary of its outbreak, through the 50th anniversaries of the Battle of Britain and Pearl Harbor, and a whole series of other such anniversaries, we can confidently expect this parade to continue until 1995. Because I have been working on a soon-to-appear general history of the war for the last 14 years, I would like to place before the readers of this journal some issues that appear to be in need of further discussion and examination. When examined with some care, these issues may cause us to look at the events of that war somewhat differently. For convenience, matters are put forward a country at a time.

Germany

Since the Germans began the war with their invasion of Poland in 1939, they will be put first. The single most difficult task of all those working on World War II in Europe and North Africa face is the need to penetrate the fog of distortion and confusion generated by the vast German memoir literature, especially that of generals like Heinz Guderian and Erich von Manstein. Long the basic staple on which secondary literature was based, closer examination of these works with reference to contemporary evidence has shown the memoirs to be almost invariably inaccurate, distorted and, in some instances, simply faked.

The memoirs of von Manstein, to take a particularly striking example, fail to reveal he was the one high ranking leader who broke with all other

German army and air force commanders in insisting Stalingrad could and should be held, thus encouraging Hitler in his decision to opt for an air supply and relief effort that all others (except Hermann Göring) rejected.

The Field Marshal also pretends in his memoirs that on December 19, 1942, he had provided Gen. Paulus, the commander of the German forces in Stalingrad, with orders to break out. As the major study of the Stalingrad battle by Manfred Kehrige proves, this order is a postwar invention.

The German government's Military History Research Office in Freiburg has made a laudable effort to write its impressive series of volumes, currently appearing on the history of Germany and World War II, on the basis of the real evidence. The uproar this has at times caused in some circles in the Federal Republic is in my opinion greatly to their credit. Those vocal objections illustrate the extent to which the authors in Freiburg have honestly portrayed a past that others had found expedient to alter. The truth often hurts, especially liars.

A continuing issue in the writing of the history of World War II, therefore, will be a new liberation. This time the Allies do not have to liberate the occupied peoples from Axis control; instead, scholars in all countries need to liberate their own minds and their own writings from a preoccupation with an enormous collection of dubious works and from the influence of an even larger mass of secondary works largely based on those memoirs.

It is not only that the memoirs are filled with errors and distortions; they also omit important information, very well known to their authors, which is essential for an understanding of the events of that era and the roles played in them by many who loom large in the story. The most obvious example of this kind, which has already been examined by some, is that of the involvement of key German military men in the Holocaust.

There is another example that is not so frequently mentioned, and to which I believe attention ought to be paid. This is the systematic bribery of German military figures by Hitler — probably on a colossal scale.

Practically all field marshals and four-star generals received enormous sums secretly from Hitler, partly in huge sums and partly in regular monthly secret supplements to their already very high pay. It is understandable that most have displayed a discreet silence on this score. There is, for example,

almost no record in Guderian's memoirs of the year between his being sacked as commander of 2nd Panzer Army during the crisis before Moscow in the winter of 1941-42 and his appointment as Inspector General of Armored Troops in February 1943. During that period he spent much of his time travelling around occupied Poland to select an estate to be stolen for him by the German government. He was given a huge estate worth 1.25 million marks — and there is a thick file of his correspondence complaining this princely gift was not large and elegant enough.

Bribery always requires two parties: one who wishes to bribe and one who is willing to be bribed. There is, I submit, a world of difference between a publicly announced gift in gratitude to a victorious commander after a war, of the kind Prussia had repeatedly awarded her military leaders, and Britain had given the Duke of Marlborough and the Duke of Wellington, on the one hand, and sums secretly slipped into the accounts of field marshals and admirals during hostilities with equally secret assurances that these gifts were exempt from taxes.

The whole subject still awaits deeper scholarly investigation, but those who wonder about the curious willingness of German military leaders to honor their oath to Hitler, while disregarding earlier oaths to uphold the Weimar Constitution and laws — which included the Treaty of Versailles — or their postwar oaths to tell the truth in court proceedings, may wish to look at the authors of the memoir literature rather more closely.

One wonders what German soldiers, struggling against overwhelming odds in the latter part of the war, would have thought had they known that for each month the war continued, every field marshal could secretly pocket an extra 4,000 Reichsmarks, and every four-star general an additional 2,000 Reichsmarks? (The regular monthly pay for both was 2,000.)

Those who are interested in the cohesion of the Germany army in the last weeks of World War II will want to reexamine the impact of large scale bribery. They will also want to consider the effect of the terror exercised by the so-called "military justice" system of the German armed forces, which by latest estimates had well over 25,000 German soldiers, sailors and airmen shot. Huge bribes for many at the top and bullets for thousands at the bottom — not the picture of the German army projected by much of the literature.

For those who might like to see a specific example of the type of distortion in the postwar books by participants in the events of those years, there is a recent publication that is in many ways unique. Though it comes from the diplomatic rather than the military sphere, it provides extremely useful insight into the problems created by the whole genre of writings on which so many have relied.

A middle level German diplomat by the name of Curt Prüfer kept a diary during part of World War II. After the war he decided to publish this diary, but his son made it possible for a distinguished American scholar, Donald McKale of Clemson University, to print both versions together in a single volume.

As the editor explains in his introduction to *Rewriting History: The Original and Revised World War II Diaries of Curt Prüfer, Nazi Diplomat*:

The handwritten original diaries, kept between the time Prüfer returned to Germany in the fall of 1942...and September 1943..., showed him supporting overwhelmingly the nationalism, dictatorship, and anti-Semitism of the Nazi government and despising the Anglo-American and Russian enemies. The revised diaries, on the other hand, which Prüfer claimed to have written during 1942-43, but which he actually wrote after Germany's defeat and occupation by the Allies, portrayed the reverse: Prüfer and the Germans appeared therein as anti-Hitler and anti-Nazi, sympathetic to the Jews, and much less hostile toward the Reich's conquerors.

There are numerous examples in the text: the story of the impact of the "unconditional surrender" demand at the Casablanca Conference of February 1943 is a postwar insertion; Prüfer's vehement anti-Semitism and knowledge of mass extermination are carefully shrouded in the revised version he intended to publish, pretending it was "in no way changed."

The editor wisely warns readers not to trust other Third Reich diaries that cannot be verified by comparison with the originals. To pursue this matter further in the archives, the best place to start is the German Military Archive in Freiburg, where, in the papers of some of the military figures, one can follow the deliberate attempts to "cook" the record.

Great Britain

The way in which the memoir history of Winston Churchill has dominated the writing of World War II history by others has been the subject of considerable discussion in recent years. We can now see more easily than earlier what the documents from which he quoted actually said, the answers to his notes which he generally omitted, and the effect of contemporary issues in Britain's domestic politics and foreign policy that influenced the writing of particular portions during the postwar years when Churchill was in opposition or again leading the government.

We can see today, to take one example, how the presentation of the Teheran Conference of 1943 was altered in 1951 in the preparation of the memoirs in order to avoid any bad impression of the discussion of the German question on the Federal Republic of Germany, and to make sure Gen. Charles de Gaulle would not be offended too much

by comments made at Teheran, since he might come to power again in France. The papers of Gen. Ismay, who played a key role in the preparation of Churchill's six-volume set, are particularly useful in illuminating how contemporary political and foreign policy perspectives influenced the way specific events and personalities were portrayed.

Further, it has not yet become sufficiently widely known that the diary of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff for most of the war, Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, was issued by Sir Arthur Bryant in a manner that will not stand up to scrutiny. Some of the changes in the print from the original text, which is now (like the Ismay Papers) accessible to scholars at the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King's College, can be understood in terms of needed protection for security interests and personal susceptibilities; but other changes have the effect of either distorting the original or at least omitting important clues to Alanbrooke's thinking at the time.

Alanbrooke's certainty the September 1943 Allied landing at Salerno would fail and that the British faced disaster in the Japanese invasion of India in early 1944 was quietly eliminated by the editor. A psychohistorian will find it of interest that, as the original text shows, Alanbrooke never was able to spell correctly the name of Gen. William Simpson, whose American *9th Army* he always wanted kept in Montgomery's *21st Army Group*.

France

Next, it is France's turn. And here I would like to take up an entirely different kind of topic. It is a puzzle to which someone ought to provide a satisfactory answer. As yet, no one as far as I know has even formulated the question. The puzzle is the following: why was the army of Vichy France willing and able to fight everyone on the face of the earth except for the Germans, the Italians, and the Japanese?

In 1940, at the same time as the army at Dakar was fighting off the British and Free French, the army in northern Indo-China was not called on to defend that French colony against Japan. In the summer of 1941, the French army in Syria fought desperately against the British, the Australians, and the Free French; at the same time, there was no resistance to the Japanese occupation of southern Indo-China. In early 1942, the Vichy government urged the Germans to agree to joint efforts to try to get the Japanese to land on Madagascar. When, with strong US endorsement, British forces landed at the northern end of Madagascar, the French army fought. When American soldiers landed in northwest Africa, hundreds of them were killed by French bullets, but not one German or Italian soldier was as much as scratched when they landed in Tunisia or took over the unoccupied portion of France.

The literature on Vichy deals with each of those incidents in isolation without ever putting them together, without looking at the pattern.

The French forces in all these events were commanded by leaders who made their way up the promotion ladder in prewar years. They had carefully weeded out all Jewish officers and noncommissioned officers in a delayed reaction to the Dreyfus Affair. This was then what its leaders saw as the true army of France, and it would fight only the friends, but never the enemies, of the country.

It is my hope someone will address this problem. Now that the French archives for those years are beginning to open, we may learn more about these issues.

The Soviet Union

One can only hope the recent changes in the former Soviet Union, as in the other countries of eastern Europe, will bring a major change in the hitherto restrictive policy on archives access there. That is essential, not only so scholars can write some solidly based accounts of the war, but also if the record itself is not to vanish from sight before anyone has had an opportunity to see it. That is, the wartime paper used was of such poor physical quality that unless opened to access now and preserved on microfilm in the immediate future, it will have decomposed beyond retrieval. Denial of access into the next century, when the paper itself will have vanished, will result in these countries cutting themselves off from a major portion of their own history.

On the substantive side of research in any newly opened archives, this is where we are likely to see the most extensive changes in our understanding of the war in coming decades. Earl Ziemke, John Erickson and David Glantz have carried us about as far as possible in following the war on the Eastern Front without an opening of Soviet archives. The debates about Stalin's role will continue, but perhaps they will now be informed by contemporary evidence instead of being a continuation of political debate by other means.

The official Soviet revisions of views about the secret protocol to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 and the murder of Polish POWs at Katyn suggest there is lots still to come. Some of these revelations will shed light on old controversies — like the Red Army halt before Warsaw in the summer of 1944 — but others may very well open up entirely new perspectives on major issues that we have simply not been able to examine effectively before at all.

Let me point to two examples: how did the Red Army come to underestimate the size of the Axis force trapped inside the Stalingrad encirclement by such a large factor; and how did the Soviet high command see the German bridgehead in western Latvia, what the Germans called the Courland Bridgehead, in the winter of 1944-45? The first of those puzzles is related to the Soviet shift in approach that concentrated on the Stalingrad pocket instead of a drive to the Black Sea at Rostov, which would have cut off the German

army group in the Caucasus. The second might shed light on the interaction between Soviet and German strategy on the Eastern Front in the six-month period from October 1944 to March 1945.

The Pacific War

China and Japan had been at war for years before Japan decided to expand that war into a part of the fight that began in Europe in 1939. Much of the discussion of China in the war has focused on the defeats and weaknesses of the Chinese and their government. There is without doubt much good sense in that approach. But I would suggest there might be another question worth investigating: why didn't the Chinese collapse earlier than 1944, when their resistance fell apart before the Japanese offensive of that year?

A comparison with the prior Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and the earlier wars of the Chinese Empire against Western invaders in the 19th century, suggests the consolidation of China under the Nationalist regime may have gone farther than scholars have often been willing to admit. The Nationalist regime, with all its faults, held on from 1937 to 1944. Would a different government have been able to defy the Japanese even longer — or might it have collapsed much earlier as the Japanese evidently expected?

The other side of all this is the extraordinary and repeated inability of Japan to make anything substantial or lasting out of a long series of victories. One is sometimes reminded of Germany's performance in World War I, when that country won its way through repeated victories to total defeat.

I am even more intrigued by what appears to have been the truly astonishing incompetence of the leaders of the Japanese navy. How is one to explain the development of plans so complicated as to practically invite defeat, repeated failure of nerve at critical moments, and what appears to have been an extraordinary lack of imagination?

With some of the best warships in the world, with dedicated and well-trained crews, the admirals of the Imperial Navy managed to accomplish astonishingly little. They neither grasped the significance of the Indian Ocean when it was open to them in 1942, nor harvested the fruit of their own plans in the great naval battle off Leyte in October 1944. The performance of Japanese naval leadership in Alaskan waters can only be described as feeble-minded. How come?

Again, as in the French case, what intrigues me is the pattern, not just the individual cases. What could have happened in earlier personnel policies, training systems, or other aspects of Japanese recruitment and preparation of naval officers to produce this astonishing pattern?

The Pacific War, its origins and its course, have become something of a taboo subject in Japan (unlike Germany). There is a great reluctance to deal with dark passages in the country's past, such

as the atrocious conduct toward prisoners of war — after Japanese forces had acquired a reputation for exemplary treatment of prisoners in the Russo-Japanese War and World War I. This neglect can only come back to hurt Japan. A renewed effort to come to grips with the war could provide both a needed catharsis and new light on major questions.

A subject related to the role of Japan is that of the extreme nationalists who sided with them in the Pacific War, somewhat the way certain other extreme nationalists sided with the Germans in Europe and the Middle East.

These individuals — one thinks first of the Indian Subhas Chandra Bose — had in front of them the model of Japanese colonialism in Korea, undoubtedly the worst record of any colonial power. What on earth made them believe a Japan and Germany that had defeated Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States would treat the inhabitants of the colonial empires of the Western powers any more kindly than they already treated their own? How did they imagine themselves working for independence against a triumphant Axis? Here is a question that surely deserves a new look now that the immediate passions of war and of decolonization are, or at least ought to be, past.

The United States

It can be argued the relationship of the United States to its allies has not always been discussed in a proper light. This is, I believe, because some things were so obvious no one referred to them at the time, either because they were too obvious to deserve mention or because alluding to them would have been impolite and inexpedient. Their not being mentioned meant their not appearing on the record and hence, all too frequently, their being overlooked by subsequent analysts.

In regard to US relations with the Soviet Union, the fact the latter was carrying most of the burden of the war was so obvious from daily news reports, however inaccurate in detail, no one needed to point it out. Day after day, the newspapers and intelligence reports, the newsreels and the intercepts of messages showed in public and in secret that the bulk of the German army was engaged in the bloodiest fighting on the Eastern Front. If Americans at home and in Washington, in the White House and in the military, sought to provide help, that must always be seen against the background of contemporary reality.

The recent events in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union ought also to make us take another look at the origins of the Cold War in the latter stages of World War II. Perhaps there is more merit to the traditional view that the Western Powers were reacting to the Soviet imposition of an unwanted system on unwilling peoples than was fashionable in some circles.

I notice the word "totalitarian," which was for so long decried as an inappropriate term for talk-

ing about Nazi Germany and Stalin's Russia, and whose use was seen for some time almost as a form of Red-baiting, has reappeared in the political discourse: it is now regularly used by individuals in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to describe the system under which they lived.

In regard to our occasional difficulties with the British, there is an entirely different matter, in this case one which — at least to judge by the record — Americans were too polite to mention. I refer to the extraordinary string of British defeats, disasters, and surrenders.

The contrast between American forces holding out in the Philippines for months, and the defenders of Singapore marching off to POW camps in huge numbers practically as soon as the Japanese obtained a foothold on that island is a case in point. After almost three years of war, the garrison of Tobruk surrendered in the summer of 1942.

British military leaders made a practice of deprecating the military ability of their American ally, a matter now much easier to follow in the record; but what about their own forces?

Two years after their Kasserine Pass defeat, American troops were chasing the remnants of the Wehrmacht in the Rhineland. Had they not learned rather more quickly than their British cousins? What the American military did on Guadalcanal in 1942 took the British until 1944 to accomplish in Burma.

These comments are not designed to minimize the significance of the British effort in the war or to deprecate the bravery of its soldiers, sailors or airmen; it is merely to suggest that the supercilious tone often found in British records and subsequent writings might well bear reassessing.

A last aspect of the American effort to which I would like to allude is the discussion of the dropping of the atomic bombs. This is all too frequently done without reference to a question often asked in other contexts during the conflict: "Don't you know there's a war on?" That is, I find it intriguing much of the literature on the subject deals with it as if one fine day the Americans had thought they had nothing else to do that weekend, so they dropped A-bombs on Japan.

Neither Martin J. Sherwin's well known book, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Great Alliance*, nor the recent bibliographic article in *Diplomatic History*, reviewing the whole literature and controversy on the subject, contains a discussion of the fighting on Okinawa. The American reading of Japanese diplomatic telegrams, which showed the Japanese government had discussed but rejected the surrender alternative, is similarly absent from the literature, in spite of the records on this being available in the National Archives for years.

In Sum

There probably cannot be any certain answers to the speculative questions like the ones raised

above, and there are surely many other issues of World War II that remain to be illuminated. That vast conflict is not only certain to attract the attention of scholars long after the 50th anniversaries have been concluded, it will do so deservedly. ☐



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Hearts and Minds

The US Army Green Berets Today

by Marty Kufus

It was 1986; the United States was aiding the government of Honduras in its fight against leftist guerrillas. In Tegucigalpa, the capital, some off-duty Green Berets were sitting in a restaurant discussing a mission to provide medical aid for the rural poor.

"We were wearing civvies," recalled Sergeant First Class Dennis Weaver, who is now an Army Special Forces (SF) medic instructor. "At a table next to us was what turned out to be a CBS television crew. They were listening, and after a while they asked us if we were with the *Peace Corps*."

He added, "They were pretty surprised when we told them who we were. They said they didn't know the Army did that kind of thing."

Helping a friendly government battle an insurgency sometimes requires more than sending US military advisors and materiel. Humanitarian aid, including medical care and construction projects, can weaken "grass-roots" support that is vital to a guerrilla movement.

Hearts & Minds

An SF medic is a highly trained unconventional-warfare specialist whose patients might be not only US soldiers but foreign troops and civilians as well.

As a member of a 12-man "Operational Detachment Alpha," or "A-Team," the medic is res-

ponsible for the health of his teammates — a captain, a warrant officer and other NCOs — during training, advisory or combat missions. Some A-Teams have two medics; some have only one, in part because of the demand for them in SF support elements and civil-affairs groups.

From Latin America to Southeast and Southwest Asia, Green Berets have worked in the roles of paramedic, nurse, doctor, dentist — even veterinarian. In rural and remote areas of the Third World, any modern medical care can help win hearts and minds.

The Q Course

The technical training required for SF medic qualification is comprehensive and challenging. It has a wash-out rate of at least 60 percent.

SF medic students are rigorously selected volunteers. Most of these men are in their mid- to late-20s; all have served at least three years of exemplary duty in the Army. Some have already had military medical training, but most have not. All must complete parachute training, if they haven't already — and jumping out of a perfectly good airplane is one of the *easier* tasks facing them.

SF qualification training — known as the "Q Course" — begins at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and is run by the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center. Fort Bragg is also home to the Special Forces Command, which controls the five active-duty, two Reserve and two National Guard SF Groups: approximately 12,000 troops in all. (Only two of those Groups, 3rd and 7th — both active duty — are based at Fort Bragg.) The SF Command, in turn, is a component of the Army's Special Operations Command that also controls three Ranger light infantry battalions, an aviation regiment, psychological-operations and civil-affairs groups, and signal and support units: about 27,000 troops, total.

SF candidates — NCOs and officers — attending the Q Course are first sent to Camp Mackall, a compound in the piney woods near Fort Bragg, for a grueling three-week assessment and selection program. It comprises cross-country land navigation courses, timed road marches with heavy rucksacks, team problem-solving, obstacle courses and psychological testing. Additionally, each SF candidate must be eligible for a security clearance and capable of learning a foreign language. Those who make the cut at Camp Mackall are sent on to SF specialization training.



Officers spend six months in the classroom and field, learning how to plan and lead missions in guerrilla warfare, foreign internal defense ("counterinsurgency" was the old buzz word), and special reconnaissance. They also learn how to conduct "direct action" (DA): basically, attacking an enemy position, killing its occupants and blowing it up. (In reality, though, DA missions fall more in the domain of the more conventionally-oriented Rangers, whom SF soldiers sometimes refer to as "the Trolls.")

For NCOs, there are three other individual specialties besides field medicine: infantry weapons (US and foreign); engineering (both construction and demolition), and radio communications. Of the four, the training for medics is by far the longest: 31 weeks at Fort Sam Houston, Texas; four weeks of on-the-job training in government hospitals, and 16 weeks at Fort Bragg.

Fort Sam Houston

Since 1967, the bulk of the Special Operations Medical Sergeant's Course has been conducted at the Army's medical-training centers: the Academy of Health Sciences at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio. (Interestingly, a proposal to move the medic course to Fort Bragg — apparently for bureaucratic reasons — by the mid-90s has sparked bitter debate within Special Forces.) SF medic training at Fort Sam Houston is regarded so highly that other elite units — the Rangers, Navy SEAL (SEe, Air and Land) teams and Air Force combat search-and-rescue detachments — sometimes send their medics there for additional training.


The high point of the course is a must-pass field exercise known as "Trauma 3." It is held about every three months at Camp Swift, a National Guard training post 25 miles east of Austin. The five-day Trauma 3, which usually begins with a nighttime parachute insertion, occurs about halfway through the year of medic training required for the SF students.

In one Trauma 3, held in December 1992, 63 soldiers tested alongside nine SEAL corpsman. All 72 rotated through the graded role of "operator" — medic — and the ungraded roles of "Will E. Makit," the casualty, and "Hadji," the Third World assistant.

Casualties

Soldiers with blood-covered wounds — victims of a guerrilla mortar attack — are sprawled inconveniently in holes, across logs and under trees. Each wound is actually an expertly made *mouflage* fake that would rival those of any Hollywood production. Some of these "casualties" have impaled metal objects and abdominal lacerations. Others have amputated hands and compound-fractured legs. In this scenario, all are assumed to have neck injuries from being knocked to the ground by blasts. All are hypovolemic: low on blood.

Purple and yellow smoke grenades tossed into "Death Valley," a series of erosion ditches on Camp Swift, start this field test. Medic students dash through the smoke carrying stretchers and 30 lb. medic bags. Finding their patients, they go to work, first assessing the multiple wounds — some obvious, some hidden — then cutting off torn uniforms and beginning emergency medical treatment.





As civilian instructor and retired SF medic Barry Guffie (standing) watches, a student operator and his assistant attend to a casualty.

Each operator has only 45 minutes. By the end of the first 22, he has to have established an open airway and stabilized the neck, assessed injuries, dressed wounds and successfully started two actual lines of intravenous (IV) solution.

"Operator, do something," an instructor yells at one student. "Give me a reason to believe you know what the hell to do about your patient's hypovolemic state!"

The operator, a 24-year-old paratrooper, is searching his patient's arm for a good vein in which to stick an IV needle. The medic's assistant squats beside him, ready to help. Unfortunately, Hadji doesn't speak English very well. Precious minutes pass. The two begin working on a second wound. Unnoticed, the instructor squirts fake blood onto a dressing on a leg wound. This "ineffectual" dressing has to be detected and corrected — quickly.

As in the real world, a medic who loses his cool, loses his patient. Here, if the patient "dies," the operator flunks. If this test isn't stressful enough, there will be artillery simulators and more smoke bombs — and maybe even medical surprises.

An instructor armed with a clipboard and stopwatch closely watches each operator. The stu-

dent has to describe each step of his medical procedures, and announce the patient's actual vital sign data. He records this information in his field notes. The instructor, in turn, controls the simulation by reading off hypothetical vital-sign data indicating the patient's positive — or negative — response to treatment.

Meanwhile, students in the role of Hadji (the name is taken from a character in the 1960s cartoon series "Johnny Quest") quietly hold up bags of IV solution and maintain pressure on field dressings. Requiring supervision and clear instructions from the harried operator, Hadji can do only so much.

The scenario has built-in complications — at the instructor's discretion. On a prearranged cue, "Willie" suddenly might suffer cardiac arrest. Maybe a bee sting sends him into anaphylactic shock. Or another instructor might walk up with a syringe and pretend to give the casualty an overdose of morphine.

Trauma 1, 2 and 3

The norm for SF medic students at the Academy are 10-hour class days with two to four hours of homework nightly, with some more on weekends. They have to study, or they will fail.

Academy training for SF students begins with college-level anatomy and physiology, and basic medical skills such as bandaging, splinting, and starting IVs. It continues into trauma care, in two sections: Trauma 1 — field response, and Trauma 2 — clinical procedures. Basic pharmacology covers a variety of emergency drugs.

After completing Basic Cardiac Life Support classes, the students are ready to take a basic Emergency Medical Technician test administered by a civilian instructor who is a paramedic.

Next comes Trauma 3. Students who pass it probably will make it through the remainder of their medic training. However, many fail. In 1992, for example, out of one class of 54, only 12 passed.

Mechanism of Injury

Sergeant First Class Weaver makes his rounds through "Death Valley." He is the "trauma guru" who researched and wrote Trauma 3's medically accurate scenarios.

"What was his mechanism of injury, operator," Weaver loudly asks a student whose patient's legs were supposedly struck by mortar fragments.

"He was shot," the student replies, not looking up, as he removes sterile dressings, IV kit and bags of solution and a rigid neck brace from his medic bag.

"Shot? Shot with a shrapnel-throwing supergun the Iraqis made," Weaver asks sarcastically. "His mechanism of injury would be an interesting thing to find out, operator!"

The "Trauma guru" moves on to another casualty site.

"Do you know what you're doing, operator," Weaver needles, trying to shake the student's concentration. "Look at that wound and all that *blood*. It's pretty scary, operator."

Near the end of the time limit, Weaver lobs smoke grenades. "Hurry up, operators," he yells. "The Somali rebels are coming!"

Stragglers finish their work in a purple haze. Minutes later comes the advancing barrage of artillery simulators. Medic teams scurry with stretchers. Simulators land nearby and whistle threateningly. Operators and assistants lower their stretchers, drop to the ground and cover the patients with their own bodies, carefully avoiding ripping out IVs.

The charges explode loudly but harmlessly, billowing white smoke. Three stretcher teams get up, lift their loads and hike to an assembly area 200 meters away. The field test ends there. Instructors then critique their operators and give them their scores.

Pass or Fail

Seven — half — of the operators failed the test. They will be re-tested later, facing different wounds and new scenarios. If they pass, they will move on to part two: the clinical. But if they fail again, they will be dropped from Trauma 3.

"I botched it and it's all on me," says one student, a former forward artillery observer in an artillery unit. His patient's simulated wounds were an impaled object in his back, a broken left forearm and an amputated right hand. But this operator started badly — and lost too much time — by perforating a vein during his first two IV attempts. Not that he hadn't practiced with needles: each student gives — and receives — about 90 "sticks" by the time he reaches Trauma 3.

The seven successful operators moved on to the clinical test: emergency room procedures on a new batch of "casualties" brought to a large tent set up as a battalion aid station.

Clinical

Stopwatches begin a 90-minute march. Under bare light bulbs, aid-station operators assess injuries.

"Hey, Bud, can you hear me," asks an operator who used to be a Russian linguist in signals intelligence. His eyes and glove-covered fingers move methodically down his patient, who is clad only in bandages. Hadji stands quietly, watching and awaiting instructions.

"Blood on this wound, dressing ineffective," the operator calls out.

"That's what it looks like, operator," replies instructor Barry Guffie, a retired SF medic. Guffie then squirts red liquid from a spray bottle onto a second dressing.

A few feet away another operator fastens a rigid neck brace onto his patient. Just then, the gen-



The "trauma guru," Sergeant First Class Dennis Weaver (center rear), fires off questions to a student medic attending to his casualty.

erator outside dies. Lights go out for several minutes. The operators seem not to notice, and continue working in the dim daylight. The instructors cut them no slack.

"When you manipulate wounds, you break clots," Watkins loudly reminds one operator. "Once you get it stable, stop f*****g with it!"



An operator (left) and his assistant perform emergency room procedures on a casualty—a fellow student covered with moulage wounds and fake blood—in Trauma 3's mock aid station.

Another operator and his assistant fumble with the stretcher as they elevate their patient's legs. Instructor Tom Gonzales, a former member of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), feigns exasperation.

"Operator, did you go through Trauma 2," Gonzales, a staff sergeant, asks. "Do you want me to do this clinic for you?"

Down the line another operator, a former support soldier in the 5th SFGA, has correctly performed his medical procedures. Now he is looking for a few good veins on the arm of his patient.

His Willie, a corpsman from SEAL Team 3, has three moulages — a sucking chest wound, an abdominal laceration and a lacerated right arm — supposedly from a bayonet fight. At all three, "bleeding" has stopped.

Urban Violence Gives SF Medics "Battlefield" Training

Urban gang violence has, ironically, provided Army Special Forces medics with peacetime opportunities to treat "battlefield" wounds. In a program that began in October 1991, the Army sends SF medics to San Antonio for 10 and a half weeks of civilian training that refreshes their emergency medical skills and includes actual ambulance duty. The program, conducted at the University of Texas Health Science Center, also prepares these Green Berets to test for civilian paramedic certification. Highly-trained SF medics sometimes find their trauma skills have degraded from insufficient use.

"It's a really good program," said Sergeant First Class Phil Raines, an SF medic instructor at Fort Sam Houston and former member of the 5th SFGA. "It's a good review, and it also brings us up to date on the latest civilian standards of pre-hospital care."

SF medics who receive Army approval to attend the program leave their units on temporary-duty status. They are billeted at Camp Bullis, a National Guard post near San Antonio. By the end of the program's first year, a total of 102 SF medics had attended.

"They [SF medics] do receive a lot of valuable, good training, but whether or not they get to practice those skills on a regular basis is another thing," commented Charles Garoni, assistant program director in the university center's Emergency Training Department.

A part of this program is the soldiers' participation in ambulance runs made by the city fire department's Emergency Medical Service (EMS). "They are all required to spend a minimum of about 120 hours, but some of them spend more," Garoni said.

An Associated Press report in December 1992 said San Antonio police had attributed an increase in murders to the growing use of 9mm weapons in drive-by shootings. The 9mm round is used worldwide in submachine guns, carbines and semi-automatic pistols.

"The only time the military sees gunshot trauma is when there's a war," Garoni commented. "But on the streets of most American cities, paramedics see it on a routine basis. And not only gunshots, but knife attacks as well."

The operator prepares his first IV. He quickly inspects a bag of solution. "Expiration date 12-94; cap looks O.K.; no sediment or condensation; no leaks," he calls out. "Cap appears secure; no kinks in the line."

Next comes the needle. "Patient, if you can hear me, you're going to feel a stick," he says. Willie feigns unconsciousness; it's in his script. A liter bag of IV solution is soon connected to his left arm. Civilian instructor Richard Smith, a former Army practical nurse, watches closely, then writes on his clipboard.

The operator makes quick work of a second IV. He grabs his stethoscope and blood-pressure cuff for a re-assessment. He announces actual vital-sign data and skin condition, which he quickly jots in his clinical notes. In response, Smith reads off mock information indicating the patient's condition is starting to stabilize. A few minutes later, Willie opens his eyes and struts.

"Tell me what happened to you," the operator says.

"I remember stabbing a guy...last thing I remember."

"Are you allergic to anything," the operator asks.

"Penicillin...fire ants, bee stings."

The operator jots this in his notes. Then he fills out a card and hands it to his assistant. "Hadji, take this and go get blood," he orders.

The assistant rushes out. At a nearby tent, cadre members scrutinize the document. A few minutes later, Hadji returns with a bag of fake blood. The operator simulates feeding it into an IV line.

Next comes a live rectal exam. "Good sphincter tone," the operator says. "Prostate: walnut-sized — no abnormalities."

He changes gloves. Next, he simulates inserting a urinary catheter into his patient. Then he re-checks vital signs.

Finally, with hand motions and step-by-step detail, the operator describes to Smith how he would insert a chest tube to re-inflate the patient's "collapsed" right lung. Smith checks off another item. This student will pass clinical.

"He was a little bit out of sequence at times," Smith says afterward, "but he went back and got everything." In all, only three operators out of seven passed. The other four will be re-tested later. But the three who passed still aren't quite finished.

They go outside the tent, sit on the ground and write hurriedly in their notebooks. They have only a few minutes to organize their clinical data before taking an oral quiz given by their instructors. Each operator will then have to decide how much of which drugs his patient would receive, hypothetically, in the next 24 hours.

More Training

Nearly eight more weeks of Academy training await the SF students who pass this Trauma 3.

Watkins, an Army physician's assistant, is the primary instructor during this next "block."

He begins with disease processes, "the 150 or so most common diseases, worldwide." Students then receive more training in pharmacology. They have to maintain their 10-hour class days as subjects turn to internal medicine, hematology, obstetrics and gynecology, dermatology and dental extractions.

The students now go from *simulating* urinary catheters to performing live ones — on each other.

After their 31 weeks at the Academy, the SF medic students will perform four weeks of on-the-job clinical training at hospitals on stateside Army bases or Native American reservations in New Mexico and Arizona. The soldiers work under doctors' close supervision.

Then the students return to Fort Bragg for their final 16 weeks of medical training. They are introduced to limited surgical procedures relating to battlefield wounds. They also train in Advanced Cardiac Life Support, and in the diagnosis and treatment of tropical zoonotic ("animal-caused") diseases. Since they someday might have to doctor livestock, the students also study basic veterinary procedures.

Once they've completed medic training, the students still have about nine weeks of SF soldier training: unconventional-warfare doctrine, small-unit infantry tactics, land navigation, field craft, and survival, evasion, resistance and escape techniques.

The Q Course ends with a 13-day exercise in which student A-Teams train guerrillas and then lead them into mock, unconventional warfare in the Uwharrie National Forest in North Carolina.

Next, all of the newly qualified SF soldiers receive mandatory training in a foreign language. Nowadays, Arabic dialects are emphasized. But Spanish-speakers are still needed, too, partly because of the military's support — officially non-combat — of the War on Drugs. In April 1992, the Pentagon acknowledged that military advisors had been training police in Peru, the world's main source of cocaine (as reported in *Command* no. 18). SF teams have also supported US law-enforcement officers along the border with Mexico.

Quiet Professionals

SF soldiers tend to view themselves as "quiet professionals." Their force is a low-cost, low-profile and highly adaptable tool of US foreign policy.

"Green Berets are politically acceptable when conventional US forces are not," Army Gen. Carl W. Stiner, commander of the US Special Operations Command, testified in 1992 before the House Armed Services Committee. USSOCOM, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, controls about 42,000 troops — active duty, Reserve and National Guard — from all branches of service.

In a diplomatically sensitive situation, Stiner said, "If you put a platoon from the 82nd Airborne or the Marines in, they would be considered provocative." SF soldiers, on the other hand, are "focused and trained" for sensitive missions in specific areas of the world. What's more, he added, "you don't read about them much in the paper." ☉

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Operation Icarus

The German Plan to Invade Iceland

by Carl O. Schuster

[Ed's Intro: In the Jan/Feb issue, we presented a piece on the stillborn Axis plans for invading Malta. This piece is about yet another cancelled amphibious operation. The German side of this story is here laid out in English for the first time.]

It was apparent by mid-June 1940 that Great Britain would soon be fighting alone against Nazi Germany. France was defeated; Italy had become an active German ally, and the remaining countries of Europe were either conquered or neutral. The whole world waited for Hitler's next move: the invasion of England. The Führer, however, had other ideas. He wanted a quick and easy way to drive Great Britain out of the war so he could move on to attack the nation he considered National Socialism's greatest enemy, the Soviet Union.

Hitler saw the British dependence on imported food, fuel and raw materials as their Achilles heel. He therefore directed the commander of the German navy (*Kriegsmarine*), Adm. Erich Räder, to draw up plans for the seizure of Iceland. Once conquered, the island would be used as a staging base for air and naval attacks on Britain's sea lines of supply. The Royal Navy and Air Force would

be hard pressed indeed to protect Atlantic convoys if Iceland were in German hands.

For planning purposes, Hitler authorized the commitment of the troops originally earmarked for the relief of Narvik earlier that year, and he directed *Group XXI* in Norway to provide a liaison officer to Räder's staff. Designated "Operation Icarus" (*Fall Ikarus*), the plan was to emphasize speed and surprise to take the island before London could react. For that reason, the landing force was to be heavily motorized to enable it to perform swift, mobile operations.

It was estimated Iceland could be taken in four days, because the island had no military of its own and the recently arrived British forces consisted of only one territorial infantry brigade and a Royal Navy port operations company. Moreover, there were still no military aircraft stationed on the island in June.

Hitler saw in all this a chance to repeat the success of the recent Norwegian campaign. However, his naval commanders looked on it as a suicide mission that would probably lead to the sacrifice of their surface fleet for no strategic gain. The army saw little prospect of the *Kriegsmarine* being able to provide the logistics support they would need before major *Luftwaffe* elements arrived to provide air cover. Indeed, both the army and navy planners believed only the presence of a significant *Luftwaffe* force could deter the Royal Navy from conducting a counter-invasion, or at least blockading the island.

Initial naval planning called for two high speed (26.5 knot) passenger liners, *Bremen* and *Europa*, to carry the troops to Iceland. Once there, they had to seize a port immediately because Germany lacked the landing craft needed to conduct beach assaults. *Bremen* was to be equipped with two powered ferries to relay the invaders ashore until a pier was secured.

Both liners carried only five-ton cranes that could not off-load heavy equipment such as tanks. At the same time, the need to motorize the invasion force increased the cargo space requirements above that which could be accommodated in the two ships. Those requirements were further increased by the need to carry four weeks' worth of supplies so the invaders could hold out against an extended British blockade.

Unfortunately for the Germans, they had no high-speed cargo ships that could supplement the



liners. The fastest steamers available were the 15-knot *Potsdam* and *Gneisenau*,* both of which could carry and off-load the largest tanks then in German service. However, their inclusion in the invasion flotilla would have introduced as many problems as it solved.

*This is not a mistaken reference to the battlecruiser *Gneisenau* mentioned elsewhere in the article. There were two ships of different classes, but the same name, in service at the same time.

The two passenger liners could make the voyage from Tromsø, Norway (where the troops to be used were stationed), to Iceland in less than three days. The steamers, though, would have required another 36 hours. Thus the planners faced a dilemma: the original basis of the plan was for the troops to arrive in Iceland and be established ashore before the British could intervene. A slower transit speed increased the possibility of detection and interception at sea, where the Royal Navy's superior firepower would prove fatal.

Germany's Ground Force for Icarus

Though the German army didn't have time to get heavily involved in the planning for Operation Icarus before its cancellation, Hitler had directed it to make available the forces which had previously been assigned to rescue Gen. Dietl's mountain troops in Narvik.


Built around a cadre from the *2nd Mountain Division*, that operation's battlegroup was both mobile and powerful. It had been issued German and captured Norwegian vehicles to give it mobility, and it was reinforced by tank, engineer, mortar, and motorcycle attachments. Additions for Icarus were to have included an amphibious engineer battalion, two construction companies, a 10.5cm coastal defense artillery battery, and an anti-aircraft battalion.

The force would have numbered some 5,000 men and was to be led by Lt. Gen. Erwin Engelbrecht, commander of the *163rd Infantry Division*. Though he had only enough assault craft to land a reinforced company in the first wave, Engelbrecht's experienced men could have been expected to acquit themselves well against the British.

With the arrival of Alabaster Force on 27 June, however, the British gained what would have been a vast superiority in artillery, even without Royal Navy support. This preponderance of enemy guns, coupled with the lack of German air support for the invaders, would have made capture of Reykjavik uncertain. British troops were good at defense, especially when not subjected to air attack.

OPERATION ICARUS

Landing Force



Alternatively, splitting the force into two echelons, one fast and one slow, would have necessitated the landing force commander begin his operations on the island without tanks and only the slimmest logistical support. Further, the slower transport group would have faced a significant risk of interception, and its destruction would mean the isolation of the landing force in a hostile

environment without supplies or heavy equipment. Under such conditions, the troops would not have lasted long in the harsh climate of Iceland.

It was this transport conundrum, coupled with Iceland's shortage of suitable invasion points, adequate ports and food supplies that mitigated against the plan. Weather conditions limit-

Alabaster Force: Britain's Iceland Garrison

Iceland's importance to the British war effort can be seen from the high priority given to its garrisoning, which was second only to that of Great Britain itself during the dark days of 1940.

The initial garrison, a battalion of Royal Marines, went ashore on 11 May. This 500-man force lacked anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, and was equipped with only one battery of 25-pounder gun-howitzers. A second-


line territorial infantry brigade, the 147th, replaced the Marines five days later.

Churchill sent those troops to prevent the Germans conducting a bloodless occupation of the island, which was at the time a dependency of recently-conquered Denmark. The occupation was widely publicized throughout the world for that reason. Churchill hoped that however politically unpopular, the scant occupation forces would delay the Germans until after he found a more potent garrison for the island.

Two seaplanes were soon sent to provide a reconnaissance and early warning capability, and a Royal Navy port operations company was dispatched to improve the infrastructure of Reykjavik harbor. At the time, though, there was not a single anti-aircraft or coastal defense gun anywhere on the island, nor was there any radar.

Finding more troops and equipment for the Iceland garrison was difficult in June 1940, since it was just one month after the British Expeditionary Force had narrowly escaped destruction on the continent. Still, on 23 June, the War Office ordered the commander of the 49th Territorial Division, Gen. H.O. Curtis, to take his headquarters staff and two territorial infantry brigades, the 70th (second-line), and the 146th (first-line), to Iceland and assume command of its defenses.

Designated "Alabaster Force," the headquarters and lead elements of the brigades landed in Reykjavik four days later. The entire force was established ashore by 30 June.



ed the timing of the operation to the period from April to September; the likelihood of unpredictable storms made the move too risky during any other times.

The Germans' intelligence estimates indicated only two ports were suitable for their uses, Reykjavik in the southwest, and Akureyri in the north. Separated by nearly 300 miles, they were connect-

ed by the island's only major road, a two-lane, gravel-paved "highway." The terrain was devoid of cover, and the road was dominated by nearby glaciers and mountains.

Reykjavik was the better port and the island's capital. It also had the only airfield and was where the British forces were located. The lack of other suitable landing areas limited the invasion

Alabaster force included a reinforced engineering battalion because Curtis wanted to activate the nearby Kaldadarnes Airfield as quickly as possible. The War Office and Admiralty also wanted Iceland's airfield capacity expanded to support the battle of the Atlantic. Aircraft operating from such fields could range far out into both the Norwegian Sea and North Atlantic Ocean. (Curtis had a still more personal interest in airfields. His staff had led the ill-fated Avon Force in Norway, and he had no desire to relive that nightmare.)

Curtis also sent urgent requests to London for a fighter squadron, along with others for anti-aircraft and coastal defense guns. What he got, though, was a Royal Marine Fortress Unit on 1 August. Though 450 men short of its authorized strength of 1,200, the RMFU brought with it two refurbished 6-inch naval guns, three searchlight units, and a battery of four 2-pounder anti-aircraft (AA) guns.

Curtis promptly put the AA battery at the airfield. Though he didn't believe the enemy could conduct an airborne landing so far from German bases in Norway, he was not one to take chances. He also garrisoned the airfield with a full brigade. The remainder of the forces were positioned in a semi-circle around Reykjavik.

Reconnaissance detachments surveyed the island to determine likely invasion sites. Their work became the basis for defensive plans for the remainder of the war.

The defenses were improved incrementally over the next six months. In September, Curtis recommended the extension of the defensive perimeter to include coastal defense detachments in every major fjord on the island. His survey had found five likely invasion areas, one small beach inside Reykjavik's harbor area, one south of the city, two in Hrutafjord, and another one north of Akureyri.

He wanted enough troops to station a brigade group in the eastern part of the island to delay, if not halt, any invasion force landing on the northeast coast. He also wanted to protect the island's only significant economic facilities, the fish oil factories at Siglufjord. London agreed, and promised to provide the necessary troops and equipment once the danger to Britain itself was reduced.

The actual rate of reinforcement proved slow but steady. By the end of August, Curtis had an additional coastal defense battery of two 4.7-inch naval guns positioned in Hafnarfjord, about 10 nautical miles south of Reykjavik, and another pair of 12-pounders protecting Hvalfjord (where the port operations company was based a naval base). An additional pair of 6-inch guns

were installed in Saurbaer by 4 September. By November, Iceland had a full coastal defense regiment and the general was able to emplace two 4-inch naval guns in Eyjafjord, controlling the entrances to Akureyri. By October, there were lookout detachments and observation posts in every fjord, great and small, across the island.

Thirty days later, Curtis had nearly 20,000 personnel of all services under his command, including nine infantry battalions reinforced by two additional companies, one field company of Royal Engineers, and four general construction and three road construction companies. His forces also included a platoon of Norwegian ski troops, made up of volunteers who had escaped the German onslaught on their own country.

Still, the garrison suffered from a shortage of anti-aircraft guns. The first heavy AA weapons, some 3.7-inch guns, were not delivered until November. Even as late as June 1941, there were still only 16 heavy and 8 light AA guns on the entire island, all concentrated around either Reykjavik or Kaldadarnes Airfield.

President Roosevelt agreed the US would assume defensive responsibility for Iceland starting in April 1941, and American troops began arriving shortly thereafter. US Navy Task Force 19 delivered the *1st USMC Expeditionary Brigade* to Reykjavik on 7 July 1941. The first US Army Air Force aircraft, 30 P-40Es of the *33rd Pursuit Squadron*, landed at Reykjavik Aerodrome one month later. The Marines were replaced by US Army troops, including an entire AA regiment and medium tank company, beginning in August. The last British troops were withdrawn in July 1942, and the *49th Division* reverted to its first-line infantry role upon its return to England.

At its peak, the British garrison had included nearly 28,000 troops and other personnel, including an infantry division, an independent brigade group, a coastal defense regiment, and a coastal artillery group. The Americans defended it with a slightly smaller ground force, but stationed a full air wing on the island to be able to destroy any invasion task force as soon as it came in range.

After 1940, Hitler never considered invading Iceland; Allied strength was too great. It is interesting to note, however, the potential threat had been great enough to move Churchill to despatch what amounted to roughly one-sixth of Great Britain's available combat troops to Iceland during the desperate summer of 1940. If nothing else, Hitler's designs on Iceland served as a useful diversion for Germany, tying down Allied forces that could have been used more productively elsewhere.

force to a direct assault in the harbor area (which might not have been as bad as it sounds, since the British had no heavy weapons there until 28 June).

Akureyri had no Allied forces present at all before August, but landing there meant the ground force would have to take several days to reach Reykjavik. The British defenders could not be expected to sit still during that move, and Räder believed the Royal Navy would react within 24 hours by dispatching a powerful task force of battleships and cruisers, supported by at least one aircraft carrier.

Thus outnumbered, outgunned and lacking the overwhelming land-based air support that had proven so decisive off Norway, Räder feared his *Kriegsmarine* would be overwhelmed and destroyed.

Still, naval planning went ahead to completion by 12 June, and was officially presented to the *Führer* 10 days later. Given at a time when

Räder's credibility with Hitler was at its greatest, the admiral geared the briefing to emphasize the risks involved and the negative effects the expected losses would have on Germany's overall war effort. Hitler accepted the gloomy assessment and cancelled the operation.

Britain delivered the remainder of a territorial division to the island on 27 June, and was preparing to transport another brigade group and a Royal Marine Fortress Unit. If there had ever really been an opportunity for the Germans to conduct a successful invasion, it was lost during June's final week — the defending garrison was too strong after that.

Given Germany's inadequate naval strength, Operation Icarus had no real prospect of success no matter when it was attempted. Only the *Luftwaffe's* intervention had saved the *Kriegsmarine* off Norway, but the air arm lacked the long-range planes needed to do so again off Iceland.

Icarus: The Aerial Dimension

In contrast to the Norway operation, and all other German offensive operations before 1944, Icarus would have been launched without significant air support. Once past the Faroe Islands area, the Icarus "Task Group" could only expect air support from its own seaplanes, and a handful of Fw200 long-range maritime patrol aircraft operating out of Bordeaux, France.

The Fw200 was a frail aircraft that had to drop its bombs from a low altitude at slow speed. This was a workable tactic against unarmed, slow moving merchant ships, but would have proven costly against warships. Low-and-slow bomb drops also significantly reduced the effectiveness of armor-piercing bombs, the only kind that could damage heavy cruisers and battleships. Finally, Fw200 availability would have been limited to one or two sorties per day; that wouldn't have been enough to make a serious impression on the Royal Navy or the Iceland garrison, except perhaps during the initial landing.

On the other side, the Royal Navy was sure to enjoy air supremacy the moment it brought an aircraft carrier to the scene. Though the RN employed obsolete fighters in its air wings, they were more than adequate to handle Fw200s.

The Skua fighter-bombers had earlier demonstrated their effectiveness by sinking the light cruiser *Königsberg* in Bergen harbor during the Norwegian campaign. Certainly they could have made operations difficult for any German force moving across Iceland's barren, almost coverless, terrain. The carriers' Swordfish torpedo bombers would have been a serious threat to the German transports, if not to the *Kriegsmarine's* major combatants.

In short, air power would have been the key to Iceland, and the Germans would not have had it.

Comparison of Available Aircraft

Aircraft Types	22 June 1940	
	British	German
	Shore Based	
Bombers	0	10 Fw200
Seaplanes	2 Sunderland	0
	Carrier Based	
Fighters		10 Me109T*
<i>HMS Furious</i>	12 Skua†	
<i>HMS Hermes</i>	12 Skua†	
<i>HMS Ark Royal</i>	12 Skua†	
Dive Bombers	see note†	20 Ju87C*
Torpedo Bombers		10 Fi167*
<i>HMS Furious</i>	21 Swordfish	
<i>HMS Hermes</i>	12 Swordfish	
<i>HMS Ark Royal</i>	48 Swordfish	

Notes:

*These figures represent the air wing formed for the German aircraft carrier *Graf Zeppelin* in August 1939 (its originally scheduled completion date). They are included purely to illustrate the potential contribution such an air wing might have had on the operation.

†These fighter-bombers were inferior fighters and bombers. Too slow and ponderous to be effective fighters, they also carried too light a bomb load (500 lbs.) to be good dive bombers, but their performance would have been sufficient to make a difference in any potential scenario for a German Iceland invasion.

At the same time, however, the British presence on the island was deeply resented by its citizens, and a German invasion force may therefore have met with some local support. Still, such support could in no way have ensured the invaders' victory once the Royal Navy arrived on the scene. Germany could certainly not have sustained its forces on Iceland in the face of overwhelming British maritime supremacy.

The basic strategic concept for a German seizure of Iceland was sound; and the potential threat exerted a significant influence on Allied attitudes toward the island throughout the war.

American troops began replacing the British on Iceland in July 1941 (and the United States has remained responsible for the island's defense to this day). Despite indications Germany lacked both the intention and the capability to seize the island after 1940, Iceland was kept garrisoned with the equivalent of a reinforced division supported by a composite air wing until the very end of the war.

Aircraft and ships operating out of Iceland protected convoys from Labrador to the Faroe Islands. Iceland was also a critical staging area and refueling stop for naval and air units enroute to Great Britain. Despite the long odds, then, had Icarus been successfully executed by Germany, the island's loss would have had a disastrous effect on the Allied war effort. ☉

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Icarus: The Naval Dimension

Though Hitler's designs on Iceland were strategically sound, they were not practical; the *Kriegsmarine* lacked the strength to undertake such an operation. The Germans had only two battlecruisers, *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, to face the British Home Fleet, which always had at least four battleships on duty in Scapa Flow. The infamous *Bismarck* was not yet ready to sail, and would not be until the autumn. Even then, her presence would not have been enough to stop a determined Royal Navy task force. The situation with respect to cruisers and destroyers was even more in Britain's favor.

The Royal Navy had two aircraft carriers, *HMS Furious* and *Hermes*, available to support the fleet, while Germany had none. *HMS Ark Royal* could also have been available after a few days.

Air power had given Germany victory in Norway, but the failure to complete the aircraft carrier *Graf Zeppelin* on schedule precluded Germany from having it ready for operations against Iceland.

The Germans, then, would have been hard pressed to protect their transports, particularly the slower ones, from British air attacks. More significantly, the Royal Navy's carriers would have given the British a superior reconnaissance capability as well. The Arctic summer provides nearly 18 hours of daylight, enabling a carrier to launch as many as three full strikes a day. The British could have struck at the German task group at will, damaging or slowing its combatants or transports as needed. In contrast to ships making surface raids, an invasion task force has to stand and fight, or the entire invasion force must withdraw to avoid destruction.

The *Graf Zeppelin's* presence would not have made a decisive difference, but it would have reduced the risk. Its air wing contained superior aircraft, but whether that superiority would have been enough to offset British numbers is still open to question.

Ironically, the *Kriegsmarine* did enjoy one advantage over the Royal Navy during this period: in codebreaking. Its *B-Dienst* had broken the RN's operational codes before the war and was reading between 10-20 percent of its coded radio traffic. In those pre-ULTRA days of 1940, that capability would have given the Germans a significant operational advantage, but, again, probably not enough of one to overcome the vast disparity in overall power between the two fleets.

Great Britain's very survival rested on denying Iceland to Germany, and the Royal Navy's determination to destroy any invasion force would have matched that need. Churchill and his commanders realized Britain could replace its naval losses more readily than Germany, and that the loss of Iceland would have been more decisive than any casualties suffered in its defense. Adm. Räder knew that as well, and knew also that German possession of Iceland was not worth risking the total destruction of his fleet.

A New Kind of War

by George Friedman & Meredith LeBard

[Ed's Intro: *The horror — the horror!*]

The Trouble With Guns

For the past 500 years or so, warfare has been dominated by a single technology: the tube-fired projectile travelling on a ballistically determined course. From .25 caliber handguns to the largest artillery pieces, from infantry to armor to ships to aircraft, the cutting edge of war has always been guns.

The key weakness of guns has been their ballistic character: once fired, their course could not be corrected. To a great extent, the history of modern warfare was determined by the fact the probability of a given projectile striking a given target was extremely low, and the only way to increase that probability was to saturate the target area with projectiles. Nations that could mass produce vast quantities of guns, the platforms on which they rode, and the projectiles they fired, won wars. Those that couldn't, lost.

In the early 1970s, after half a millennium, things changed dramatically. At the bombing of the Paul Doumer Bridge in Hanoi in December 1972, and on 8 October 1973 in the northern Sinai, a new species of projectile was encountered — the non-ballistic projectile, which could be maneuvered after being fired or released.

The destruction of a bridge in Hanoi by guided gravity bombs and an Israeli armored brigade by AT-3 Sagger anti-tank missiles represented more than merely the emergence of a new refinement of the traditional ballistic system. It represented a radical break with the past, in which precision was to replace saturation on the battlefield, and the criteria for victory would shift dramatically. The premium is now on intelligence and control — knowing where the target is and controlling the movement of munitions to that point.

This is the second revolution in warfare in 500 years. For centuries, intelligence and control were combined into one weapons platform — except for the emergence of the forward observer for indirect artillery fire late in the 19th century. Now they could be separated: target acquisition and fire control no longer had to be located in the same place. This means weapons platforms do not necessarily have to be close the battlefield. The intelligence platform acquires the target, the weapons platform launches the projectile, and the weapon controller may be located in a still different place. These distances began as small ones, measured in meters and kilometers, but there is now no longer any the-

oretical reason they cannot be measured in intercontinental distances as well.

The traditional 20th century weapons platforms — tanks, heavy bombers, large surface vessels — all combined the functions of intelligence, control, and firing platform. But it is now conceivable, as technology allows us to separate the three functions, to conceive of very different configurations. Where a satellite or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) acquires the target, a projectile is launched at great distance from the battlefield and guides itself to the target using space-, air- and ground-based guidance data.

Indeed, a decrease in the number of projectiles necessary for a successful engagement is paralleled by a decline in the size of the weapons platform. Since remote sensors can take over intelligence functions, the idea of an even smaller weapons platform, perhaps the size of a man, is now conceivable.

The following, then, is a description of a raid by a Japanese commando team against a Korean armored brigade in the year 2014, the 100th anniversary of World War I. The countries involved are incidental, as are the rationales for the mission. What we intend to portray is the passing of the guard from one type of weapon system to another — the end of the tank and the return to primacy of the eternal infantryman.

The weapons described may at first appear far-fetched, but each of them is under at least preliminary study by some section of the military service, or other agencies of the Department of Defense. Certainly some of these technologies will not pan out; but it's also safe to say many technologies that will dominate parts of the battlefield by the year 2014 have not yet even been imagined. Our purpose is to consider the profound effect these new technologies will have on warfare in the 21st century, and to think about them not incrementally, but as a revolution in the very nature of war.

31 August 2014: Background

Tensions are high. Forces of the now united Korean Republic and Japan have had several clashes along the Yalu River. American units were not involved, but their presence in Korea, the presence of US interdiction satellites overhead, and an entire Space Sector Defense System from the Seventh Space Command, are regarded by Japan as unwarranted intrusions into her sphere of influence.

Those spheres had been developing ever since the mid-1990s, when regional economic relationships evolved into regional economic blocs and

then into formal political arrangements. The European zone was self-absorbed, falling back into traditional patterns of European fratricide. The richest and most secure zone was the American, dominating the western hemisphere, poaching on Africa and even Europe, with a presence in Australasia as well. Continued American support for Korea, Taiwan and Singapore was irritating to the Japanese, who were allied with the remnants of the Beijing regime. In addition to providing bases for US power, those places sat astride vital Japanese supply lines.

Japan was especially disturbed by Korea, as the time-to-target of hypervelocity cruise missiles from there to Japan was only minutes. Indeed, Japanese control of their own airspace, particularly in the south, was threatened by American UAVs, which had the capability to loiter for days at extremely high altitudes, then swoop down and destroy aircraft, or fire a burst of low energy laser power to blind pilots and confuse avionics systems. Japan, therefore, had been demanding the withdrawal of all American forces from Korea, followed by that nation's neutralization and disarmament. Korea, of course, refused outright.

Tokyo decided to show the Koreans that such intrusiveness had its cost. The essence of their plan was to probe at the peninsula's long sea coast with stealthy, damaging raids.

The Japanese knew many of the anti-air and anti-missile systems they would encounter were jointly operated by US and Korean forces, with data being fed directly into the American Command, Control, Communications/Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (C³/RISTA) system. That system was centered on a complex manned network of modules in geostationary orbit some 23,000 miles above 135° west, just north of West Irian and over the equator.


Nicknamed "Battlestar," the main US space station controlled an armada of sensors and weapons. Neither CINCSPACE (Commander-in-Chief Space) nor CINCPAC (Commander-in-Chief Pacific) were on board. CINCSPACE had several other space stations and their space fleets to manage, and remained secure in Cheyenne Mountain, while CINCPAC's responsibilities were not confined to space but to air, land and especially sea.

Still held by a senior naval officer, the Pacific Command had four carrier battle groups. While CINCPAC was concerned with and regarded his space assets as important, his view — the conventional view of the water navy — was that space was merely an aid to the primary mission, securing the sea lanes with sea going vessels.

Space War

About 80 men were stationed aboard Battlestar, commanded by an air force brigadier general, with a navy captain as his operations officer and an army colonel as his link to ground operations. Their task was huge.

First, they monitored the surface and airspace beneath them for the movement of weapons platforms. They used multisensor systems aboard their own vessel, others sensors aboard armadas of small, inexpensive, single spectrum satellites constantly sweeping across interesting areas from 60° north to 15° south latitude, along with an array of tiny, silent UAVs, each no more than 12 inches long and wide, flying at up to 70,000 feet and powered by solar batteries, to tirelessly look, listen and otherwise sense for any military developments.



The American C³/RISTA system over east Asia, it had evolved by 2014.

Second, they could order a variety of weapons into action, and Battlestar could itself directly fire some specially designated systems. Still other systems were used to keep the men in the loop, but required intelligence or authorization from the ground to fire. Most importantly, surveillance satellites containing precise navigational systems provided terminal guidance for an array of projectiles, ranging from intercontinental missiles to artillery shells. They either acted as passive Ground Positioning System (GPS) or for active target acquisition and guidance, locating targets and homing projectiles.

Defensive weapons were aided by look-down satellites, able to locate incoming low-flying aircraft and missiles amid clutter. Having done so, Battlestar would be in a position to manage defensive battles by directing manned and missile intercept missions. In addition, Battlestar's sideways looking, superconducting, synthetic aperture radars were able to probe beneath the seas and even beneath the earth's surface, searching for such things as mine fields buried under the sand or submarines operating close to the surface. Still other superconducting sensors, peering into the colder parts of the spectrum, such as ultraviolet, were able to sense threatening weapons and platforms that were standing down, trying not to create an obtrusive infrared signature.

The centrality of space to strategic thinking had come as a surprise to many planners. When the United States formed its Space Command in 1991, and appointed its first CINCSpace, outer space was understood to be a throwaway zone, in which unmanned vehicles would carry out missions either automatically or under limited ground control. When such systems' life expectancy or missions were completed, they would be discarded and replaced by others. Navstar typified that approach. It performed its mission automatically, telling units on the ground precisely where they were located, but its components could not maneuver, defend themselves, or directly harm the enemy.

Other satellites were fixed in orbit, but could shift their observational modes under command from the earth. A few others could actually shift their orbits slightly on their own. Outright maneuvering in space, however, was limited by the engines available, such as ion engines, that barely gave enough thrust for station keeping, let alone radical shifts in orbit. The ability to maneuver, defend and attack, was completely lacking. New missions normally required a new satellite, and completed missions exhausted the utility of older ones.

The invention by the Russians of plasma engines, and by others of nuclear electric propulsion, finally opened a new sphere of operations in which satellites could be shifted to entirely new orbits, maneuvered to avoid threats, and used to attack other satellites.

Satellites thus became true operational platforms. With that change, satellites could be both threatened and defended, and their value rose dramatically. Space became both a strategic and tactical area of operations.

The cost of manned spacecraft limited the number of such platforms that could be operated. This led to a tremendous concentration of functions aboard single command platforms that, in turn, oversaw a wide variety of unmanned systems. This made the security that could usually be had from redundancy extremely difficult to achieve in the new arena. Control could not be fully decentralized to unmanned platforms, nor could earth based control substitute for space based control.

It was the new maneuverability of satellites that made the problem of control infinitely more complex. Previously, only limited maneuvers had been possible in highly predictable orbits. Now, as more radical maneuvers became possible, the ability of earth based stations to handle space vehicle management by themselves declined.

There was an inherent weakness in earth managed space operations: the lag and degradation of signals from satellites to earth and from earth to satellites. Optimally, there was a lag of just over 0.1 second for a transmission each way — a seemingly trivial amount, except at orbital speeds, and with the extraordinary computing times of neural based computers, using genetically engineered conductors and photon-based data processing, that tenth of a second was practically an eternity. The lag actually was longer, due to other degradations in the sensors, computers or transmitters.

Equally important, the two-way communication link was a vast highway begging to be interdicted. It was so vulnerable a huge effort had to be devoted to signal integrity, with the advantage always going to those wanting to disrupt the signal even momentarily. Were that to happen, the unmanned spacecraft would suddenly become space junk.

The threat of maneuvering spacecraft homing in on orbiting satellites made countermeasures difficult. Some satellites could themselves be maneuvered, while others, geostationary or in a vital fixed orbit, had to be protected. A set of defensive systems was created, ranging from passive screening systems to active anti-anti-satellite devices. To fight this battle, split second, intelligent decisions were necessary, wherein data were clear and response lag minimal. Men had to be in the loop, and for that they could not be on the surface.

With each Space Fleet containing well over 100 operational platforms, and each of those was vital and expensive, repair and maintenance had to be more rapid than scheduling a new launch for the next fiscal year. Even with the Hypersonic Space Plane, space-based repair was cheaper and more prudent than the old approaches. The best method

was to employ men on space scooters who performed the continuous chore of checking the satellites.

The Japanese Plan

Strategic success, then, seemed to require destroying Battleslar, but the Japanese had no interest in directly engaging the US. The Americans were all over the interior of Korea, operating sophisticated missile, energy and data systems. The Japanese didn't want to strike at those Americans; rather, they wanted to drive a wedge between them and their Asian hosts. To do that they chose a limited ground operation intended to decimate the Korean forces in one sector, thus simultaneously demonstrating Japanese power and the Americans' inability to counter it. It was to be a commando strike, intended to wreak havoc without triggering a general war with the US.

During the 20th century, commando operations had been the pinpricks of war. The amount of firepower a squad or company of infantrymen could deliver against a target was limited. Those early commandos' only real hope lay in arriving unnoticed, using explosives, and then withdrawing before there was any major counteraction. It was axiomatic the attacking party couldn't survive a serious encounter with defending forces, since once the alarm was in, the offense-defense ratio would quickly become catastrophic.

In 2014, however, the Japanese faced a different reality. Their intention was not to engage technologically advanced American infantrymen, but Korean forces. The latter were skilled and disciplined soldiers, but still armed with the previous generation of weapons. The target the Japanese finally chose was an elite armored brigade on coastal defense duty at Yosu.

The Koreans there were armed with a combination of heavy US made M1A2 tanks purchased between 2000 and 2010, Korean manufactured lightweight, ceramic armored, infantry fighting vehicles, armed with fire-and-forget anti-tank munitions and 20mm cannon able to fire smart rounds, and carrying infantrymen armored with Kevlar and armed with rifles, machineguns and mortars (which alone had precision guidance capabilities).

Japanese electronic intelligence had determined the brigade was not hooked directly into the American C³/RISTA network, but was only tied to the Korean army's general headquarters, which in turn was given C³/RISTA access only on an as-needed basis. In fact, the decision to provide data was made at the Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security Council level, to keep the Koreans on a short leash.

On the other side, the Japanese strike force would have full access to data, though specific interrogations of the terrain, particularly those involving superconducting synthetic aperture

radars, were avoided so as not to alert the Americans about the impending operation.

21st Century Commandos


The attackers were launched from a submersible amphibious vessel about 50 miles due south of Yosu. Inboard were nine domed, oblate vessels, lacking any straight lines. They were made out of an extremely light and transparent "aerogel" substance developed at the Livermore labs in the 1990s. Aerogels were among the lightest solids, nearly invisible to the naked eye and in other spectra as well, and had almost no heat conductivity. Holding a block of aerogel, a blowtorch could be directed against the other side without the holder feeling any heat. Even interior heat was kept inside, rather than radiated out. Indeed, dispersing accumulated energy was a key engineering problem in using aerogel. The stuff was impossible to see on radar, difficult with infrared, and barely noticeable in ultraviolet.

When the vessel moved, it was mostly submerged in water, and therefore was easily missed by the naked eye. Powered by a superconducting engine, it gave off little turbulence and could sneak up to shore stealthily or, if necessary, rapidly generate speed and rush in at over 50 knots. Such a maneuver, though, was less than desirable, since, first, it implied the mission had been compromised; and second, because the vessel was not really stable at high speeds. One weakness of the ship lay in that it was highly vulnerable to direct impact of even ordinary shells, since aerogel had no armoring qualities. But on this mission, it was thought stealth would be the best protection.

On board each of the nine Amphibious Attack Craft (AAC) were 11 men — an infantry squad. These infantrymen bore little resemblance to their 20th century forebears, or to the Korean troops ashore. Those technically more primitive infantry were vulnerable to all kinds of threats, particularly high explosive artillery shells and their deadly shrapnel.

The infantryman of the 21st century was the true king of the battlefield, deadly and extremely difficult to find and kill. He dressed in loose fitting garments derived from the idea of Kevlar, but actually a product of biogenetic engineering. They covered him from boots to neck. The garments could stop high velocity 20mm rounds (not without broken bones, since it was not rigid armor — avoiding large caliber, high velocity rounds was still the preferred drill), and could easily handle small arms fire and shrapnel.

The garments were neither water nor air permeable, meaning the infantryman wearing them was already garbed in an anti-chemical warfare suit. The basic problem with such suits was that, not being air permeable, the accumulation of moisture inside rapidly made them unbearable. That problem was solved by a small air recirculation



One late-20th century fix for the problem of precise eye-hand coordination in combat. The soldier focuses his eyes on a target, points a laser or electro-optical sighting device in its general direction, and a tiny computer takes over from there.



The state of the art infantryman of the early 21st century in combat array.

system, fueled either by air drawn from the outside, or small, high pressure canisters (Kevlar armored) worn in the small of the back. Those canisters also allowed the user to become independent of outside air for extended periods in the event of biological or chemical threats. Canisters could be replaced, and with rations carried inside the suit, the user might survive indefinitely, though personal sanitation problems had still not been solved.

The most extraordinary difference between 20th and 21st century infantry was that in 2014 the soldier's head could be completely closed off from the outside world. Helmets provided protection and were mounted with a large number of sensors: tracking in infrared, ultraviolet, multifrequency radar, electro-optical, nuclear-biological-chemical, and other modes. Rather than delivering raw data to the wearer in each of those modes — something that would paralyze him with too much to think about in combat — the data were integrated by a high speed computer, carried in a backpack, which analyzed, and displayed the information visually, creating a "Virtual Reality."

The infantryman saw arrayed on his screen, in full relief, the reality outside. He could "see," all at once, enemy troops visible only to infrared, a tank visible only to radar, and a fortification visible only in ultraviolet. Side looking radar noted minefields, while the air was constantly measured and its qualities displayed.

The data displayed were not only those being gathered by his own sensors, but by those of others in his unit, as well as from other gathering systems: satellites, high and low altitude UAVs and Remote Pilotless Vehicles, and ground based sensors — all linked in complex laser and electromagnetic networks. A flick of a switch displayed the rear, another zoomed in on any desired particular feature.

The commander could see the position of each of his men, plus call up a readout of each soldier's physical condition, available ammunition, and systems integrity. Multiple communications options were also available. The underlying principle was that each infantryman could be fully aided in concentrating on his own main task, his personal part of the mission.

For that purpose he used a weapon capable of firing a variety of munitions, including tiny hyperkinetic rounds that travelled at over Mach 100, more conventional bullets that exploded on impact and were shaped to penetrate armor, and small grenades with tremendous explosive power.

The weapon was not a rifle. The accuracy of rifles had come from their long barrels and the rifling within them, which caused the bullets fired to spin and move in stable predictable directions. In 2014, accuracy no longer required rifled barrels; each round carried its accuracy within it.

Perhaps the greatest revolution was in this enhancement of individual weapons accuracy. The problem of all man-portable ballistic systems had

been that while the eye can see accurately, it is difficult to get the hand to coordinate precisely with that vision, especially under combat conditions. Traditional weaponry had thus been enormously inefficient, requiring endless training by their users and lots of rounds to make up for that weakness.

There were several solutions, all built around ending the tyranny of hand-eye coordination, that emerged around the turn of the century. One was to aid the soldier in firing his weapon by having him focus his eyes on his target, point his weapon in the general direction of that target, but then have the projectile guided to its impact by radar, laser, or infrared, which, when screened by a computer, would translate into aiming instructions via a series of audio cues.

A more radical solution was to have the infantryman fire at his target conventionally, guided only by his helmet display, and then allow the projectile to be homed to the target by an active GPS satellite, which allowed a microprocessor contained in the round itself to use various means to maneuver to its target.

In each of those cases, the weapon continued to be held in the soldier's hands. A still more radical solution, however, was to take the weapon out of the soldier's grip altogether, mounting it on top of his helmet or his shoulders. Then the infantryman merely focused on his target (while a tiny laser quickly and accurately measured that eye focus), triggered the weapon with some movement of a facial muscle or finger, and thus made a shot with all the accuracy of an eye not dependent on a hand.

By the time of the raid, many Japanese and American troops, but no Koreans, were armed in these new ways.

The infantry of the 21st century will also be provided with another new weapon: the multi-mission projectile. The MMP is essentially a rocket with a modularized warhead. It can be fitted for different missions and with different guidance systems. Thus one basic warhead will allow an infantryman to engage an enemy tank, aircraft or fortification. It can be ordered to guide itself to the target using radar, infrared or ultraviolet guidance systems, or be guided by laser designators or an optical guidance system held by the soldier firing it.


In addition, MMPs can be fitted with special munitions and guidance. For example, they can be fitted with anti-tank rounds that explode over a group of vehicles, the warhead for each being guided to individual targets by data received from satellites overhead, or by miniature, "brilliant" computers on board. Alternatively, MMPs can be fitted to fly to a certain point, burrow down a specified number of feet, and then explode, destroying supply and command bunkers.

With such a weapon, each infantryman can provide his own artillery, anti-armor, and anti-air support. With a minimum of mission planning,

bringing along the right specialized warheads and guidance systems, the infantry squad will become deadly almost beyond belief.

Of course, one problem that will remain in 2014 is that of weight. Launcher, warheads and rockets together weigh hundreds of pounds. Though all will be shrunk tremendously, they will still add up to more than a man could normally be expected to carry for any length of time. Some of the equipment will therefore be ported by robots following the troops. These will be strange looking contraptions, mounted for mobility across any terrain, kept upright by computers and sensors.

On commando raids, however, where stealth is everything (even robots can't be trusted to be completely silent), some soldiers will be fitted with exoskeletons — braces on their limbs — moved by motors driven by lithium batteries and controlled by computers. These will sense the motions of its wearer and multiply that force by a specified factor. That way, a man normally capable of effectively carrying 100 pounds in combat might operate with 500 to 1,000, depending on system design and need. In 2014, such devices will still be relatively clumsy. Later, they will become standard for every soldier who needs greater strength or speed.



A 21st century soldier's aid, a robot vehicle. The Gunga Din of the future.

In all, the 11-man squads consisted of the following:

Squad Leader — carrying a personal weapon and powerful computing and communications gear, enabling him to speak to all, some or one of his men at a time, or his platoon and company commander, as well as to all sensing and targeting systems.

Two Programmer/Telecommunications Specialists — carrying personal weapons, but charged primarily with calibrating the weapons of others to fit any changing needs, and with reprogramming projectiles for new targets and tasks. In combat they also serve as the target acquisition team, using multi-spectral sensing devices to search for enemy air and land threats and targets, transferring data to appropriate weapon systems.

Four Heavy Weapons Team Members — carrying the components of a Multimission Projectile System. Each such launcher system can simultaneously launch two projectiles. Each of these men is fitted with an exoskeleton to aid in lifting. With those and trailing robots, over 20 large projectiles can be ported into combat.

Four Personal Weapons Specialists — armed with ordinary weapon launchers. Their function is to provide perimeter security while the specialist teams operate. These men move in advance of the main body, doing the eternal dirty work of the bleeding, bloody infantry. The only difference between them and their forebears is that they are extremely difficult to kill, and can each employ more firepower than a 20th century platoon.

The Raid

The nine amphibious craft approached the coast nearly submerged. They reached the shore just before midnight, disgorging 99 men and their equipment within minutes. Studying their helmets' display screens, each soldier deployed to the position designated for him. The commander of the operation watched everything on his screen, which alerted him that one of his men in squad three had encountered some difficulty. That man's sergeant saw the same thing on his screen, checked him, and reported a broken leg from stumbling over a fallen tree in the landing zone.

The first task was launching three small UAVs to provide tactical information on targets. It was hoped that Japanese satellites would not have to be used in active mode for targeting information during the raid, to prevent the Americans from detecting transmissions, and hence the operation, while it was still underway.

The UAVs' ultra-directional antennae minimized the chance of interception, while their on-board computers were programmed with the most complex algorithms for channel hopping (to avoid

jamming). They had multi-spectral sensors able to detect even the most camouflaged enemy positions.

The UAVs were launched, and within minutes data were flowing into the processors in each helmet and within each unit. The telecommunication specialists rushed from soldier to soldier and weapon to weapon, as inevitable glitches in calibration, hardware failure, and general software bizarreness showed themselves. The UAVs reported no change in the enemy deployment, but the operation's commander and his superiors in Tokyo were increasingly uneasy about the delays imposed by the complex equipment.

Finally all units were operational, except for three men who were assigned to remain behind with the boats — a man without full telecomputing capabilities is worse than useless on a commando raid.

The targeting team carefully downloaded the data from the UAVs, checked it against earlier terrain data received from satellites and used both to build up a complete display. They then moved over to their commander, attached a hard-wired ultra-high speed data transfer bus, and switched their information directly into his computer. The commander compared the new data to earlier intelligence efforts, saw the targeted brigade was still deployed in roughly the same fashion and that the plan did not require major changes, except squad six would find its target tanks had been moved three miles, and could now be found in the repair depot, a routine rotation.

The commander hit a switch on his belt and the data became part of the mission's overall database, supplanting all previous databases. On the displays of each trooper, there appeared a map denoting his own position, that of the rest of his squad, their designated targets, and the general route of advance to launch point. More importantly, it provided each man with precise locations for his own final deployment and launch, orders for the type of projectile to be used, coordinates and so on. This data could be displayed all at once or sequentially as needed.

The mission orders were computer generated, based on a complex program derived from expert systems built on artificial intelligence models. The commander reviewed each movement plan, and knew he could not himself design new plans as quickly or comprehensively in the time available. He accepted the computer generated missions, but then briefed squad six directly, via a secure laser communication network, on the new location of their targets.

The idea was not to close with the Koreans, but to move within range of the rockets carried by the heavy weapons teams. They would set up their systems, calibrate and fire. Ideally, that done, only the task of withdrawing would remain.

The light weapons teams would deploy ahead of the heavies to provide security, with each man

able to cover a front nearly half a mile wide, given his sensors' and weapons' range. In other words, it was possible for each defensive squad's four infantrymen to effectively man a perimeter of two miles. The 36 troopers in the task force provided 18 miles of coverage, supplemented, of course, by the heavy weapons teams providing defense in depth.

With the perimeter secured, tactical reconnaissance underway, full data and voice communications established, and heavy weapons teams in place, the munitions and warheads were quickly loaded onto the missiles.

The choice of warhead and guidance was determined by the mission: destroy a brigade of tanks, dug in and poorly visible. This task was actually relatively simple since the tanks were not moving. Their precise positions were locked in by satellite and monitored by the UAVs. The problem would be eliminating any that survived the first strike and began maneuvering.

The first volley would consist of Brilliant Anti-Tank (BAT) munitions (descendants of earlier, merely "smart," munitions that had begun to be deployed before the turn of the century), carried by conventional rockets launched about 25 miles from the target area.

The tanks were grouped in threes, each grouping spread around a triangular area 200 yards on a side. Each rocket carried 12 BATs. The Korean brigade contained 300 armored fighting vehicles of various kinds, all of which were to be destroyed. The first attack was intended to hit the most dangerous elements, the tanks, of which there were some 100.

CI and sensor systems also had to be hit by that first volley. The command bunker would be taken out by a burrowing device that, in addition to digging down into the concrete and exploding, had a follow-on system to examine the damage, determine if the bunker had actually been penetrated (by sniffing for humans with a device first used in Vietnam), and call in another strike if necessary.

As always, the allocation of firepower was the key. Off shore, three support vessels readied anti-air and anti-ship missiles against any attempt to disrupt the landing, attack or withdrawal. Others readied their launchers in case the ground commander needed additional firepower. However, their basic function was to cover the retreat and serve as a fire reserve.

On land, the commander — and his computer model — selected the optimal fire pattern for the mission:

Squad 1 — Both launchers targeting the command bunker and missile and ammunition bunker. One missile set on a preprogrammed course would be fired at each, an analysis of the strike made by Squad 1, assisted by a data specialist, and back up rockets

launched, as needed, to finish the job. At the option of the commander, both bunkers could be filled with nerve gas.

Squad 2 — Targeted at enemy tactical devices: antennae, computer installations, UAV launch and receptor sites. The four projectiles fired would carry various submunitions, some designed to hit receiver installations (radar dishes), others emitting electromagnetic pulses to disrupt communications, still others loitering, searching for signs of radiations, and homing in on them.

Squad 3 — Assigned to be a defensive squad. They would load their launchers with anti-air missiles in case any pilot attempted to bring a conventional aircraft against any of the teams, and line-of-sight anti-tank destroyers, in case any of the obsolete behemoths actually broke into the defensive area of the unit.


The rest, **Squads 4-9**, would fire BATs, each of 12 launchers firing 12 submunitions. These would be used in a pattern determined by the commander's fire control computer, and would not engage their own sensors to impact. Rather, knowing the fixed location of target tanks and their own precise location, they would simply travel a predetermined path to target, and upon crashing into the top of the turret, generate an ultra-high temperature plasma fire, penetrating and destroying the tank. Energy was able to trump armor every time.

The data crew set about making final position adjustments, double checking GPS information and correlating everything to sensor locations on the targets. The commander, noting all was as ready as it could be, with only one launcher hopelessly down, instructed the data crew to order their computer-transmitters to lay down a multi-spectral camouflage screen. This was intended to prevent electromagnetic pulses from penetrating above a man-made layer, by using balloons giving off random pulses at various altitudes and firing lasers horizontally, disrupting heat radiation from the ground without exciting sensors in patrolling satellites.

The commander was doubtful all of this would do anything more than announce the attack to the enemy, but he had been ordered to use the new technologies. Once invented, they must be used.


Finally, all launchers fired. It was not a spectacular sight. All the rockets had low heat thrusters, and the already low heat was further suppressed by dispersing fans to prevent concentrations. The sound was little more than the *whoosh* one would expect from a rocket propelled grenade, since they were expelled from firing tubes by high pressure CO₂ cartridges. Expecting no opposition, the rockets were set for sub-sonic mode, to further minimize their heat signatures.

Time to target at 300 mph was a full five minutes. That five minutes was a blessing, as it allowed



This drawing shows how mini-UAVs might operate in advance of an attacking ground force to provide last-minute reconnaissance of a target area.

time for reloading. Half the crews reloaded with BAT to finish the anti-armor fight that might be coming, while the rest remained temporarily uncommitted to await the results of the first strike and allow the commander room for decision. Meanwhile they repaired their launchers (they



One concept for a multi-purpose UAV that could be manufactured in a range of sizes.

were always damaged to some degree by launch), checked new rocket motors, took out warheads and guidance systems and waited.

The missiles moved toward their targets, sensors sending out pulses, searching for enemy anti-missiles or anti-air artillery. Automatically measuring wind, humidity, temperature, constantly checking internal systems against data provided by navigational satellites, the missiles moved themselves along their programmed routes. In terminal mode, the multi-spectral sensors scanned and located their targets, whose positions were then double checked against the data base. Finally, in the distance, the sounds of impact became clearly audible.

UAVs began turning cameras and sensors on the impact sites and downloading what they recorded to the data team and commander. Computers screened the data, designating tanks unhit, damaged, or destroyed. The UAVs functioned well, so no request for satellite reconnaissance was necessary. Analysis of the bunker strike showed the command bunker had been penetrated, while the weapons bunker had not.

All C-1 facilities targeted had been destroyed. Whether any untargeted facilities existed would be discovered shortly.

The commander keyed his computer for orders about the second wave. Obviously, another strike on the weapons bunker was needed, and nerve gas would be deposited in the command bunker. About half the strikes were displayed as kills; another 20 percent had damage of an indeterminate amount; the rest were clean misses. Most of the tanks had been destroyed or damaged, which left the infantry fighting vehicles, totalling about 150. The nine launchers loaded with BAT could handle about 100 vehicles, so five more were ordered to supplement them.

The others were loaded with anti-personnel dispensers, in principle much like BAT, but used to spread individual submunitions. However, such anti-personnel submunitions would explode at a lower altitude, hurling tiny pellets at high velocity in all directions. The pellets contained a final explosive, triggered by the rapid deceleration caused by their hitting a human body. A single submunition could clear an area in size about three times as large as a football field. The entire load of 24 submunitions carried by a single rocket could devastate individuals, supplies and soft-sided vehicles throughout a divisional area. Multiple rockets would be overkill.

Should all go well with the second strike, the Korean armored brigade would no longer exist, and withdrawal could take place.

At this point, some random indirect fire began striking around the Japanese positions. The Japanese infantry were so widely dispersed, though, and so well protected against anything short of a direct high explosive hit, no damage was done except to

some electronic systems shaken by concussion. They were rapidly and automatically replaced by backups.

American Reaction

While the Japanese rockets were still in flight, a screen on board *Battlestar* flashed an alert. Infrared sensors aboard a low altitude satellite had detected the near simultaneous opening of doors on the nine assault craft. The satellite streamed the data back to *Battlestar*, where computers sifted it for interesting regularities and after processing and reprocessing it, reported to the commanding officer for the sector.

That officer assumed it must be some easily explained event — fishing boats coming ashore, or an exercise by the Koreans themselves. Nevertheless, he called up additional data, before and after the anomaly. Nothing was visible prior to the sighting, but careful computing revealed heat streaks passing out of the source and moving inland. The quality of the sighting was not great, but only one conclusion could be drawn: some kind of craft were located at that point, and men (judging from the temperature indicators) or animals had moved inland from them in some vague formation.

Had this occurred some place other than the southern Korean coast, the event would probably not have been noted or analyzed. For this to happen where it had, though, made it extremely interesting. The information was passed to the Commanding General Seventh Space Fleet, who had his flag aboard *Battlestar*. He immediately notified CINCSpace and CINCPAC of the event, and ordered his assets to begin full monitoring.

One UAV was in position to observe events immediately. Another was ordered to move and would be there in an hour. An electronic intelligence satellite was shifted with plasma thrusters so it would pass directly over the area in two minutes. Two low level satellites were maneuvered so they could loiter and pick up infra-red and electromagnetic data. It probably meant they would fall out of orbit, so a team aboard *Battlestar* prepared to launch two replacement units.

Data poured into *Battlestar's* computers, at first revealing nothing but chaos. Electronic intelligence, which should have been picking up routine emissions from an armored unit (radio, radar, etc.), received only the jumbled disorder from the Japanese electronic overlay. Radar interrogation of the terrain met the same electronic layer and bounced off randomly, without yielding insight. Ultraviolet picked up only a confused pattern. Infrared screening, scrambled by laser outputs, also came up with nothing.

At this point CINCPAC knew something was happening at *Yosu*, something involving the Korean armored brigade stationed there. The most reasonable surmise was that a Japanese unit had

come ashore, engaged the Koreans, and a battle was underway.

CINCPAC had to know more of what was going on. One way was to send in low level reconnaissance flights, but if this were actually a Japanese attack, their likelihood of returning was small. So, too, with an unmanned low-level drone.

What was incredible to him was that no form of data collection seemed to be working. Infrared, in particular, should yield something; it was receiving *nothing* that was unnerving. CINCPAC spoke to the *Battlestar* commander and urgently ordered him to re-analyze the infrared data.

Programmers on special computers using artificial intelligence expert systems rapidly generated equations for new ways of analyzing the data from a number of sources. The neural processing computer turned its full attention to the question. An unimaginably long time later by computer standards, some 12 minutes, a coherent picture emerged.

The computer and its programmers had analyzed the logic of the laser patterns, inferred underlying facts from wildly incomplete data, and generated an answer: the Korean armored brigade had ceased to exist. Intense heat emanated from many vehicles. The ammo bunker was ablaze. Someone might be alive in that mess, but there was nothing left resembling a combat unit. More importantly, there were still indications of some others, not Koreans, ranging around the area, their launchers still holding residual warmth.

CINCPAC alerted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who in turn alerted the Director of the National Security Council, who told the President. The Japanese had launched a raid against a Korean unit and destroyed it. They were now retreating to their boats. What did the President wish to have done?

Ideally, the Koreans would engage and destroy their attackers. Unfortunately, no other units were in place to do so (the Japanese had selected their target well). The President could not leave the aggression unpunished; the Japanese unit involved should be destroyed, and some additional act of retribution should be carried out as well.

The CJCS suggested the following course of action: 1) a missile attack on the retreating boats; 2) sinking of the mother ship; and 3) in retaliation, destruction of one of the Japanese infantry brigades stationed in Manchuria.

It was estimated the boats would be reloaded and submerged in about 20 minutes, and that once submerged, hitting them would become extremely difficult. Three cruise missiles powered by scramjets were standing by on hot alert in the Aleutians. Their distance to target was about 5,000 miles. Their speed would be about Mach 30, or just under 30,000 mph. Their time-to-target was 10 minutes.

The order was to launch at rough coordinates, with readjustment to be provided at midcourse via

satellite, and once again to the submunitions pods when they were calved.

Another two missiles were launched at the mother ship from a base in Washington state. These would take about 20 minutes to target, which was no problem, given the speeds with which they were dealing, since the mother ship was stationary.

Finally, with time to spare, but not much because an alert unit might intercept one or two, a spread of 12 missiles was ordered to hit a Japanese infantry brigade outside Linyang near the Yalu River. This launch was to be from California and would take about 25 minutes to target.

The Aleutian salvo was fired within two minutes. It took some five minutes to launch the anti-ship round, and an inexcusable 23 minutes to launch the anti-personnel spread. Japanese Space Command began picking up the launches a few seconds later, and downlinked to Tokyo command. Tokyo ordered notification of all units involved.

The ground attack force didn't have weapons capable of intercepting missiles travelling much over Mach 10. They relied on their AACs' air-defense system to provide that. The problem was that while they had the ability to engage missiles before they calved, afterward was a different story. They were close to the unit they were protecting, too close, so instead of three targets they had dozens. They fired but failed to destroy more than 60 percent, and the remaining 40 percent would be enough to do horrendous damage.

The Japanese command had noticed the increase in communications between Battlestar and CINCPAC minutes earlier. Their own space surveillance system had been on full alert, and now noted traffic between CINCPAC and Washington, CINCPAC and the Aleutians, and so on. They advised Tokyo to be prepared for retaliation. Tokyo notified the commander of the raiding force, but since his unit was only half reloaded, his only course was to hurry as best he could, trying to become invisible, while calling on his superiors to provide interdiction from corps, army and fleet assets.

When the launches from the Aleutians and Washington state struck, there were no surprises, but in the Aleutian-Korea strike, little assistance could be offered. The Commander of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (in overall charge of the commando raid) could only ask the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Space Defense Command to order his Home Space Fleet to launch missile interdiction assets.

As so frequently happens in situations of divided command, coordination between the two CINCs broke down, seconds were lost, and the window of opportunity disappeared. At least that was the official version. In fact, Tokyo was reluctant to act directly against American weapons,

even when they were crossing directly over Japanese territory or striking Japanese troops. Still believing a peaceful arrangement was possible with the US (and not believing their attack on Korea ought to become a serious obstacle to such an arrangement), Tokyo Command left its infantrymen to their own devices.

The three missiles from the Aleutians cut across Japan, calved their submunitions, queried Battlestar (which had been monitoring their progress), received final homing coordinates, checked with Navstar GPS, and dove toward their targets, finally locked on by optical scanners. Each warhead exploded and the entire attack force was devastated. The area munitions wrecked the AACs, which when visible were highly vulnerable. Many infantrymen, protected by their suits, survived, but were no longer functioning soldiers. A few minutes later, the mother ship waiting to the south exploded when two burrowing charges went down to the lowest deck of the ship and blew up, opening the hull and breaking the vessel in half. Its captain, having failed to set a watch, could not respond to Tokyo's warning in time. (Technology or not, the captain still made the ship.)

The Japanese were surprised when they detected the final launch toward Linyang only because it came so late in the game. Their computers rapidly analyzed the launch, and noting the northerly course, assumed it to be a feint, with the real target being Hokkaido. Not knowing the strike was actually a hurry up shot launched late, rather than a leisurely indirect shot, they alerted the Linyang anti-missile command and the Japanese infantry brigade's air defense unit. With between 12 and 15 minutes to impact, depending on the actual target, the Japanese were this time prepared for the worst and ready to respond.

The missile cluster didn't maneuver, but skimmed along the water at Mach 20 (an older, less expensive anti-personnel system — you can't move an entire infantry brigade out of the way very fast), their scramjets driving them through the ocean air, their superheated skins cooled by liquid mercury flowing along their outsides, their electronic systems protected by aerogel, their computers linked with Navstar, calculating their courses. The missiles were similar to the tactical launches of the Japanese, except for the much greater distance and much higher speed.

The movement was tracked by Japanese look-down satellites that monitored the tracks and downlinked the data to Hokkaido and to their space station. The Americans, throwing a dusty punch and hoping for surprise, had come in dumb and naked, without any anti-sensor preparation.

Hokkaido launched a set of UAVs from a scramjet that hurried into the projected path of the missiles. They hovered at about 50 feet above sea level. American sensors noted the UAVs suddenly

ahead when they were about two minutes from the target. The missiles were ordered to maneuver around them, but the UAVs released their tiny, high speed, kinetic energy pellets, which with stupid tenacity pursued the missiles and destroyed them, just as the sun rose.

So the night ended. The total: a brigade of tanks destroyed by a handful of infantrymen; the infantrymen and their ships destroyed a few minutes later by rockets launched from another continent; and a group of missiles never making it to their target because of a few minutes of delay and a handful of pebbles.

It had been a night when ancient truths about war died and new ones were born. The next day, 1 September, promised to be a day of even higher tension.

Conclusions

The real story in this piece of speculation concerns the manner in which the revolution in projectiles and intelligence will inaugurate a revolution in weapons platforms. Up to this point, heavy firepower has always required heavy platforms. Efficient fire control and target acquisition needed large platforms for maintaining and supporting those systems. The revolution in C³I and in projectiles offers the possibility of disaggregating those functions.

This has been a story in which the heirs to both the intercontinental missile and Roman Centurions have come to dominate the battlefield. For the former, speed has compressed time to such a point they have become an effective means of influencing battle even on the most tactical of levels. For the latter, the revolution in projectiles, in their accuracy and effectiveness, means that infantrymen can engage systems, such as tanks, against which they had been relatively helpless previously.

For both missiles and men, target acquisition and fire control depend on holding the high ground. In this new era the high ground is outer space.

This, then, is the ultimate argument of the article. No part of the operation described would have been possible without space assets. Their efficient utilization requires both humans and a large degree of centralization of data processing and decision making also be in space. Destroying the enemy's space assets, therefore, becomes the key to defeating both enemy missiles and infantrymen. Defending one's own assets in space becomes the key to continuing the battle.

The general principles of warfare will remain as valid in the next generation as they were for Gideon's army. Nevertheless, we are in the midst of an unprecedented revolution in warfare, one which is not merely an extension of what went before, but a radical break with the past. The future of war will rest on three pillars:

1. The ability of infantrymen to engage and destroy traditional weapons platforms, particularly tanks, while being extremely difficult to be destroyed themselves.

2. Quantum leaps in attainable speeds will result in a qualitative transformation of warfare. The ability of missiles to traverse intercontinental distances in minutes alleviates the need for bringing projectile launch platforms into close proximity of the battlefield. Neither do target acquisition or command and control have to be close.

3. C³I/RISTA functions will be located in space. The key, therefore, to victory will be the control of space, and warfare in space will become a reality. In turn, this will introduce a radical new geography to warfare, in which control of areas such as key geostationary points or orbital tracks will be the foundation for international political power.

In sum, our argument is this: if we are correct, then the continued production of traditional weapons platforms is about as rational as commissioning cavalry officers was in 1905. It had a use, but was mostly a dangerous diversion of resources. Of course, we may be wrong. But in either case, a serious national debate should begin on this issue, and it must not be left to any one segment of our country, including the military. ☐

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5. Short Rounds
 6. Antietam
 7. Commentary
 8. A New Kind of War
 9. Yugoslavia in WWII
 10. The Russian Rifle Corps
 11. Normandy
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Situation 0600 7 June 1944
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1 11 6 17 28

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